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 RIDING INTO THE SUNSET IN A “POST-RACIAL” WORLD: 
LESSONS IN EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY AND  
COLLEGE ADMISSIONS SCHEMES IN FRANCE AND THE 
UNITED STATES 
by KRISTEN BARNES* 
 
“[If affirmative action] conflicts with idealistic equality, that tension 
is original Fourteenth Amendment tension, constitutionally 
conceived and constitutionally imposed, and it is part of the 
Amendment’s very nature until complete equality is achieved in the 
area.”1 
-Justice Blackmun 
 
“The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop 
discriminating on the basis of race.”2 
-Justice Roberts 
 
“We must invent methods that are faithful to and conform with our 
traditions, without categorizing individuals by race, ethnicity, 
religion. . . . It’s quite complex.”3 
-Eric Besson, French Immigration Minister 
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 1. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 405 (1978) (Blackmun, J., separate opinion). 
 2. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007) (plurality 
opinion). 
 3. Cécilia Gabizon, Yazid Sabeg veut plus d'élus issus de la diversité; ÉGALITÉ En pleine 
obamania, le commissaire à la diversité veut prendre des photos pour mesurer la progression des 
minorités visibles. Une idée qui ne séduit guère Éric Besson, nouveau ministre de l'Immigration, LE 
FIGARO (Fr.), Jan. 21, 2009, at 11 (trans. Kristen Barnes). 
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INTRODUCTION 
Even in a “post-racial” world, race matters, especially when it comes to 
educational opportunity. French and American constitutional structures abhor and 
deny this reality, even though divisions along ethno-racial lines are apparent. A 
method of addressing the divisions in educational opportunity without running 
afoul of constitutional proscriptions is to use proxy strategies.4 As unlikely as it 
seems, an elite French university and the State of Texas have adopted measures that 
have remarkable similarities. Though they accomplish certain goals, neither 
program will be successful in addressing racial imbalances without directly 
addressing race. 
France and the United States provide interesting cases of comparison for 
several reasons. First, both nations have substantial ethno-racial minority 
populations that challenge majoritarian notions of national identity, equality and 
access.5 How the minority populations within these exceptional nations fare in 
relation to the majority population matters and has an impact that transcends 
 4. See Daniel Sabbagh, Affirmative Action in the United States and France: The Case of Higher 
Education, Remarks given at the 4th Annual Conference on Economic Growth and Development 7 (Dec. 
18, 2008), http://www.isid.ac.in/~pu/conference/dec_08_conf/PanelDiscussion.html (click “Affirmative 
Action in the United States and France: The Cost of Higher Education” hyperlink to download the file) 
[hereinafter Sabbagh, Affirmative Action in the United States and France] (defining the term 
“substitution strategy” as a “strategy by which what looks like a secondary effect of a facially neutral 
distributive rule is in fact the reason why that rule has been enacted, in a context where pursuing the 
decision-maker’s true objective in a more straightforward manner . . . without using the neutral rule as a 
proxy, would be considered illegitimate”). 
 5. See generally George M. Fredrickson, Race, Ethnicity, and National Identity in France and the 
United States: A Comparative Historical Overview, Paper given at the Fifth Annual Gilder Lehrman 
Center International Conference at Yale University, Collective Degradation: Slavery and the 
Construction of Race 11-24 (November 7-8, 2003), www.yale.edu/glc/events/race/Fredrickson.pdf 
(discussing the types of ethno-racial minorities in both the United States and France and comparing and 
contrasting the evolution of each country’s respective public policies and attitudes affecting these ethno-
racial minorities). 
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national borders.6 Second, both France and the United States, historically, have 
imported people of color to address their labor needs.7 Third, in terms of identity, 
both nations have represented themselves as white.8 Fourth, the United States and 
France have touted themselves as uniquely exceptional nations serving as stellar 
examples of civilization and democracy.9 Fifth, there appears to be a convergence 
between the trend in United States equality education jurisprudence, which 
advocates a move toward so-called “race-neutral” alternatives,10 and the interest of 
 6. Newspapers worldwide gave attention to the election of Barack Obama as President. In France, 
Germany, and other countries one question that was loudly voiced is, “Where is our Obama?” See Luc 
Bronner, Où est l'Obama français ? : L’ascension, loin de la politique [Where is the French Obama? 
Progress, Far from Politics], LE MONDE (Fr.), Oct. 29, 2008, http://www.lemonde.fr/elections-
americaines/article/2008/10/29/l-ascension-loin-de-la-politique_1112400_829254.html, (explaining that 
almost no minority role models exist in the political realm in France, but that French minorities instead 
look to the private sector for examples of professional success); Max Colchester, France Rethinks 
Relations with Minorities, WALL ST. J., Nov. 6, 2008, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122591006614902049.html (“A sense of envy at America’s electoral 
feat is being felt across Europe, where no nation has elevated a racial minority to its highest office.”); 
Letters to the Editor, How Will Obama Govern?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/10/news/10iht-edlet.1.17688801.html (describing the reactions of 
citizens in other countries after the election of president Obama, and how several Canadian citizens have 
asked news outlets “where is our Obama”); Andries Louw, South Africa’s Leadership Crisis, 
NEXTCHURCH (Nov. 7, 2008), http://nextchurch.wordpress.com/2008/11/07/south-africas-leadership-
crisis/ (discussing an article in South Africa’s Daily Sun entitled “Where is Our Obama”, which 
describes South Africa’s belief that they need a leader similar to Obama); see also Karine Lambin, 80% 
des Français prêt à voter pour un Noir? [80% of the French are Ready to Vote for A Black Man?], LE 
MONDE (Fr.), Nov. 3, 2008, http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2008/11/03/80-des-francais-prets-a-
voter-pour-un-noir_1114239_3224.html (explaining that, in a survey of French citizens, 80% of 
respondents said they would be willing to vote for a black candidate for president, while only 47% of 
respondents actually believed a black candidate could be elected in France); Nicolas Sarkozy Veut 
Avancer Sur la Discrimination Positive [Nicolas Sarkozy Wants to Move Forward with Affirmative 
Action], LE MONDE (Fr.), Dec. 17, 2008, http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2008/12/17/nicolas-
sarkozy-veut-avancer-sur-la-discrimination-positive_1132028_3224.html [hereinafter Sarkozy Veut 
Avancer] (discussing how French president Nicolas Sarkozy reopened the issue of affirmative action in 
France as a result of Obama’s election). 
 7. See Fredrickson, supra note 5, at 2, 12 (noting that both France and the United States engaged in 
the slave trade and the use of slave labor and that “both the United States and France were immigrant-
receiving societies that required massive importation of foreign labor to industrialize themselves in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries”). 
 8. See Saran Donahoo, Reflections on Race: Affirmative Action Policies Influencing Higher 
Education in France and the United States, 110 TCHRS. C. REC. 251, 271 (2008) (“In France, immigrant 
status and heritage consistently establish non-Whites as non-French. Although many people of color in 
the United States have been in the country long enough to discard or simply outgrow their immigrant 
identities, the physical and cultural markers of race afford them only second-class citizenship status.”). 
 9. See ALICE L. CONKLIN, A MISSION TO CIVILIZE: THE REPUBLICAN IDEA OF EMPIRE IN FRANCE 
AND WEST AFRICA 1895-1830 11-37 (1997) (discussing French ideological views on democracy and its 
civilizing mission). See generally UNDERSTANDING AMERICA: THE ANATOMY OF AN EXCEPTIONAL 
NATION (Peter H. Schuck & James Q. Wilson eds., 2008) (relating perspectives on American 
exceptionalism from different scholars). 
 10. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 342-43 (2003) (holding that institutions of higher 
education should periodically review their admissions policies to determine whether or not racial 
preferences are still necessary to achieve diversity, and that in twenty-five years “the use of racial 
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the French government in identifying equality strategies that will help them 
improve the dire socio-economic condition of certain ethno-racial minorities (for 
example, individuals of African heritage) without specifically referencing ethnicity 
or race in the language of the policies.11 Sixth, the timing of France’s move to 
implement affirmative action policies, which comes nearly fifty years after the 
United States’ move, provides an interesting contrast. France is just beginning the 
process of formulating programs that are intended to ensure that its multi-ethnic 
population, with emphasis on its marginalized population of African descent, is 
fully incorporated into the fabric of the country.12 For France this issue is a 
relatively new one from the standpoint of the nation’s political and legal discourse. 
For the United States, the question of the full inclusion of minorities has a long 
history. Seventh, because both nations concentrate on education as a means to 
change the status quo of the substantial divide between the haves and the have-
nots,13 it makes sense to examine the strategies adopted by both to effect change 
and the legal environments that shape these efforts. Eighth, there are lessons that 
each republic can learn from the other. Placing France and the United States side by 
side in the mode of grappling with the common issue of how to achieve equality of 
educational opportunity should allow for some useful insights that can positively 
inform the educational policies of both nations for the future. 
Academic institutions and governments in both countries have recognized that 
preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved today.”); Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. 
at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 221-22 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 1536 (argued Oct. 10, 2012) 
(No. 11-345) (“Grutter requires that any race-conscious measures must have a ‘logical end point’ and be 
‘limited in time.’ This durational requirement can be satisfied by sunset provisions or by periodic 
reviews to reconsider whether there are feasible race-neutral alternatives that would achieve diversity 
interests ‘about as well.’ In this respect, Grutter is best seen not as an unqualified endorsement of racial 
preferences, but as a transient response to anemic academic diversity.”). 
 11. See, e.g., Sabbagh, Affirmative Action in the United States and France, supra note 4, at 7 
(explaining that although the “color-blind” admission policies of the elite French university, Sciences 
Po, “officially embodies an area-based and class-based approach of affirmative action, [it] may also be 
understood as indirectly and implicitly targeting groups that . . . would be considered as ‘ethnic’ or 
‘racial’ minorities, in particular the group of second-generation North African immigrants”). 
 12. See generally Alec G. Hargreaves, Half-Measures: Anti-Discrimination Policy in France, in 
RACE IN FRANCE: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 227 (Herrick 
Chapman & Laura L. Frader eds., 2004) [hereinafter Hargreaves, Half-Measures] (examining the policy 
goals of France’s integration policies to combat racial discrimination and calling into question the 
effectiveness of these measures); ALEC G. HARGREAVES, MULTI-ETHNIC FRANCE: IMMIGRATION, 
POLITICS, CULTURE AND SOCIETY 196 (2d ed. 2007) [hereinafter HARGREAVES, MULTI-ETHNIC 
FRANCE] (discussing the French policy of “Positive Discrimination” in education and housing as it 
applies to racial and ethnic minorities). 
 13. See, e.g., Steven Erlanger, Top French Schools, Asked to Diversify, Fear for Standards, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 1, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/01/world/europe/01ecoles.html (discussing the 
consequences of France’s “Charter of Equal Opportunity” which asks its elite universities to “set a goal 
of increasing the percentage of scholarship students to 30 percent” to help “smart children of the poor 
overcome . . . huge cultural disadvantages”). See generally Lynn W. Huntley, Foreword to EBONI M. 
ZAMANI-GALLAHER ET AL., THE CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION ON CAMPUS xi, xiii (2009) 
(discussing the purpose of affirmative action programs in education as a “means to gain resources, 
power, and influence”). 
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education plays a substantial role for individuals in obtaining employment and 
being able to pursue a meaningful career. The current rhetoric emanating from 
France14 and the United States15 suggests that equal educational opportunity is an 
important goal. American and French institutions of higher learning often advance 
moral arguments asserting that it is the responsibility of schools to be open to all 
members of its society and to cultivate racial and ethnic diversity within this realm. 
Former United States Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s words are 
exemplary of this sentiment: “[Access to a college or university] must be inclusive 
of talented and qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity, so that all 
members of our heterogeneous society may participate in the educational 
institutions that provide the training and education necessary to succeed in 
America.”16 
Sounding in a similar register, former French Education Minister Jack Lang 
has spoken favorably of the Priority Education Agreements, or CEP, program17 at 
the Institut d’études politiques de Paris’ (“Sciences Po”),18 noting that the CEP 
program addresses “the need for a democratic country to diversify the social origin 
of its elites.”19 Comments made by Richard Descoings, former Director of Sciences 
 14. See, e.g., John Thornhill, Ministerial Rivalry Clouded Early Response to French Riots, FIN. 
TIMES, Nov. 8, 2005, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3a26ea32-4ffc-11da-8b72-
0000779e2340.html#axzz298uArI00 (recounting the message then French President Jacques Chirac had 
for protesters in the wake of the civil unrest in October 2005) (“Those who want to sow violence or fear 
will be caught, tried, and punished . . . . But we also understand very well that we must move towards 
respect for each individual, justice and equality of opportunity. We are all completely determined to go 
down this road and pursue the efforts that are already underway in this domain.” (emphasis added)). 
France also created the post of Minister for Equal Opportunity, to which the writer Azouz Begag was 
appointed. See Mélina Gazsi, Azouz Begag: An Exemplary Path, FRANCE IN THE U.K.: FRENCH 
EMBASSY, http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/Integration-Azouz-Begag-an.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2012) 
(describing Azouz Begag’s rise from a low income minority family, and his current goal of equalizing 
opportunities for people of all races in France). 
 15.  See, e.g., Huntley, supra note 13, at xi (“It is the institutional arrangements, policies, and 
practices based upon race, gender, and other characteristics that still operate as built-in headwinds, 
blocking the success and upward mobility of people stuck at the bottom. It is the nation’s massive failure 
to provide low-income people and members of minority groups with equal and fair access to quality 
education. Formal equal opportunity can do little good if people lack equal access to educational 
opportunities that would allow them to take advantage of this policy.”). 
 16. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 332-33. 
 17. This program is known in French as the Conventions Education Prioritaire program. Brochure, 
Sciences Po, Objective: Equal Opportunity—The Priority Education Agreements 1 (2011), 
http://www.sciencespo.fr/sites/default/files/Equal%20Opportunity%20and%20Diversity%20Program%2
02011.pdf [hereinafter Priority Education Agreements Brochure]. 
 18. The English translation of the school’s name is The Institute of Political Studies of Paris, 
commonly referred to in French and English as “Sciences Po.” See generally SCIENCES PO, 
http://www.sciencespo.fr/en (last visited Nov. 4, 2012) (English version of Sciences Po website). 
 19. John Vinocur, Affirmative Action Recruiting for Top Schools Startles French Elite, INT’L 
HERALD TRIB., Mar. 31, 2001, at 4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/03/31/news/31iht-
france_ed3__2.html (citation omitted); see also Erlanger, supra note 13 (explaining that the result of the 
admissions system before the Priority Education Agreements was a “self-perpetuating elite of the 
wealthy and white, who provide their own children the social skills, financial support and cultural 
knowledge to pass the entrance exams”). 
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Po, often emphasize the “social responsibility” of France’s elite universities to 
address socio-economic disparities.20 Descoings explains: 
 
[I]n France, it is by gaining admission into one of these few top 
schools (the major engineering and business schools, along with the 
École normale supérieure and Sciences Po) that you eventually get 
to the most elite positions, not only in the business world, but also in 
public administration, the media, and the cultural sphere . . . . those 
people who have not gone through one of these schools will have a 
very hard time pushing through the glass ceiling found in [those 
sectors].21 
 
The foregoing statements suggest that, as a matter of fundamental fairness, it 
is the responsibility of society to ensure that substantial and meaningful 
opportunities for quality education are presented to a broad swath of people and 
where those opportunities appear to be lacking (for example, for certain ethno-
racial minorities and lower-income individuals), active steps must be taken to 
address the inequities. 
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate and compare two strategies designed 
to promote ethno-racial22 inclusion that were initiated in France and the United 
States in the context of higher education.23 In particular, I examine the Priority 
Education Agreements Program or CEP, an innovative affirmative action program 
which was implemented in 2001 by the Sciences Po, one of France’s elite 
 20. See Suzanne Daley, Elite French College Tackles Affirmative Action, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2001, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/05/04/world/elite-french-college-tackles-affirmative-action.html (“The 
director of Sciences Po, Richard Descoings, said it was obvious to him that coming up with a way of 
diversifying the student body had to be a priority. ‘Here at Sciences Po is where we form our elite for 
both business and government,’ he said. 'When you have that responsibility, it is impossible not to ask 
yourself who is coming here. We thought about our social responsibility and we decided we had to do 
something.’”). 
 21. Interview by Daniel Sabbagh with Richard Descoings, Dir. of Sciences Po, FRENCH-AM. 
FOUND., 1, (Feb. 2, 2010), 
http://equality.frenchamerican.org/sites/default/files/descoingstranscript_en.pdf [hereinafter Interview 
with Richard Descoings]. 
 22. Even though, in the context of this article, I extensively use the terms “race” and “ethnicity” to 
apply to groups that are not Caucasian, I recognize that “race” applies to Caucasian people and that a 
variety of different ethnic groups may be categorized as “white.” I find the definition of “ethnic group” 
offered by legal scholars Juan Perea, Richard Delgado, Angela Harris, Jean Stefancic, and Stephanie 
Wildman useful. These authors define “ethnic group” as “a group of people larger than an extended 
family whose boundaries are marked by a social practice or experience perceived as distinct: a history or 
a religion; customs or traditions; a language or alphabet; perhaps even a geography.” JUAN F. PEREA, ET 
AL., RACE AND RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A DIVERSE AMERICA 5 (2000). 
 23. In this article, I do not focus on integration and diversity schemes at the elementary and high 
school levels. That topic will be the subject of a future law review article. Even though the Texas Top 
Ten Percent plan looks to the performance results of high school students, my discussion is concerned 
with the implementation of the program at the college and university level and its effectiveness in that 
realm given the goals stated. 
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universities,24 in relation to the Texas Ten Percent Plan that was established in 1997 
in the United States by the State of Texas.25 
Sections I and II of this paper will provide the historical and social contexts in 
which the proxy strategies created by Sciences Po and the State of Texas emerged. 
I then develop the fundamental points of my argument which are that: (1) race and 
ethnicity still “matter”26 and will need to be considered in the administration of 
college and graduate admissions programs despite the declaration, which I dispute, 
that American society has entered a post-racial era and France’s continued 
celebration of its egalitarian principles at the expense of the attainment of 
substantive equality; (2) to the extent that laws permit the consideration of ethnicity 
and race in the United States, they should be retained for as long as necessary to 
accomplish equal education opportunities and meaningful access to higher 
education; (3) where laws permitting an express consideration of ethno-racial 
factors do not exist, as is the case in France, the issue of amending the relevant 
laws should be revisited to allow for an express consideration of these 
classifications to facilitate the creation of effective affirmative action approaches; 
(4) proxy strategies are to be encouraged because they are effective, to some 
degree, in achieving diversity and improving access to higher education for 
underrepresented ethnic and racial minority groups, and because they are politically 
palatable and legally viable for accomplishing the stated goals in the United States 
and France; and (5) while creative approaches such as proxies should be pursued, it 
is important to build some flexibility into the strategies and not to over rely on them 
particularly if it becomes apparent that they are not functioning to allow for the 
admission of a “critical mass”27 of underrepresented ethno-racial minorities to 
higher education institutions. 
In connection with my analysis of how the Sciences Po and Texas have 
navigated certain constitutional issues with respect to the implementation and 
maintenance of the specific admission schemes I examine, I rely upon select laws 
and legal cases for each country. In addressing the French constitutional issues, in 
Section III I examine one of the decisions rendered by France’s high legal advisory 
 24. See Donahoo, supra note 8, at 262-63 (defining the CEP program and describing generally its 
purpose and implementation). 
 25. See MARTA TIENDA, ET AL., CLOSING THE GAP?: ADMISSIONS & ENROLLMENTS AT THE TEXAS 
PUBLIC FLAGSHIPS BEFORE AND AFTER AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 2 (2003), available at 
http://theop.princeton.edu/reports/briefs/wws_brief_closinggap.pdf (“[T]he . . . Texas legislature passed 
H.B. 588, which guarantees admission to any Texas public college or university for all seniors 
graduating in the top 10 percent of their class.”). 
 26. I am using the term “matter” in the sense that race and ethnicity still figure prominently in the 
treatment of individuals and in the distribution of social goods in American and French society. The 
ethno-racial discrimination that has historically played a role in both countries continues to substantially 
impact the economic and social progress of certain sectors of the French and U.S. populations. 
 27. Rather than offering some quantifiable number to define “critical mass,” I defer to a definition 
given by Erica Munzel, Director of Admissions at the University of Michigan Law School, in 
connection with Grutter, 539 U.S. at 318. According to Munzel, “critical mass” does not correspond to 
any particular number but rather refers to a “meaningful representation” of a group that “encourages 
underrepresented minority students to participate in the classroom and not feel isolated.” Id. 
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council, the Conseil constitutionnel,28 the Preamble and Article 1 of the 1958 
Constitution of the French Fifth Republic,29 the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of 
Man,30 and the Preamble to the 1946 French Constitution of the Fourth Republic.31 
In Sections II and IV, I primarily focus upon the United States and the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution,32 Section 
601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,33 Section 1981(a) of 42 U.S.C. 
1981,34 and the cases Brown v. Board of Education,35 Regents of the University of 
California v. Bakke,36 Grutter v. Bollinger,37 Gratz v. Bollinger,38 Fisher v. 
University of Texas at Austin,39 and Hopwood v. Texas40 for my analysis.41 
After examining the American and French strategies of ethno-racial inclusion 
in terms of their historical, social, political, and legal contexts, in Sections V and 
VI, I offer some thoughts on how the two programs compare overall, the positives 
and shortcomings of each, and the lessons that Sciences Po’s plan has for the 
United States and Texas’ plan has for France. I conclude, in Section VII, that while 
proxy strategies can be useful from the perspective of the goals of ethno-racial 
diversity and of improving access to equal educational opportunities for minorities, 
they alone are likely to prove insufficient to fully meet these goals because of the 
particular histories of the two countries, persistent socio-economic barriers and 
disparities, and the state of ethno-racial relations in each. Further, I maintain that in 
order for academic institutions to be successful in their endeavors to be inclusive 
and serve historically underrepresented minorities and increasingly varied multi-
racial and ethnic populations, along with majority populations: (1) ethnicity and 
 28.  Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2001-450DC, July 11, 2001, 
Rec. 82 (Fr.), translated in MARTIN A. ROGOFF, FRENCH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 335-36 (2011) [hereinafter Constitutional Court decision No. 2001-450DC]. 
 29. 1958 CONST. art. 1, pmbl. (Fr.), available at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-
constitutionnel/root/bank_mm/anglais/constitution_anglais.pdf. 
 30.  THE DECLARATION OF HUMAN AND CIVIC RIGHTS OF 26 AUGUST 1789 (Fr.), available at 
http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/root/bank_mm/anglais/cst2.pdf [hereinafter 
DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN OF 26 AUGUST 1789 (Fr.)]. 
 31.  1946 CONST. pmbl. (Fr.), available at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-
constitutionnel/root/bank_mm/anglais/cst3.pdf. 
 32. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 33. The Civil Rights Act 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-2000d-7 (2006). 
 34. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2006). 
 35. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 36. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 37. 539 U.S. 306. 
 38. 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
 39. 631 F.3d 213. 
 40. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996), abrogated by Grutter, 539 U.S. 306. 
 41. Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 is also part of the corpus 
of equality of education jurisprudence.  In Parents Involved, Chief Justice Roberts drew a sharp 
distinction between the policy in Grutter, which upheld the use of ethno-racial factors in post-secondary 
admissions decisions, and the use of such criteria by primary and high schools. 551 U.S 701, 725 (2007) 
(plurality opinion). Since this decision concerns race-conscious plans implemented at the elementary 
and secondary school levels and was not used as a reference point for reworking the admissions 
procedures I discuss in this article, I have opted not to include it in my analysis. 
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race will need to be taken into account and laws must be maintained or fashioned to 
address this necessity; and (2) the architects and proponents of proxy strategies 
must adhere to transparency in the outcomes so that, if the intended goals are not 
being attained, there is a credible basis for making adjustments to the schemes, as 
necessary. 
I.  THE INESCAPABLE PAST AND ITS INFLUENCE ON AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
POLICIES: THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW APPROACH TO ETHNO-RACIAL INCLUSION 
History largely explains why certain ethno-racial minority groups are 
identified as the focus of admissions policies designed to increase their 
representative numbers in French and American schools.42 For France, the colonial 
history in Africa and treatment of African immigrants once they arrived in the 
metropole must be remembered. For the Unites States, the history of African 
Americans, Latinos, and Native Americans, Jim Crow laws, years of de jure 
segregation, and ongoing de facto segregation must be kept in mind when 
formulating and evaluating student admission policies in higher education. 
France, in 2001, and the United States, beginning in the 1950s, implemented 
educational programs and policies aimed at addressing inequalities in educational 
opportunities in their respective countries. This section and Section II, respectively, 
are intended to shed light on the controversial decisions to structure Sciences Po’s 
CEP program and the Texas Ten Percent Plan in the manner in which they are 
designed. 
A.  France is Burning: France’s Colonial and Immigration History 
The current state of France, with its frequent eruptions of civil protests in 
Clichy-sous-Bois, Stains, Grigny, and other Parisian suburbs giving voice to the 
outcries regarding the lack of opportunities in education and employment for the 
French African population,43 is deeply rooted in France’s colonial history and its 
troubled twentieth century immigration policies. Even though it is generally not 
acknowledged in mainstream French discourse, the act of distinguishing between 
 42. While a historical perspective is relevant, it does not provide the only rationale for using 
strategies designed to increase minority representation and opportunities for underrepresented minorities 
at elite academic institutions. There are overall benefits that society can reap, as observed in Grutter, 
from ensuring that diverse student bodies are achieved at universities and colleges. 539 U.S. at 329. 
Nonetheless, history offers some clues to explain why certain ethnic and racial minorities are 
underrepresented and, therefore, are the target of a university’s race-proxy or race-conscious admissions 
policies. Adopting these approaches can be viewed as equalizing measures. From a historical 
perspective, in general, Caucasians had opportunities to attend schools that were not available to 
minorities falling within the underrepresented groups. So, a policy fashioned to change the pattern and 
impact of historical practices is needed. 
 43. See, e.g., Mark Landler & Craig S. Smith, French Officials Try to Ease Fear as Crisis Swells, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/08/international/europe/08france.html 
(discussing civil protests in 2005 in which youths burned and destroyed property, confronted police, and 
caused disruption primarily in the areas in which they live). 
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people on the basis of ethno-racial differences has played a significant role in the 
historical formation of France, first as an empire, and later as a leading nation-state 
within Europe.44 While French law, beginning with the Constitution of 1946 
purports to ensure human rights and equality for all French citizens,45 France’s 
historical relationship with non-white populations – in the Caribbean,46 Africa, and 
Southeast Asia – along with ethno-racial tensions that were enflamed during the 
struggles for independence,47, and the antisemitic Vichy period,48 suggest that 
strong cultural ideas about ethno-racial differences are embedded in the 
consciousness of the contemporary French nation regardless of whether these ideas 
are apparent when examining the country’s formal laws.49 
The 1950s, the period immediately preceding the end to France’s colonial 
reign in Southeast Asia and Africa, were marked by a substantial influx of 
immigrants into France primarily from the Maghreb50 and West Africa (for 
 44. Guillaume Aubert, “The Blood of France”: Race and Purity of Blood in the French Atlantic 
World, 61 WM. & MARY Q. 439, 443 (2004) (“The idea that natural qualities were transmitted through 
blood from one generation to the next . . . rapidly became an essential feature of the early modern 
French ethos . . . . [I]nfluential French authors [of this time] repeatedly insisted on the inherent 
inequality of mankind.”). 
 45. See, e.g., 1946 CONST. § 1 (Fr.) (creating the foundation for French equality by stating that 
“each human being, without distinction of race, religion or creed, possesses sacred and inalienable 
rights” (emphasis added)); JOHN BELL, FRENCH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 199-206 (1992) [hereinafter 
BELL, FRENCH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW] (explaining that equality became the most important issue for 
French law after the revolution in 1789, and describing the constitutional, statutory, and court-made 
laws which enabled France to move forward into equality after its racially divided past). 
 46. See WILLIAM B. COHEN, THE FRENCH ENCOUNTER WITH AFRICANS: WHITE RESPONSE TO 
BLACKS, 1530-1880, at 35-39, 130-54 (1980) (recounting how France instituted colonies in Martinique, 
Haiti, and Guadeloupe in the 1600s that were supported by slave labor). 
 47. MARTIN SHIPWAY, THE ROAD TO WAR: FRANCE AND VIETNAM 1944-1947 276-78 (Jolyon 
Howorth ed., 1996) (describing France’s eight year war with Vietnam). 
 48. MICHAEL R. MARRUS & ROBERT O. PAXTON, VICHY FRANCE AND THE JEWS 181-91 (1981) 
(discussing how anti-semitism reached its peak in France from 1941 to 1942). 
 49. Numerous French scholars have commented on ethnic and race-based prejudice experienced by 
peoples of African heritage in France and during the colonial period. See, e.g., Thomas Deltombe & 
Mathieu Rigouste, L’Ennemi Intérieur: La Construction Médiatique de la Figure de l’ “Arabe”, in LA 
FRACTURE COLONIALE: LA SOCIÉTÉ FRANÇAISE AU PRISME DE L’HÉRITAGE COLONIAL 191, 191-98 
(Pascal Blanchard et al. eds., 2005) (Fr.) (describing the media’s role in perpetuating the French view of 
“Arabs” as immigrants and outsiders); COHEN, supra note 46, at 283-93 (describing ideas of race 
inferiority developed during France’s colonial history and how they remain present in modern French 
society); TAHAR BEN JELLOUN, FRENCH HOSPITALITY: RACISM AND NORTH AFRICAN IMMIGRANTS 47-
51 (Barbara Bray trans., 1999) (noting numerous murders of African Immigrants in France in the year 
1982-83); PATRICK MANNING, FRANCOPHONE SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 1880-1995 26-29 (2d. ed. 1998) 
(describing the institution of slavery in French colonies in Africa); Interview by Daniel Sabbagh with 
Louis-Georges Tin, Vice President, Conseil Représentatif des Associations Noires (CRAN), FRENCH-
AM. FOUND. (Jan. 27, 2010), http://equality.frenchamerican.org/sites/default/files/tintranscript_en.pdf 
(“Blacks in France are the victims of discrimination—that is a fact. We aren’t discriminated against 
because we embody one aspect of ‘diversity;’ we are discriminated against because we are black, and 
perceived as such. In order to tackle racial discrimination, we first need to use the appropriate 
language.”). 
 50. HARGREAVES, MULTI-ETHNIC FRANCE, supra note 12, at 20 (defining the Maghreb as “the 
western part of North Africa, consisting of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia” and identifying this region as 
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example, Senegal and Mali), and to a lesser extent from Vietnam.51 Initially, France 
encouraged immigration from these areas because of the nation’s shortage of 
crucially needed laborers to work in its factories.52 Males from these regions were 
heavily recruited.53 Over time, with pressure from the workers and other advocates 
of immigrants’ rights, African workers were able to bring their families to join 
them in France.54 Despite the initial welcoming gestures, France had no intention of 
making these individuals permanent residents of France. As the need for immigrant 
labor decreased, the French government devised policies in the 1970s and into the 
1980s regarding African immigrants intended to motivate African workers and 
their families to return to their originating countries.55 Rather than return to their 
countries of origin, however, many African immigrants became more entrenched in 
French culture, in part due to their children who were born on French soil and who 
eventually matriculated into the French school system.56 This community of 
African immigrants and their children tended to settle in regions situated in the 
the source of the fastest growing group of immigrants to France in the period 1946-82). 
 51. Id. (identifying Southeast Asians, Turks, and Africans from former French colonies in West and 
Central Africa as major immigrant groups into France beginning in the mid-1970s). 
 52. See Marie-Eve Blanc, Vietnamese in France, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DIASPORAS: IMMIGRANT 
AND REFUGEE CULTURES AROUND THE WORLD, 1158, 1159-60 (Melvin Ember et al. eds., 2005) 
[hereinafter Blanc, Vietnamese in France] (noting that migration to France occurred in six waves). “The 
first wave corresponds to the recruitment of soldiers-workers during Word War I. The French Ministry 
of War decided to transplant [immigrants] . . . and employ them in factories and the war industry to 
replace workers mobilized for combat.” Id. at 1159. See also James F. Hollifield, Immigration Policy in 
France and Germany: Outputs versus Outcomes, 485 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 113, 116 
(1986) (“[T]he rationale for recruiting immigrant workers after 1945 was not only to provide additional 
manpower for economic reconstruction and expansion, but also to give a needed boost to the 
population.”). 
 53. See Blanc, Vietnamese in France, supra note 52, at 1160 (“The second wave [of immigration] 
occurred during the 1920s and 1930s. . . . This volunteer . . . migration was constituted mostly of 
men.”); James R. McDonald, Labor Immigration in France, 1946-1965, 59 ANNALS ASS’N AM. 
GEOGRAPHERS 116, 125 (1969) (“[A] poor harvest in Algeria or a slight expansion of employment 
opportunities in France has been sufficient to provoke a wave of labor migration. . . . [T]hese [Algerian] 
entrants are mainly coming only on speculation that jobs will be found . . . there are no . . . job contracts 
to provide guaranteed employment for a [sic] least a certain percentage of them, and . . . family 
immigration is slight . . . .”). 
 54. See Hargreaves, MULTI-ETHNIC FRANCE, supra note 12, at 23-24 (providing data showing 
females as an increased presence in various immigrant groups in France in the period 1946-99). 
 55. E.g., Hargreaves, Half-Measures, supra note 12, at 228 (“The presidency of Giscard d’Estaing 
was marked from its inception in 1974 to its last gasp in 1981 by a series of initiatives designed to halt 
and if possible reverse inward flows of migrants. . . . [T]he administration focused its efforts on . . . 
immigrants . . . originating in France’s North African colonies.”); PATRICK WEIL, LA FRANCE ET SES 
ÉTRANGERS: L’AVENTURE D’UNE POLITQUE DE L’IMMIGRATION 1938-1991, at 107-38 (1991) (Fr.) 
(explaining France’s reverse immigration policies in the 1970s, including one introduced before 
Parliament in 1977 by Prime Minister Raymond Barre in which the government would give unemployed 
immigrants 10,000 francs if they returned to their country of origin). 
 56. See Interview by Daniel Sabbagh with Dominique Sopo, President, SOS Racisme, FRENCH-AM. 
FOUND., 5 (Jan. 28, 2010), http://equality.frenchamerican.org/sites/default/files/sopotranscript_en.pdf 
[hereinafter Interview with Dominique Sopo] (“[A]round the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 
1980s, those immigrants [from North and Sub-Saharan Africa] began realizing that, because of their 
children, they were likely going to remain in France.”). 
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Parisian suburbs; they were connected to, but remained apart from, the Parisian 
center.57 This separation persists today and is relied upon, for better and worse, by 
Sciences Po in administering its equality admissions program.58 
The number of people of Arab and African ancestry living in France has been 
estimated to be 10% of France’s population,59 comprising three to six million60 of 
the total population of approximately 63.7 million living in metropolitan France.61 
Even though this minority population is substantial, the indicators for socio-
economic progress show that this group is not faring well relative to the majority 
 57. See Maurice Blanc, Urban Housing Segregation of North African “Immigrants” in France, in 
URBAN HOUSING SEGREGATION OF MINORITIES IN WESTERN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 145, 
148 (Elizabeth D. Huttman et al. eds., 1991) (“In Paris, 110,000 North Africans represent one-third of 
the foreigners in the city. Most are concentrated in old housing in formerly industrial and working-class 
districts of the north and east of the city. In the industrial suburbs close to Paris . . . and more clearly in 
industrial suburbs far from Paris . . . they concentrate in large public housing estates.”). 
 58. See Interview with Richard Descoings, supra note 21 (“[France] is increasingly segregated. The 
rich cluster together, and the poor are forced to cluster together because there’s no place for them in the 
rich areas. Given the fact that a large fraction of young people whose parents, or grandparents, or great-
grandparents immigrated to France, come from less well-off backgrounds, the social, economic, and 
cultural segregation I’ve been talking about also turns out to be an ethnic segregation to some degree. As 
a result, considering the location of a [high] school allows us to draw upon a much more diverse pool of 
potential candidates.”). 
 59. See, e.g., Colchester, supra note 6 (“An estimated 10% of France’s population has African or 
Arab roots.”). 
 60. Because the French government prohibits statistical data of this kind, Loi 78-17 du 6 janvier 
modifiée relative à l'informatique, aux fichiers et aux libertés [Modified Law 78-17 of January 6, 1978 
of Computer Science, Files, and Liberties], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] 
[OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Aug. 25, 2011, http://www.cnil.fr/en-savoir-plus/textes-
fondateurs/loi78-17/, the estimates of the African population vary widely. See, e.g., Gerda Bikales, 
African Migration and the Transformation of France: Interview with Jean-Paul Gourévitch, 14 SOCIAL 
CONTRACT 91 (2004), http://www.thesocialcontract.com/pdf/fourteen-two/xiv-2-91.pdf (“[W]e can 
reasonably estimate that there are between 2.3 and 3 million Black Africans (including children) in 
France today, nearly as many as there are North Africans, who number a little more than 3 million.”); 
see also Être né en France d’un parent immigré [Born in France to An Immigrant Parent], INSTITUT 
NATIONAL DE LA STATISTIQUE ET DES ÉTUDES ÉCONOMIQUES, available at 
http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/document.asp?reg_id=0&ref_id=ip1287 (“[M]ore than half of children 
younger than 30 have a relative who came from Africa. . . . 1.3 million descendants between 18 to 50 
have at least a father or mother from Algeria, Morocco or Tunisia, or Sub-Saharan Africa. . . . Among 
descendants aged 18-20, 18% have a parent from Asia, the Middle East, and America.” (emphasis 
added)); France Métropolitaine: Les Immigrés par Sexe, Age, et Pays de Naissance [Urban France: 
Immigrants by Sex, Age, and Country of Birth], INSTITUT NATIONAL DE LA STATISTIQUE ET DES ÉTUDES 
ÉCONOMIQUES, http://www.recensement-
2009.insee.fr/tableauxDetailles.action?zoneSearchField=FRANCE&codeZone=M-
METRODOM&idTheme=9&idTableauDetaille=25&niveauDetail=1 (showing that in 2009, the most 
recent year for which census data is available, 721,274 immigrants living in metropolitan France were 
from Algeria; 663,502 were from Morocco; 236,242 were from Tunisia; 681,892 were from other 
African countries; and 734,637 were from other non-European and non-African countries). 
 61. Demography – Population at the Beginning of the Month – Metropolitant France, INSTITUT 
NATIONAL DE LA STATISTIQUE ET DES ÉTUDES ÉCONOMIQUES, http://www.insee.fr/en/bases-de-
donnees/bsweb/serie.asp?idbank=000436387 (last visited Nov. 18, 2012) (reporting France’s population 
as 63,696,000 in October, 2012). 
 
108 TEMPLE POLITICAL & CIVIL RIGHTS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:1 
white French population.62 Recent statistics suggest that France’s African French 
population, generally does not have the same educational opportunities that are 
afforded the majority white French population. According to one article: 
 
Deep fractures have emerged in the French education system. . . . 
Schools in many poor neighborhoods are dangerous and run-down. 
Some 36% of high school dropouts are children of immigrants, and 
those who graduate often lack the skills to find good jobs or enter 
higher education. “It is becoming more and more evident that there is 
inequality between the schools in suburbs and those in the [more 
affluent] city centers.” . . . Wealthier French communities get a 
disproportionate share of education aid because their elected officials 
have more clout than those from immigrant neighborhoods.63 
 
France also has an extended colonial history with the Vietnamese that carries 
over into the present day.64 When compared to the African French, Vietnamese 
 62. See Carol Matlack et al., Crisis in France, BUS. WK., Nov. 21, 2005, 
http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2005-11-20/crisis-in-france (“Unemployment [in France] is 
nearly 10%, and among those under 25 it is nearly 22%, about twice the U.S. rate. Youth joblessness 
runs over 50% in the suburbs that are home to many of France’s more than 5 million first- and second-
generation African and Arab immigrants.”). It is difficult to draw conclusions about the socio-economic 
state of the African diaspora in France because French law prohibits the formal collection of statistics on 
racial and ethnic groups, Modified Law 78-17 of January 6, 1978 of Computer Science, Files, and 
Liberties. 
I find the approach taken by CRAN, an advocacy group for black people modeled on the United 
States’ National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (“NAACP”) to be a useful one for 
providing some statistical information on how peoples of African heritage are faring economically and 
politically in France. CRAN was created in 2005 and is composed of 120 organizations representing 
African and Caribbean peoples living in France. Qu’est-ce que le CRAN?, LE CRAN, 
http://lecran.org/?p=2037 (last visited Nov. 6, 2012). CRAN has emphasized the importance of statistics 
on the diversity of France by commenting that they “are the only means of measuring indirect 
discrimination, which makes up the most egregious and serious discriminatory acts, in particular 
concerning salary gaps and inequalities in career advancement that are what we call the ‘glass ceiling.’” 
Carine Fouteau, Des Statistiques Éthniques, Pour Quoi Faire?, DÉSIRS D’AVENIRS PARIS 5 (Mar. 29, 
2009), http://desirsdavenirparis5.over-blog.com/article-29628752.html (Fr.) (trans. Kristen Barnes) 
(“[L]es statistiques de la diversité «sont le seul instrument de mesure possible des discriminations 
indirectes, qui constituent les discriminations les plus criantes et les plus graves, en particulier pour ce 
qui concerne les écarts salariaux et les inégalités dans les évolutions de carrière qui sont ce que l’on 
appelle le ‘plafond de verre’».”). 
CRAN has presented statistics regarding the black French population noting that even though 
there are three to five million black people living in France when one examines the situation in 2009: 1) 
out of thirty-nine senior ministers there are zero black people serving in this capacity, 2) out of the 324 
senators elected in continental France there are zero black people serving in this capacity, 3) looking at 
the one hundred top executives in the country there are zero black people. Patrick Lozès, President, 
CRAN, Presentation at Constructing Black France, “A Transatlantic Dialogue”: International 
Symposium (Apr. 17, 2009). 
 63. Matlack et al., supra note 62 (quoting Saïd Hanchane, Researcher, Laboratory of Sociology and 
Labor Economics, Université de la Méditerranée). 
 64. See Louis-Jacques Dorais, Vietnamese Communities in Canada, France and Denmark, 11 J. 
REFUGEE STUD. 107, 113 (1998) (“As Indochina’s former colonial power, France was always a magnet 
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people residing in France make up a relatively small portion of the overall 
population.65 As measured in 2006, the number of Vietnamese immigrants who are 
citizens of France constituted approximately 250,000 of a total French population 
of sixty million.66 Overall, there appears to be an appreciable difference in how the 
Vietnamese are viewed as compared to the African French. There is also a notable 
difference in their economic success. In general, the Vietnamese are considered to 
be an assimilated, well-integrated group; the second-generation often identifies 
more strongly as French than as Vietnamese.67 Nonetheless, there are recent 
immigrant groups from Vietnam and Cambodia who do suffer from socio-
economic disadvantages similar to those suffered by African immigrants and their 
descendants. This sector of the group tends to relocate to the same economically-
challenged suburban zones populated by the marginalized African French 
population.68 
The disparities between the wealth and status of the African French population 
relative to the majority white French population have highlighted the need to 
develop national policies, programs, and laws that can positively impact and 
improve the socio-economic situation of this group and other ethno-racial 
minorities who lag behind the majority. A landmark response to the status quo 
came not from the French Government but from one of the country’s grandes 
écoles, Sciences Po. 
B.  The Design and Implementation of Sciences Po’s Proxy Program 
At the outset some explanation of what I mean by a proxy strategy, as applied 
in the education policy context, is necessary. A proxy approach typically operates 
in the following manner: rather than expressly including race or ethnicity in the 
criteria which serve as components of an admissions decision-making process for 
an academic institution, a school references alternative criteria (for example, class, 
geographic location, high school rank) as substitutes to capture the target 
population.69 Both Sciences Po and Texas have embraced proxy strategies out of 
for Vietnamese immigration.”). 
 65. Répartition des Étrangers par Nationalité, INSTITUT NATIONAL DE LA STATISTIQUE ET DES 
ÉTUDES ÉCONOMIQUES, http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/tableau.asp?reg_id=0&ref_id=etrangersnat (last 
visited Nov. 4, 2012) (reporting that in 2009, the last year for which census data is available, 
approximately 41,000 Cambodians, Laotians, and Vietnamese immigrants resided in France, comprising 
1.1% of France’s total immigrant population; approximately 1,534,000 African immigrants resided in 
France in 2009, comprising 40.7% of France’s total immigrant population). 
 66. Blanc, Vietnamese in France, supra note 52, at 1162 (“Today, almost all scholars and official 
figures estimate the Vietnamese communities in France to number about 200,000 to 250,000 people.”). 
 67. See id. (finding that the second and third generations of Vietnamese migrants in France know 
little about their country of origin, do not speak Vietnamese, and live like French people). 
 68. See Interview with Richard Descoings, supra note 21 (explaining that Sciences Po’s geographic 
affirmative action program will admit Asian immigrants who live within the targeted zones). While 
referring to the cultural segregation in France, Descoings notes that “[t]he rich cluster together, and the 
poor are forced to cluster together because there’s no place for them in the rich areas.” Id. 
 69. See, e.g., Elise Langan, The Normative Effects of Higher Education Policy in France, 53 INT’L 
J. EDUC. RES. 32, 35 (2012) (“Critics of Sciences Po’s separate admissions policies point out that 
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necessity in view of their challenging political and legal environments. 
In 2001, Sciences Po took up the challenge to address educational disparities 
in France, which often play out along racial and ethnic lines. The school boldly 
launched an innovative and radical admissions scheme, which may be described as 
France’s first affirmative action program.70 Then director of Sciences Po, Richard 
Descoings, was a chief designer of the plan, known as the Priority Education 
Agreements or CEP.71 The Sciences Po administrators were responding not only to 
the lack of ethno-racial diversity in the university’s entering classes but also to the 
results of a survey, which indicated that in 2001, “less than 1[%] of the students” 
enrolled at Sciences Po were from “working-class backgrounds—as opposed to 
12.5[%] . . . enrolled at other non-selective universities.”72 With the goal of 
reversing these trends in mind, the school administrators began devising a program 
that would not only help to socially and economically diversify Sciences Po’s 
student population but that would also achieve a measure of ethno-racial 
diversity.73 
In pursuing these ends, the Sciences Po faced an immediate substantial hurdle 
in that the French Constitution does not allow ethno-racial distinctions to be 
made.74 Therefore, any program designed to include the African French population 
could not be framed in terms of ethno-racial categories. In this respect, the strategy 
adopted would need to look different from affirmative action programs in the 
United States that typically make explicit reference to the target populations (e.g. 
African Americans, Latinos, Native Americans and, sometimes, Asians) that are 
intended to benefit from them.75 The solution that the French school officials 
arrived at was to frame their admissions program in terms of class and geographic 
choosing students from poor neighborhoods is a proxy for choosing them based on race and ethnicity.”). 
 70. See Daniel Sabbagh, Affirmative Action at Sciences Po, 20 FRENCH POL., CULTURE & SOC’Y 52, 
53 (2002) [hereinafter Sabbagh, Affirmative Action at Sciences Po] (“[D]irector of Sciences Po, Richard 
Descoings, by way of experiment, decided to create a special admission track for the students of seven 
high schools located in economically disadvantaged areas (‘zones d’éducation prioritaire,’ or ZEP), with 
a view to ‘diversifying and democratizing’ the school’s admission process.”). See generally Sabbagh, 
Affirmative Action in the United States and France, supra note 4 (discussing affirmative action for 
college admissions in France and the United States). The name of the program is often abbreviated to 
“CEP” and its participants as “CEP” or “ZEP students.” At times, in this paper I also will rely on these 
abbreviations to reference the student participants and the program. 
 71. Procédure Conventions Education Prioritaire, SCIENCES PO ADMISSIONS, 
http://admissions.sciences-po.fr/college-cep (Fr.). See generally Priority Education Agreements 
Brochure, supra note 17, at 1-3 (describing the Priority Education Agreements, known in French as the 
Conventions Education Prioritaire). 
 72. Sabbagh, Affirmative Action in the United States and France, supra note 4, at 6. 
 73. Langan, supra note 69, at 35 (“The (former) director of the CEP program, Cyril Delhay, argues 
that the initiative is a way to promote diversity.”). 
 74. See 1958 CONST. I (Fr.) (“France is an indivisible, secular, democratic and social Republic. It 
shall ensure the equality of all citizens before the law, without distinction of origin, race or religion. It 
shall respect all beliefs. It shall be organised on a decentralised basis.”). 
 75. See, e.g., Tara J. Yosso et al., From Jim Crow to Affirmative Action and Back Again: A Critical 
Race Discussion of Racialized Rationales and Access to Higher Education, 28 REV. RES. EDUC. 1, 8 
(2004) (“[U.S. college] [a]dmissions officers . . . consider race and gender as ‘plus’ factors in deciding 
between multiple highly qualified candidates.”). 
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criteria and goals. In other words, the CEP plan would rely upon residential 
location and class as proxies for ethnicity and race.76 Fashioning policies in terms 
of these alternative characteristics, as I discuss in more detail in Section III, is not 
inconsistent with the French Constitution. Thus, by structuring its program in terms 
that address geographic diversity or class disparity issues, the CEP plan has the 
effect of being an ethno-racial affirmative action policy without explicitly being 
labeled as such. Sciences Po professor Daniel Sabbagh, in describing Sciences Po’s 
strategy, concludes: 
 
Therefore, the Sciences Po program, although it officially embodies 
an area-based and class-based approach of affirmative action, may 
also be understood as indirectly and implicitly targeting groups that, 
in the American context, would be considered as ‘ethnic’ or ‘racial’ 
minorities, in particular the group of second-generation North 
African immigrants. It may seem at least plausible to read this 
formally color-blind policy as partaking of a “hidden agenda” 
specifically directed at accelerating the integration of these second-
generation immigrants into the mainstream through a “substitution 
strategy.”77 
 
The decision to implement this type of program at Sciences Po, an exclusive 
and revered institution, which has educated several French presidents and 
prominent governing officials, and continues to produce high-ranking corporate 
executives, was not universally welcomed.78 In addition to constitutional challenges 
and outcries that the program is an affront to France’s meritocracy, there have been 
criticisms that the program conjures up images of the period of colonialism during 
which a few “good ones” (namely Arabs and Muslims) of the colonized population 
were allowed to intermingle with the white French in Algeria but otherwise, “kept 
in their place.”79 
 76. See Langan, supra note 69, at 35 (“[C]hoosing students from poor neighborhoods is a proxy for 
choosing them based on race and ethnicity.”). 
 77. Sabbagh, Affirmative Action in the United States and France, supra note 4, at 7 (emphasis 
added). 
 78. Daley, supra note 20. 
 79. Id. (“‘What hypocrisy,’ wrote Zaïr Kedadouche, adding that the program was reminiscent of the 
colonial days in Algeria when most Muslims were kept in their place, but for a few ‘good ones’ who 
were allowed to mingle with the French.”); Zaïr Kedadouche, Sciences-Politiquement Correct, 
LIBÉRATION (Fr.) (Mar. 8, 2001), http://www.liberation.fr/tribune/0101366413-sciences-politiquement-
correct. This view also relates to the concerns expressed by French legal scholar Gwénaële Calvès that 
quotas operate as a ceiling that hinders the access of minority groups to the particular benefit being 
sought. Interview by Daniel Sabbagh with Gwénaële Calvès, Prof. of Law at the Univ. of Cergy-
Pontoise, FRENCH-AM. FOUND. (Jan. 28, 2010), 
http://equality.frenchamerican.org/sites/default/files/calvestranscript_en.pdf [hereinafter Interview with 
Gwénaële Calvès]. Some critics note that because all the economically disadvantaged neighborhoods are 
not included, those schools that have students living within a privileged zone have an advantage over 
students who are economically similarly situated but not attending the selected partnership schools. This 
criticism may be sufficiently countered in time as more partnership schools are added to the Sciences 
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Sciences Po structured its program by linking its admissions procedure to 
previously delineated priority education zones, called zones d’éducation prioritaire 
or “ZEPs.”80 Relying upon newly-devised criteria, which I discuss in the following 
sections, the university then selects students from the zones for admission. 
1.  The Targeted Zones 
Sciences Po targets regions for its program based on Paris’ map for dissecting 
the city into priority education zones.81 The specific zones concentrated on by the 
university were the sites of many of the high-rise housing estates in which 
immigrants and second and third generation French citizens of African extraction 
reside.82 While Sciences Po’s equality admissions program primarily impacts 
students of African heritage, it is important to recognize that the measure is 
intended to target all economically disadvantaged students living within certain 
designated geographic zones.83 Thus, Vietnamese and Cambodian immigrants who 
populate the zones are also included in the eligible pool of candidates.84 Also, to the 
extent that Caucasians of varying ethnicities and recent immigrants are residents of 
the target zones and otherwise meet the criteria, they too are eligible to participate 
in the program.85 Descoings, remarks: 
 
Schools in less well-off neighborhoods are made up of whoever 
happens to live in the area—whites, Arabs, and blacks, but also 
immigrants from Vietnam and Cambodia (we always tend to forget 
Asian immigrants in this country)—, and all of these students can 
Po’s CEP program. Id. 
 80. Sabbagh, Affirmative Action at Sciences Po, supra note 70, at 53. 
 81. Id. (describing how Sciences Po’s alternative admissions track targets Priority Education 
Zones); see Robert C. Lieberman, A Tale of Two Countries, in RACE IN FRANCE: INTERDISCIPLINARY 
PERSPECTIVES ON THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE, supra note 12, at 189, 193 (describing France’s 
Priority Education Zones as “a program of targeted assistance to schools in depressed areas” ). 
 82. See Sabbagh, Affirmative Action at Sciences Po, supra note 7070, at 53 (noting that a substantial 
portion of the ZEP residents are of “North African extraction”); see also Anna Muldrine, After the 
Flames, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Nov. 13, 2005), 
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/051121/21lede.htm (“When French Interior Minister 
Nicolas Sarkozy visited one of the crime-infested high-rise housing projects outside Paris to see how the 
government’s measures against violence were working out, the answer was apparent: not so well. He 
was pelted with bottles and rocks by the poverty-ridden neighborhood’s residents, made up mainly of 
the French-born children and grandchildren of North African immigrants.”). 
 83. See Interview with Richard Descoings, supra note 21, at 3 (“[C]onsidering the location of a 
school allows us to draw upon a much more diverse pool of potential candidates”). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Cf. id. at 4 (“Every now and then, [a comparatively rich parent living in a ZEP] will enroll 
his/her children in the local public high school. Would it be morally acceptable if, when these children 
apply to Sciences Po, we inflicted a disadvantage upon them because of their parents’ decision to enroll 
them in a school where they were less unfortunate, less poor, and less socially vulnerable than the rest of 
the student body? It wouldn’t, and it would only reinforce the tendency for such parents to avoid those 
schools in the first place.”). 
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equally take advantage of this new, competitive admission track.86 
 
Selecting its zones based upon the local government’s existing map was a 
clever political and legal strategy that has tremendous benefits because it functions 
to: (i) legitimize Sciences Po’s program in that there is already the government’s 
recognition of the CEP area as one that is in need of socio-economic assistance87 
and (ii) facilitate the achievement of the tacit goal of the CEP program, which is to 
accomplish ethno-racial diversity at Sciences Po along with class and geographic 
diversity.88 Scholar Gwénaële Calvès comments on the priority educational areas as 
follows: 
 
[T]he creation of “priority educational areas” (zones d’éducation 
prioritaire, or ZEPs), according to an administrative guideline 
(circulaire) of 1 July 1981, should “contribute to the correction of 
inequalities through a selective reinforcement of educational action.” 
A 1989 law stated further that the goals of the ZEP are to provide 
“special pedagogical attention” to “socially disadvantaged pupils” 
through the allocation of additional resources. These resources were 
to be directed primarily toward increasing the number of teachers in 
these areas—offering them employment incentives as well as a 
“specific training.” “To give more to those who have less” is the 
general motto of this class-based affirmative action policy.89 
 
By adopting and incorporating the city’s map into its program, Sciences Po is 
able to work with the government to bring about societal changes by servicing 
areas of the population that are in dire need of attention with the government’s 
 86. Id. at 3. 
 87. See Roland Bénabou et al., Zones D’Éducation Prioritaire: Quels Moyens Pour Quels 
Résultats? Une Évaluation sur la Période 1982-1992 [Priority Education Zones: Which Means for 
Which Ends?], 380 ÉCONOMIE & STATISTIQUE 3, 3 (2004) (Fr.) (“In 1982, in response to the persistence 
of disadvantaged students failing in school, a new tactic seeking equality of treatment was developed: 
priority education zones were created in a few regions. The zones were reinforced and extended in 1989 
and again in 1990, and have been steadily continued since. These zones incite schools to develop 
educational projects and local partnerships by giving them extra resources (credits, jobs, teaching hours, 
etc.). The objective is to improve school performance by stimulating new projects. Lowering class sizes 
is also considered a tool.”) (trans. Kristen Barnes) (“En 1982, face à la persistance de l’échec scolaire 
parmi les élèves les plus défavorisés, une expérience rompant avec l’idée d’égalité de traitement est 
tentée : les zones d’éducation prioritaire (ZEP) sont créées dans quelques régions, mesure renforcée et 
étendue en 1989, puis en 1990, et prorogée régulièrement depuis. Elle incite les établissements à 
développer des projets éducatifs et des partenariats locaux en les dotant de ressources supplémentaires 
(crédits, postes, heures d’enseignement, etc.). L’objectif est d’améliorer les résultats scolaires en 
stimulant des projets nouveaux. La baisse de la taille des classes est peu à peu considérée également 
comme un outil.”). 
 88.  See Langan, supra note 69, at 35 (“The (former) director of the CEP program, Cyril Delhay, 
argues that the initiative is a way to promote diversity.”). 
 89. Gwénaële Calvès, Color-Blindness at a Crossroads in Contemporary France, in RACE IN 
FRANCE: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE, supra note 12, at 219, 
221; see also Bénabou et al., supra note 87, at 3 (describing the ZEP’s enactment and goals). 
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imprimatur of legality90 that is apparently needed in order for the CEP measure to 
be accepted by the majority French population. In order to fully appreciate the 
innovative aspects of the program and its effectiveness it is necessary to provide 
more detail on how it functions. 
2.  Requirements for Admission under the CEP Program and How it 
Operates 
The CEP plan impacts high school students who are applying to colleges and 
universities. Sciences Po, as a prestigious and selective publicly-financed 
university, requires a sufficiently high score on the competitive placement exams, 
known as le concours, to gain entry.91 With the adoption of the CEP track, Sciences 
Po established new admissions procedures that are exclusively applied to the CEP 
students.92 Initially, twenty places for students from designated geographic areas 
were created to add to Sciences Po’s total undergraduate student population of 
approximately 2,500.93 Rather than using the traditional entrance exam scores as a 
basis for admission, under the policy governing the newly created CEP slots, 
Sciences Po considers, as admissions criteria, the recommendations of the high 
 90. This is not to say that CEP’s legality has not been challenged. See Langan, supra note 69, at 35-
36 (“In 2001, France’s leading right-wing union, the ‘National Interuniversity Union’ (UNI) asked the 
Court Tribunal of Paris to cancel the CEP program, arguing that by creating an admissions track that is 
open to certain students based on where they live, the university was violating the constitutional 
guarantee of equal opportunity. The French National Assembly and Senate subsequently ruled that the 
Board of Directors at Sciences Po could determine its conditions and methods of admission and allowed 
it to adopt procedures that assured diverse recruitment. It authorized Sciences Po to experiment and 
reaffirmed the institution’s autonomous corporate status irrespective of the fact that it receives 
government subsidy. In 2003, an appeals court ruled that the CEP program could continue with some 
modifications, e.g., expanding the number of secondary schools from which Sciences Po draws; UNI is 
still waging efforts to dismantle the CEP initiative.”). 
 91. Id. at 34 (“Sciences Po falls into the category of a grande école and was started to train the 
French elite for careers in civil service. Grandes écoles are characterized by their competitive entry 
examinations, or ‘le concours,’ preparation for which requires two years beyond the baccalauréat and 
necessitates studying a specialized curriculum only available in a limited number of selective secondary 
schools. Some concours preparatory courses are offered at government expense to the best students. 
Private courses cost over $8000. The Sciences Po concours is comprised of four written elements: three 
known criteria and a surprise essay question. In addition, there is an extensive oral examination whereby 
applicants are not only expected to know the material but to be engaging and witty. One legendary story 
is when an applicant was asked how far the distance was if he were to dive off the Pont Neuf into the 
Seine. Without missing a beat, he replied that the bridge was slightly arched so the distance would 
depend on exactly where he was standing when diving.”). 
 92. Id. at 35 (“Seeking to alter [the school’s] white, male homogeneity, alumnus Richard Descoings, 
the Director of Sciences Po since 1996, admitted 18 ZEP students in the fall of 2001, without requiring 
them to sit for the concours. Applying ZEP students are made to write two papers—one a synthesis of 
press articles related to a specific topic, the other an essay on the same subject—and defend them before 
a jury composed of teachers and administrators from their high school. If selected, they submit to oral 
interviews of 30-40 min at Sciences Po before a preliminary round of five judges. Those who pass go 
before thirty judges composed of academics, politicians, and business executives and undergo a rigorous 
oral examination. Students are evaluated on their maturity, originality, and ability to succeed.”). 
 93. Daley, supra note 20. 
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school teachers at the participating schools, test scores on the national baccalauréat 
exam,94 grades, the student’s overall “profile,” an oral presentation, and an 
interview.95 If selected, the CEP students “are offered financial aid and special 
access to tutoring and mentoring upon matriculation to help them adjust to this new 
and highly demanding educational environment.”96 
Seventeen students were admitted under the CEP criteria in the first year of 
the program.97 The program has grown beyond its initial numbers, despite ongoing 
resistance.98 In 2002, thirty-two CEP students were admitted.99 In 2007, 117 CEP 
students were admitted.100 The number of CEP admissions increased again in 2009 
to 126 students.101 The program has also developed in terms of the number of 
participating high schools targeted for the special track, expanding from the initial 
seven participating high schools in 2001 to eighty-eight in 2011.102 
3. Performance of CEP Students at Sciences Po and the Effectiveness of 
the Proxy Strategy in Increasing Diversity and in Improving Access for 
Ethno-Racial Minorities in France 
A consideration of how the CEP students are performing at Sciences Po and of 
the growth of the CEP initiative is important to the assessment of this new 
admissions program.103 Recent information on the CEP plan reveals that while it 
 94. The baccalauréat is different from the concours. The baccalauréat is administered in two parts. 
The first part is given during a high school student’s junior year. The second part of the exam is 
administered over a two-week period in June and July of the senior year. Students must receive a 
designated minimum score. Depending upon the score one receives, an oral component may also be 
imposed as a requirement for passing. See Carolyn W. Schott, The National Competency of Testing, 2 
KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 97, 102 (1992), for a discussion of the French competency exam. 
 95. Interview with Richard Descoings, supra note 21. 
 96. Melissa LaiFat et al., Shaping Preferential Treatment Policies Without Race: The Case of 
Admission to Elite Institutions of Higher Education in France, HUMAN. IN ACTION, 
http://www.humanityinaction.org/knowledgebase/121-shaping-preferencial-treatment-policies-without-
race-the-case-of-admission-to-elite-institutions-of-higher-education-in-france (last visited Nov. 8, 2012). 
 97. Diversity and Accessibility: A University for All Talents, SCIENCES PO., 
http://www.sciencespo.fr/en/content/80/diversity-and-accessibility (last visited Oct. 3, 2012) [hereinafter 
Diversity and Accessibility]. 
 98. See Daley, supra note 20 (“Some have applauded the program as a small step toward addressing 
a growing disadvantaged population in France, and the often unspoken racial issue it entails. But others 
see it as an attack on a tradition that has produced scholars of high quality as well as a slide into an 
American-style system.”); Diversity and Accessibility, supra note 97 (noting an increase in the 
program’s numbers for student intake). 
 99. Diversity and Accessibility, supra note 97. In addition, of the thirty-seven students admitted in 
2003, “two-thirds [had] at least one foreign-born parent . . . from Algeria or Morocco.” Sasha Polakow-
Suransky, Crème de la Crème: How a Few Dozen Immigrant Students at an Elite French College 
Created a Crise Constitutionnelle and Still Got Good Report Cards, LEGAL AFF. (July/Aug. 2004), 
http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/July-August-2004/story_suransky_julaug04.msp. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Diversity and Accessibility, supra note 97. 
 102. Priority Education Agreements Brochure, supra note 17, at 4. 
 103. In using the term “assessment,” I am not proposing to undertake an extensive empirical study of 
the Sciences Po CEP students’ performance on exams, graduation rates, and job placement in 
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has had some positive effects on improving the quality of post-secondary 
educational opportunities available to the African French population and to 
students from lower socio-economic rungs, the overall results are nominal, given 
the enormity of the national problem.104 My comments focus on the areas of (i) 
student performance in the program and graduation rates, (ii) the increase in ethno-
racial diversity at Sciences Po, (iii) the impact of the CEP plan more broadly in 
terms of other post-secondary academic institutions, and (iv) the numbers reported 
regarding job placement rate and salaries of students. 
There are three main conclusions that I draw from my examination of the 
reports regarding the CEP initiative. First, this proxy strategy has not been 
expanded enough within the walls of Sciences Po and beyond to have a profound 
impact on the opportunities available to underrepresented minorities, such as 
African French students, to attend quality institutions of higher education. Second, 
the prohibition on ethno-racial classifications makes it impossible to fully and 
accurately assess the impact of the CEP plan on the lives of the target population; 
thereby, impairing the development of cogent arguments regarding what remains to 
be done in terms of designing initiatives for the future. Third, while the ostensible 
limitations of the current strategy being used by Sciences Po may not be due to the 
fact that it is an approach that relies on other factors (that is, class and geography) 
in lieu of ethnicity and race, the constraints that the program is experiencing 
suggest that bolder initiatives, such as explicit ethno-race-based policies, are 
needed in addition to the CEP track in order to make significant advancement 
towards the goal of equal educational opportunity for all in France. Regarding the 
last point, Sciences Po imposes limitations on how far to extend the program based 
in part on the administration’s political assessment of what the French population 
will tolerate in the interest of diversity, and also on what French laws will permit 
the school to do.105 I discuss in greater detail the impact of the legal environment on 
Sciences Po’s special admissions program in Section III. 
The data available on student performance show that the CEP measure has 
been successful in demonstrating that post-secondary institutions can utilize 
alternative criteria as a basis for admitting students without suffering a loss in the 
quality of the education provided overall and without creating a situation in which 
the students selected under different requirements will not perform adequately to 
comparison with other Sciences Po students from the inaugural moment of the program in 2001 to the 
present. Rather, I primarily rely upon the reports that Sciences Po has issued to draw conclusions about 
the program. See Vincent Tiberj, Sciences Po, dix ans après les Conventions Education Prioritaire 
[Sciences Po, Ten Years after the Priority Education Agreements], SCIENCES PO (2011), 
http://www.sciencespo.fr/sites/default/files/CEP_Etude_VTiberj_final.pdf (Fr.) (reporting progress on 
the CEP program ten years after its initiation); 10 Years of Promoting Student Diversity at Sciences Po, 
SCIENCES PO, http://www.sciencespo.fr/en/content/7686/10-years-promoting-student-diversity (last 
visited Oct. 15, 2012) (summarizing the above report’s findings in English). 
 104. See Hargreaves, MULTI-ETHNIC FRANCE, supra note 12, at 40-74 (analyzing the relationship 
between low socio-economic status and immigrants in France). 
 105. See Constitutional Court decision No. 2001-450DC, supra note 28, ¶ 31 (upholding Sciences 
Po’s admissions policy under the French Constitution; relying in part on its guarantee of equal access to 
education for children and adults). 
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graduate.106 According to a new 2011 study, commissioned by Sciences Po and 
conducted by French sociologist Vincent Tiberj, approximately 90% of CEP 
students graduate within three years of being admitted to Sciences Po.107 The 
statistics help to counter those critics who assert that affirmative action programs 
undermine meritocracy. Typically, those asserting that affirmative action plans 
such as CEP are not meritocratic argue that exams and grades are neutral and fair 
mechanisms for measuring achievement and ability, and that students should be 
rewarded based upon how they perform by gaining admission to prestigious 
academic institutions.108 Relevant to my thesis is my corollary argument that the 
concept of meritocracy itself needs to be unpacked to explore the extent to which 
the criteria used to structure the meritocracy serve to perpetuate ethno-racial and 
class stratifications and socio-economic inequities.109 Where the purported neutral 
standard serves as a barrier to entry for certain underrepresented ethno-racial 
populations, other criteria (for example, ethnicity and race) must be included in the 
evaluation process to counter that effect.110 The data on the CEP program support 
my conclusion that the so-called neutral standards are not the only means for 
identifying able and talented candidates who have the potential to succeed 
academically and progress to meaningful, lucrative careers if given the 
opportunities to do so.111 The use of the concours exam is not the inevitable 
 106. See 10 Years of Promoting Student Diversity at Sciences Po, supra note 103 (concluding that 
CEP students “keep up or quickly catch up with their peers, and the[ir] drop-out rate is ‘marginal’”). 
 107. D.D. Guttenplan, In France, a Bastion of Privilege No More, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/05/world/europe/05iht-educLede05.html. Older data from 2004 also 
shows that the CEP students performed with a “pass rate of 82 percent compared to 90 percent of 
students overall for the 2001-2002 academic year.” Polakow-Suransky, supra note 99. 
 108. See Sabbagh, Affirmative Action at Sciences Po, supra note 70, at 59 (addressing the criticism 
that the CEP program is not meritocratic). 
 109. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s Tenth Chronicle: Merit and Affirmative Action, 83 GEO. 
L.J. 1711, 1721-23 (1995) (analyzing the concept of “merit” and how it preserves the status quo). I agree 
with the legal scholar Ronald Dworkin that “[p]laces in selective universities are not merit badges or 
prizes for some innate talent or for past performance or industry: they are opportunities that are properly 
offered to those who show the most promise of future contribution to goals the university rightfully 
seeks to advance.” Ronald Dworkin, The Court and the University, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS (May 15, 
2003), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2003/may/15/the-court-and-the-university/. “These 
goals can be, and historically have been, social as well as more narrowly academic.” Id. The goal of 
addressing unequal access to education for underrepresented ethno-racial minorities is one that a 
university may appropriately adopt; however, from the United States’ legal standpoint, the compelling 
goal will have to be framed in terms of critical mass, defined by the educational benefits of diversity in 
order to satisfy constitutional requirements. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330 (“[T]he Law School’s concept 
of critical mass is defined by reference to the educational benefits that diversity is designed to produce. 
These benefits are substantial.”). 
 110. See Luke Charles Harris & Uma Narayan, Affirmative Action as Equalizing Opportunity: 
Challenging the Myth of “Preferential Treatment”, AFR. AM. POL’Y F. (Feb. 25, 2007), 
http://aapf.org/2007/02/equalizingopportunity/ (arguing that the beneficiaries of affirmative action are 
not less qualified than other candidates but “their capabilities are not accurately gauged or fairly 
evaluated by prevailing selection criteria and procedures” (emphasis added)). 
 111. E.g., Guttenplan, supra note 107 (“On average at least 90 percent of students admitted under the 
[CEP] initiative graduate after three years.”). 
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instrument that French schools must rely upon to bar and admit students since it is 
not the only means, or even necessarily the best way to determine who can succeed 
in academic institutions of higher education.112 
  From the vantage of whether the Sciences Po’s proxy approach has worked to 
increase the ethno-racial diversity of its student population, the data suggest that the 
program has made some progress in improving the access of students of African 
heritage to this institution. The information available shows that a substantial 
number of the 860 CEP students admitted from 2001 to 2011 are persons of 
African heritage.113 The statistics further indicate that “in 2009, 83% of the 
beneficiaries of [the CEP program] had at least one foreign-born parent, and 85% 
of that 83% had a parent born on the African continent.”114 It is not clear whether 
the numbers referenced are limited exclusively to the year 2009 or whether they 
refer to total beneficiaries of the CEP initiative over time from 2001 to 2009. If one 
assumes that the foregoing numbers refer to the entering class of 2009, then using 
other data available, which indicate that the total entering class size for that year 
was 1224 (this number includes the 126 CEP students admitted that year),115 one 
can estimate that of the 126 CEP students, approximately 105 had foreign-born 
parents and approximately 89 CEP students of the 126 were of African heritage. 
While the data show an improvement in numbers compared to the seeming dearth 
of an African presence at the school before the implementation of the CEP track, 
the impact is nominal. Eight hundred sixty CEP students, out of approximately 
10,000 total students that attended Sciences Po from 2001 to 2011,116 do not 
establish that the goal of equal educational opportunity is being met. Rather, the 
limitations of the plan highlight the need for a national mandate that will prompt 
 112. See Sabbagh, Affirmative Action at Sciences Po, supra note 70, at 53 (“Instead of having to take 
the competitive exam imposed on all other applicants, [CEP applicants] were asked to write two 
papers—one a synthesis of several press articles collected on a chosen topic, the other an analytical 
essay on that same subject—and defend them before a jury made up of teachers and administrators of 
their high school. Then, the best candidates were invited for an interview at Sciences Po itself. Those 
who received an admission offer at the end of the day were also provided with financial aid, as well as 
with a specific kind of tutoring (available on an optional basis) to help them adjust to their new 
educational environment.”); 10 Years of Promoting Student Diversity at Sciences Po, supra note 103 
(summarizing data showing CEP students’ successes at Sciences Po). 
 113. See, e.g., Polakow-Suransky, supra note 99 (noting that two-thirds of the thirty-seven CEP 
students admitted in 2003 had at least one foreign-born parent, and the national origin of the foreign-
born parent was primarily “Algeria or Morocco”); Interview with Richard Descoings, supra note 21, at 3 
(noting that a majority of CEP students have a parent born on the African continent). 
 114. Interview with Richard Descoings, supra note 21, at 3. Institutions are allowed, under French 
law, to ask about the nationality of a student’s parents. Id. From the information, one might draw 
conclusions about ethno-racial background, although this approach does not ensure 100% accuracy. 
 115. See id. (stating that, in 2009, 83% of CEP students had a foreign born parent, and 85% of those 
students had an African born parent); 2011 Bilan Chiffré Des Admissions, SCIENCES PO (2012), 
http://www.sciencespo.fr/sites/default/files/ScPo_Bilan_admissions_2011_V2.pdf (Fr.) (providing 
admissions data for the 2009 undergraduate class). 
 116. 10 Years of Promoting Diversity at Sciences Po, supra note 103 (stating that 860 CEP students 
have attended Sciences Po since the program started). The total number of attendees is calculated based 
on the information that 2,500 undergraduates attend Sciences Po at a time, and the program takes 
students three years to complete. Daley, supra note 20. 
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other grandes écoles, such as the École Normale Supérieure and the École 
Supérieure des Sciences Économiques et Commerciales (“ESSEC”) business 
school to adopt similar diversifying policies. A nationally administered plan would 
enable a central institution to hold the schools accountable if there are no 
measurable changes in the ethno-racial and socio-economic backgrounds of their 
students.117 The commendable work of expanding educational opportunity and 
diversifying student populations should not fall on Sciences Po alone. 
Finally, it is necessary to consider the job placement rates and salaries of the 
CEP students once they graduate to determine whether meaningful inroads have 
been made to change the socio-economic condition of this marginalized 
population.118 It is imperative that the effects of the program not stop at the doors of 
Sciences Po but rather operate to improve the economic mobility of this group. 
This result is necessary in order for the French nation to achieve the diversification 
of the upper echelon work force and for France to live up to its ideal of 
egalitarianism. The data show “two-thirds of the students who graduated between 
2006 and 2011 are currently employed” and that “[t]he proportion of CEP students 
in full-time employment (63%) is higher than that of their Sciences Po peers 
(56%).”119 Further, “[t]wo-thirds of the CEP graduates who find employment in the 
private sector are on secure, permanent ‘CDI’ contracts” and “[h]alf of the CEP 
students earn more than 2500 euros per month after tax, which is 300 euros more 
than the average net salary of Sciences Po graduates from the class of 2009.”120 
Using 860 students as the limit of the program’s reach, the improvement in job 
 117. See Les programmes Égalité des chances, ESSEC BUS. SCH., http://egalite-des-
chances.essec.edu/page-fille-1 (Fr.) (last visited Nov. 4, 2012) (describing ESSEC’s tutoring of high 
school students and alternate admissions process for socio-economically disadvantaged students, 
including a year-long preparatory course before applicants gain admission to the program); Grande 
École Admission, ESSEC BUS. SCH., http://www.essec.fr/programmes/grande-
ecole/admission/concours.html (Fr.) (last visited Nov. 4, 2012) (describing three different routes to 
admission to ESSEC); Socio-Educational Programs, ÉCOLE NORMALE SUPÉRIEURE PARIS, 
http://www.ens.fr/spip.php?rubrique98&lang=en (last visited Nov. 4, 2012) (describing ENS’s Talens 
program that provides tutoring to high school students in preparation for admission, and also 
Perspectives, a program that provides tutoring for high school students in rural areas of France as well as 
overseas territories); Admission at the ENS, ÉCOLE NORMALE SUPÉRIEURE PARIS, 
http://www.ens.fr/spip.php?rubrique26&lang=en (last visited Nov. 4, 2012) (describing four different 
routes to admission to ENS); Aisha Labi, In France, Making Room at the Top of Higher Education, 
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Sept. 19, 2010), http://chronicle.com/article/In-France-Making-Room-at-
the/124438/ (contrasting the CEP program with other admissions practices and quoting Eric Keslassy, an 
expert on diversity, that the CEP program is “poorly perceived” because “any form of positive 
discrimination is seen as inconsistent with republican ideals of treating all citizens equally”). While I am 
not advocating the adoption of quotas here, I maintain that there has to be a way to collect statistics to 
determine whether the policies the schools are implementing to effect the change I have outlined are 
succeeding. 
 118. See Interview with Richard Descoings, supra note 21, at 7 (discussing the importance of 
attending one of the grandes écoles to achieve the most elite position in a given field). 
 119. 10 Years of Promoting Student Diversity at Sciences Po, supra note 103; see also Tiberj, supra 
note 103, at 2-5 (summarizing these statistics in a full report in French). 
 120. 10 Years of Promoting Student Diversity at Sciences Po, supra note 103; Tiberj, supra note 103, 
at 2-5.   
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attainment and salaries for a few is a positive start but it falls woefully short of the 
kind of change that is needed to show that the French nation is fully embracing this 
population. 
II.  THE SHIFT FROM ETHNO-RACE-BASED AFFIRMATIVE ACTION TO PROXY 
STRATEGIES IN THE UNITED STATES 
A.  The Principle of Equal Educational Opportunity in the United States 
For my historical treatment of the concept of equal educational opportunity in 
the United States and the emergence of the Texas Ten Percent Plan, I am primarily 
concerned with the cluster of cases in which ideas about equal access and 
opportunity in education began to germinate. Specifically, this discussion traces the 
shift away from the goal of ethno-racial inclusion towards broad-based diversity, 
and the move towards the use of proxy strategies. There is a substantial body of 
historical literature that covers the development of affirmative action policies in the 
educational realm beginning with the Civil Rights legislation of the John F. 
Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson era to the present.121 It is not my intention to retread 
this ground but, rather, to provide enough historical context to analyze the purposes 
and goals related to devising the Texas Ten Percent Plan and to assess the plan’s 
effectiveness. 
1.  The Rise of Affirmative Action in the United States 
As an initial matter, it is necessary to provide a definition of affirmative action 
as it has developed in the United States. Affirmative action may be defined both as 
“a government policy that seeks to remedy long-standing discrimination directed at 
specific racial/ethnic minorities and women”122 and as “an umbrella concept that 
subsumes different types of policies and practices tailored to meet specific, context-
derived problems of discrimination and unfairness.”123 The concept has its origins 
in an Executive Order that President John F. Kennedy signed on March 6, 1961.124 
Executive Order 10,925 prohibited government contractors from “discriminat[ing] 
against any employee or applicant for employment because of race, creed, color, or 
national origin” and further required “affirmative action to ensure that applicants 
are employed, and that employees are treated during employment, without regard to 
their race, creed, color, or national origin.”125 President Lyndon Johnson signed 
Executive Order 11,246 on September 24, 1965, which superseded Executive Order 
 121. E.g., EBONI M. ZAMANI-GALLAHER, ET AL., THE CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION ON CAMPUS: 
CONCEPTS OF EQUITY, CONSIDERATIONS FOR PRACTICE, 1-8 (2009) (discussing the evolution of 
diversity and affirmative action policies in U.S. universities). 
 122. Id. at 2. 
 123. Lynn W. Huntley, Foreword to ZAMANI-GALLAHER ET AL., supra note 121, at xiv. 
 124. Exec. Order No. 10925, 3 C.F.R. 448 (1959-1963 comp.), superseded by Exec. Order No. 
11,246, 3 CFR 339 (1965). 
 125. Id. (emphasis added). 
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10,925.126 Executive Order 11,246 states in relevant part that it is the Federal 
Government’s policy to “promote the full realization of equal employment 
opportunity through a positive, continuing program in each executive department 
and agency.”127 
2.  Equality of Educational Opportunity Historical Legal Precedents 
The main historical legal precedents concerning equality of educational 
opportunity leading up to the implementation of the Texas Ten Percent Plan 
include Sweatt v. Painter,128 Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas 
(“Brown I”),129 Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,130 and Hopwood v. 
Texas.131 In many ways, the United States’ initial approach to affirmative action 
beginning in the 1960s is captured by the words Justice Blackmun expressed in his 
separate opinion in Bakke, “[i]n order to get beyond racism, we must first take 
account of race. There is no other way. And in order to treat some persons equally, 
we must treat them differently.”132 At the time of this quote, the “persons” 
Blackmun was referencing were primarily African Americans.133 
 126. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 CFR 339 (1965), amended by Exec. Order No. 11375, 3 CFR 684 
(1967-1970 comp.). 
 127. Id. These affirmative policies were extended to females in 1967 through Executive Order 
Number 11375, 3 CFR 684 (1967-1970 comp.). 
 128. 339 U.S. 629, 632-36 (1950). Sweatt v. Painter is an important historic case for at least two 
reasons. First, Sweatt dealt with the question of whether the University of Texas’ law school admissions 
policy, which in compliance with Texas’ segregation laws prohibited the admission of blacks to its 
school, was in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 635. The 
Sweatt Court held that the separate law school facilities for blacks proposed by the University of Texas 
as an alternative to granting Heman Sweatt admission were insufficient to satisfy the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. This 1950 holding set the ground for the subsequent landmark 
decision of Brown I, 347 U.S. 483. Second, Justice Powell in Bakke, cited Sweatt as a basis for the 
Court’s ruling on diversity noting that “even at the graduate level, our tradition and experience lend 
support to the view that the contribution of diversity is substantial.” 438 U.S. at 313 (opinion of Powell, 
J.). Justice Powell went on to quote the following relevant language from Sweatt: 
The law school, the proving ground for legal learning and practice, cannot be 
effective in isolation from the individuals and institutions with which the law 
interacts. Few students and no one who has practiced law would choose to study 
in an academic vacuum, removed from the interplay of ideas and the exchange of 
views with which the law is concerned. 
Id. at 314 (quoting Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 634). 
 129. 347 U.S. at 495 (holding that public school segregation violates the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 130. 438 U.S. at 271 (holding the University of California at Davis Medical School’s admissions 
procedure constitutionally invalid). 
 131. 78 F.3d at 934 (holding that the University of Texas’ 1992 admissions procedure was in 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 132. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 407 (Blackmun, J., separate opinion). See generally Herbert N. Bernhardt, 
Affirmative Action in Employment: Considering Group Interests While Protecting Individual Rights, 23 
STETSON L. REV. 11, 20 (1993) (“Blackmun represented the moderated position, which was that 
affirmative action was necessary to comply with the law, but that it also carried dangers. Neither 
Blackmun nor other moderates in society, however, had formulated or articulated the rules that would 
enable affirmative action to achieve its goals while avoiding the dangers.”). 
 133.  Bakke, 438 U.S. at 403 (Blackmun, J., separate opinion) (“At least until the early 1970s, 
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The Brown I decision, in terms of U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence, marks 
the crystallization of the concept of equality of educational opportunity that moves 
beyond the superficial level to a concrete lived equality.134 Prior to Brown I, public 
schools, along with other cultural institutions and businesses, were legally 
permitted to exclude individuals on the basis of race from entering their doors and 
enjoying their benefits.135 African Americans suffered the brunt of these 
exclusionary practices in the United States.136 The legally sanctioned segregation of 
people on the basis of race that was endorsed by the Supreme Court in Plessy v. 
Ferguson137 signified unwillingness on the part of American society to fully include 
African Americans within the concept of the nation.138 The roots of current-day 
education and socio-economic disparities in the United States can be traced to the 
racially discriminatory practices that prevailed in this country over the course of 
many years.139 The Brown I decision was a watershed moment in which the U.S. 
Supreme Court made a link between addressing societal ills, racial exclusion, and 
educational opportunity. The Brown I Court considered the question: “Does 
segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race, even though 
the physical facilities and other ‘tangible’ factors may be equal, deprive the 
apparently only a very small number, less than 2%, of the physicians, attorneys, and medical and law 
students in the United States were members of what we now refer to as minority groups. In addition, 
approximately three-fourths of our Negro physicians were trained at only two medical schools. If ways 
are not found to remedy that situation, the country can never achieve its professed goal of a society that 
is not race conscious.”); see also Challenging Race Sensitive Admission Policies: A Summary of 
Important Rulings, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/sats/race/summary.html (last 
visited Nov. 4, 2012) (summarizing the facts in Bakke and stating that the University of California at 
Davis Medical School reserved sixteen spaces for “disadvantaged” students who were defined as 
“blacks, Latinos, American Indians and Asian-Americans”). 
 134. There are earlier segregation cases in which the U.S. Supreme Court confronted the doctrine of 
separate but equal in the education context. See, e.g., McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents, 339 U.S. 637, 
642 (1950) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state from treating a graduate student 
differently than other students on the basis of race); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 
352 (1938) (holding that a state law school could not deny admission based on race when the 
comparable school for blacks did not provide equal advantages). The Brown I case is a consolidation of 
five cases involving public elementary and high schools covering the states of Kansas, South Carolina, 
Virginia, and Delaware and was brought by African Americans who were challenging, on the ground of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, the constitutionality of the separate but equal doctrine in public education. 
347 U.S. at 486-89. 
 135. See Deborah Mayo-Jefferies, Discrimination in the Education Process Based on Race, 21 N.C. 
CENT. L.J. 21, 21 (1995) (“A dual education system was established wherein African-American children 
attended school with African-American children, and Caucasian children attended school with 
Caucasian children.”). 
 136. See id. (“Under this system, only a fraction of what was spent to educate Caucasian students was 
allocated for African-American students.”). 
 137. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 138. See Douglas J. Ficker, From Roberts to Plessy: Educational Segregation and the “Separate but 
Equal” Doctrine, 84 J. NEGRO HIST. 301, 301 (1999) (“The segregation era was a contradictory period 
in American legal history [marked by] institutional separation of African-Americans from European-
Americans.”). 
 139. Id. (detailing state courts’ interpretation and application of the “separate but equal” doctrine 
from 1849 to 1954). 
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children of the minority group of equal educational opportunities?”140 
The answer from the Court was a decisive “Yes.” The Court ruled in favor of 
the African American plaintiffs who were denied admission to public schools 
attended by white students pursuant to the “separate but equal” doctrine.141 In so 
ruling, the Court held that “[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently 
unequal”142 and that prohibiting African American students from attending certain 
public schools based solely upon their race meant that they were “deprived of the 
equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.”143 With 
this decision, the U.S. Supreme Court overruled the “separate but equal” doctrine 
upheld in Plessy and embraced the progressive idea that equality of educational 
opportunity means more than the enactment of facially neutral laws.144 This 
understanding of equality as involving more than adopting legislation and 
implementing policies that are devoid of ethnic or racial language in the name of 
treating all citizens on an equal basis is one that should be kept in mind in 
formulating admission policies for higher education institutions. The Brown I 
Court’s definition of equality of educational opportunity is a broad and expansive 
one.145 Recognizing the fundamental role of education in the formation of 
individuals and citizens, the Brown I Court concluded that, “Such an opportunity, 
where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made 
available to all on equal terms.”146 While the Court has since moved away from the 
notion that education is a right,147 the principle of equality of educational 
opportunity articulated in Brown I should be kept in mind when evaluating current 
admissions policies in place in Texas and other states. 
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke148 is the next case in the line 
of important legal precedents concerning the ongoing debate over the use of ethno-
racial criteria in higher education admissions policies. Justice Powell’s opinion is 
often consulted as a resource for determining the constitutionally proper contours 
for race-based educational programs.149 Bakke signaled how the U.S. Supreme 
 140. 347 U.S. at 493. 
 141. Id. at 495. 
 142. Id. In this respect, the Court went further than its ruling in Sweatt. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 493. 
 146. 347 U.S. at 493. 
 147. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973) (stating that education is 
not a fundamental right guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution); see also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221, 
230 (1982) (reaffirming that public education is not a constitutional right; holding that Texas could not 
deny free public education to school-age illegal immigrant children without showing that it was acting in 
furtherance of a substantial state interest); Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321, 333 (1983) (holding that a 
Texas statute restricting eligibility for tuition-free education was a bona fide residency requirement and 
was permitted under the Constitution); Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 465 (1988) 
(upholding a bus transportation fee imposed by North Dakota under the Constitution because the policy 
did not discriminate against any suspect class, interfered with no fundamental right, and served the 
legitimate government purpose of school district reorganization). 
 148. 438 U.S. 265. 
 149. The Bakke Court placed a great deal of emphasis on the Harvard College Admissions program 
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Court would view race-conscious programs designed to increase the educational 
opportunities available to historically disadvantaged minorities and to remedy past 
discrimination suffered by those minority groups in the educational realm.150 This 
case is particularly significant to my analysis for several reasons: (i) because the 
Bakke case was available to both Sciences Po and Texas for the instruction it offers 
on the type of affirmative action admissions program that will pass constitutional 
muster in the United States and the type of program that will likely give rise to 
substantial controversy and prove constitutionally fatal;151 (ii) because of its 
holding that race may be considered as a factor in designing admissions programs, 
and that diversity is a compelling, constitutionally permissible interest that can be 
pursued by the State in the structuring of its educational programs;152 and (iii) 
because of the deference the Powell Court accords to school officials regarding 
their structuring of ethno-race-conscious admissions policies that balance the 
interests of the academic institution with those of their applicant pools.153 
In the initial suit, a white male named Allan Bakke, whose previous 
applications for admission to the Medical School at the University of California at 
Davis (the “Medical School”) were denied, filed a claim against the Medical 
School alleging that the school’s special admissions program discriminated against 
him on the basis of his race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
described in the appendix to Justice Powell’s plurality opinion. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 321-24 (opinion of 
Powell, J.). Powell’s opinion evidences the Court’s recognition that certain race-conscious admissions 
programs may pass constitutional muster. Id. at 325-26. In addition, his favorable comments on elements 
of the Harvard admissions program provide some guidance to all schools on how they can design race-
conscious educational policies and programs that are constitutionally valid. Id. at 321-24. According to 
that program, no target number was set for the school’s goal of diversifying its students and the notion 
of diversity was defined broadly to take into account past academic performance, life experience, 
geographic region, musical talent, scientific ability, athletic ability, race, ethnicity, etc. Id. at 322-23. 
 150. See id. at 362 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting) (remedying 
effects of past societal discrimination is a sufficiently important interest to justify the use of race-
conscious admissions programs where minority underrepresentation is substantial because of handicaps 
caused by past discrimination). 
 151. See Daniel Sabbagh, The Rise of Indirect Affirmative Action: Converging Strategies for 
Promoting “Diversity” in Selective Institutions of Higher Education in the United States and France, 63 
WORLD POL. 470, 483 n.63 (2011) (discussing Science Po and the Supreme Court’s affirmative action 
discussion in Bakke); see also David Orentlicher, Affirmative Action and Texas’ Ten Percent Solution: 
Improving Diversity and Quality, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 181, 187 (1998) (discussing how Hopwood’s 
rejection of the Bakke standard, and the subsequent impact of Hopwood on minority admissions, led to 
the Texas legislature’s adoption of the Ten Percent Plan). 
 152. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 319-20, 311-12 (opinion of Powell, J.) (finding that diversity is a 
constitutionally valid goal and that, though the program at the Medical School violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment, there still may be significant state interests which might be properly served by the 
“competitive consideration of race” in an admissions program). Because the Bakke case produced six 
separate opinions, there was some question as to whether Justice Powell’s conclusion that diversity 
constitutes a legitimate compelling interest was part of the majority holding. Id. at 314-15. This issue 
was resolved in Grutter v. Bollinger, where the Court “endors[ed] Justice Powell’s view that student 
body diversity is a compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in university admissions.” 
539 U.S. at 325. 
 153. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314 (opinion of Powell, J.) (“[A] university must have wide discretion in 
making the sensitive judgments as to who should be admitted . . . .”). 
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Fourteenth Amendment, article I, section 21 of the California Constitution, and 
Section 601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.154 Specifically, Bakke 
complained about a program that the Medical School devised in the 1970s in 
response to the limited (or nonexistent) number of African Americans, Latino 
Americans, American Indians, and Asian Americans in the entering Medical 
School class of one hundred students.155 The approach the Medical School took 
carved out sixteen places of the existing one hundred slots and created a program 
that would operate in conjunction with the pre-existing admissions program, giving 
special attention to identifying “qualified” economically disadvantaged students 
and students who were members of minority groups.156 The U.S. Supreme Court 
affirmed the portion of the lower court’s judgment that held the Medical School’s 
special admissions program invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment, but reversed 
the portion of the lower court’s decision that held that the Medical School may not 
consider race as a factor in deciding upon which applicants to admit.157 
Specifically, the Bakke Court held that “the State has a substantial interest that 
legitimately may be served by a properly devised admissions program involving the 
competitive consideration of race and ethnic origin.”158 This groundbreaking aspect 
of the Bakke decision has been essential to the development of affirmative action 
policies in higher education and their treatment in the U.S. legal arena from the 
time of the holding to the present-day debates raging over ethnicity, race, and 
education.159 
A substantial portion of my analysis of the Texas Ten Percent Plan focuses on 
the admissions policy of the University of Texas at Austin (“UT Austin”). Bakke is 
relevant to my discussion because the Harvard College Admissions program 
favorably commented on by Justice Powell in Bakke, along with the University of 
Michigan plan challenged in Grutter, helped shape UT Austin’s admissions 
process.160 The Bakke Court’s holding that school officials may reference ethnicity 
and race as factors they may weigh in their admissions decisions and its recognition 
of diversity as a compelling interest are relevant to my analysis in several key 
respects. First, in making this allowance for ethnicity and race to be considered, 
 154. Id. at 276-78. 
 155. Id. at 272-76. 
 156. See id. at 274-75 (explaining that the minority groups that the program targeted included blacks, 
Latinos, Asians, and American Indians). 
 157. Id. at 320. 
 158. Id. 
 159. See Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., Hopwood, Bakke and the Future of the Diversity Justification, 29 
TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1998) (addressing the impact of Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke on 
institutions of higher learning in developing acceptable affirmative action admissions processes, and the 
potential for Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, to have a similar impact); see also Kimberly A. Pacelli, 
Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin: Navigating the Narrows Between Grutter and Parents Involved, 
63 ME. L. REV. 569, 572-73 (2011) (discussing how Bakke provided guidance as to how universities can 
use race in making admissions decisions). 
 160. Fisher, 631 F.3d at 217-18 (acknowledging that UT Austin’s race-conscious admissions 
program was modeled after the program in Grutter and influenced by Justice Powell’s opinion in 
Bakke). 
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there is an implicit acknowledgement that both factors operate in daily life in ways 
that can influence one’s access to vital resources, the quality of education one 
receives, and the employment prospects one has in society.161 Therefore, in order to 
counter the negative de facto discrimination that permeates society, some reliance 
on ethno-racial criteria may be necessary to address the disadvantages the majority 
may inflict on certain ethno-racial minorities.162 The Bakke Court does not phrase 
its ruling in these terms; in fact, it expressly rejects the purpose of “countering the 
effects of societal discrimination” as a compelling state interest justifying the 
reliance on ethno-racial classifications.163 Nonetheless, given the holding, which 
recognized diversity as a compelling interest and the allowance of ethno-racial 
factors in admissions decisions, Justice Powell’s opinion suggests some tacit 
agreement with the aforementioned view.164 Second, the Bakke holding regarding 
ethno-racial criteria functions as a fallback to proxy strategies in the United States 
if they fall short of their goal of admitting a meaningful number of 
underrepresented ethno-racial minorities to colleges and universities. That is, as I 
discuss later in this article, because of Bakke (and the Grutter Court’s reaffirmation 
of certain aspects of Bakke), Texas can resort to ethno-racial factors in its 
admissions process as its schools deem necessary, even though the State has 
enacted a percentage plan.165 The consequence is that Texas’ post-secondary 
schools have not been limited to the indirect strategy of the Ten Percent Plan.166 
Third, with Bakke, there is a thematizing of the concept of diversity, which has 
helped and hurt efforts to attain equal educational opportunity for ethno-racial 
minorities in the United States.167 The concept of diversity itself also may be 
viewed as a proxy to the extent that it serves as a code for discussing ethnicity and 
 161. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (indicating, through the inclusion of race and national origin as 
protected classes under Title VII, that a person’s race and/or ethnicity has an important impact on areas 
of life such as employment). 
 162. See id. (showing the government’s ability and willingness to protect individuals from 
discrimination based on their race and ethnicity). 
 163. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 306-10 (opinion of Powell, J.). 
 164. Id. at 311-14, 320. 
 165. See Pacelli, supra note 159, at 572-73 (discussing how Bakke provides guidance as to how 
universities can still use race in making admissions decisions; in particular, the Bakke Court noted that 
“the use of race as a ‘plus’ one factor could be appropriate”); see also Steven Thomas Poston II, The 
Texas Top Ten Percent Plan: The Problem It Causes for The University of Texas and a Potential 
Solution, 50 S. TEX. L. REV. 257, 265-66 (2008) (describing how the Texas Ten Percent Plan promotes 
racial diversity despite Texas’ racially segregated rural and urban high schools, by admitting the top 
10% of individual high schools and thereby creating diverse university classes; and how the program 
was in fact created in response Texas legislators’ consideration of ethno-racial factors). 
 166. The U.S. Supreme Court’s pending ruling in Fisher v. University of Texas may change this 
conclusion. Fisher will have a substantial impact on the legal landscape. The Court’s holding may 
affirm that all of the current strategies available to post-secondary schools remain as options or it may 
curtail (or even prohibit) the future use of ethno-racial criteria in college admissions decisions. My 
assessment of the implications of the Fisher decision will be the subject of a future law review article. 
 167. See Joshua P. Thompson & Damien M. Schiff, Divisive Diversity at The University of Texas: An 
Opportunity for the Supreme Court to Overturn Its Flawed Decision in Grutter, 15 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 
437, 440-41, 444-46 (2011) (discussing the introduction of diversity as a compelling state interest in 
constitutional law through Bakke). 
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race directly.168 The Bakke Court’s broad-based notion of diversity that is not 
limited to ethnicity and race is, like the other proxies that I analyze, insufficient to 
do the work necessary to accomplish the inclusion of a meaningful number of 
historically underrepresented ethno-racial minorities in academic institutions of 
higher education. The diversity goal casts a net that is too broad regarding who can 
be included under the heading. This shift in focus is evident from the language of 
the Bakke opinion, which asserts that “[e]thnic diversity . . . is only one element in 
a range of factors a university properly may consider in attaining the goal of a 
heterogeneous student body.”169 Bakke’s widening of the circle waters down the 
goal of improving access to equal educational opportunities for certain minorities 
especially African Americans, Latinos, and Native Americans. 
In the years that followed Bakke, there were a number of political shifts that 
took place. There were, for example, substantial moves in states such as 
California,170 Texas, and Florida toward further curtailing the use of affirmative 
action, which impacted whether ethno-race-conscious criteria could be relied upon 
in schools’ admissions processes. In Texas, the further entrenchment of a negative 
view towards any express reliance on ethno-race-based factors in admissions 
policies culminated in the case Hopwood v. Texas.171 
B.  Hopwood and the Design of the Texas Ten Percent Plan 
The Texas Top Ten Percent Plan was instituted in 1997, in the wake of 
Hopwood v. Texas.172 The Hopwood court rejected Justice Powell’s conclusion in 
Bakke that consideration of race or ethnicity by a university to achieve diversity in 
its student body is a compelling interest that satisfies the Fourteenth Amendment of 
the U.S. Constitution.173 Specifically, the Hopwood court, in ruling on the 
constitutionality of the admissions program at the University of Texas at Austin 
Law School (“UT Law School”), held: 
 
[T]he University of Texas School of Law may not use race as a 
 168. See Jacques Steinberg, Using Synonyms for Race, College Strives for Diversity, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 8, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/08/us/using-synonyms-for-race-college-strives-for-
diversity.html (explaining how admissions officers at Rice University used various means to include 
diverse candidates despite not being allowed to use terms like “black,” “Latino,” “minority,” etc., in 
their admissions decisions). 
 169. 438 U.S. at 314 (opinion of Powell, J.). 
 170. See California Proposition 209, California Ballot Pamphlet, General Election Nov. 5, 1996, 
(enacted as CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31) (“The state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential 
treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the 
operation of public employment, public education, or public contracting.”). 
 171. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996). 
 172. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.803 (West 2010). For the bill’s history, see H.B. 588, 1997 Leg., 
75 Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1997), 
http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/BillLookup/History.aspx?LegSess=75R&Bill=HB588. 
 173. See 78 F.3d at 948 (“In sum, the use of race to achieve a diverse student body, whether as a 
proxy for permissible characteristics, simply cannot be a state interest compelling enough to meet the 
steep standard of strict scrutiny . . . . [T]he key is that race itself not be taken into account.”). 
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factor in deciding which applicants to admit in order to achieve a 
diverse student body, to combat the perceived effects of a hostile 
environment at the law school, to alleviate the law school’s poor 
reputation in the minority community, or to eliminate any present 
effects of past discrimination by actors other than the law school.174 
 
Texas school officials were faced with a substantial challenge after the 
announcement of the Hopwood decision. In some ways, Texas’ higher academic 
public institutions were confronting a legal dilemma similar to that of Sciences Po 
prior to 2001, in that the Fifth Circuit’s175 interpretation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, like the reigning interpretation of the French Constitution, precluded 
the use of ethnicity and race-based policies to achieve diversity in their student 
populations. Like Sciences Po, in confronting a legal environment that constrains 
the use of language and strategies that explicitly reference ethnicity and race, U.S. 
universities and colleges generally have not abandoned the objective of achieving 
ethno-racial diversity in their student admissions, but instead have crafted creative 
ways to accomplish this goal.176 Texas provides one example of this ingenuity and 
dedication. After Hopwood, education and government officials began devising a 
way to maintain a certain number of underrepresented minority students admitted 
to public higher education institutions without explicitly referencing the ethnic and 
racial criteria schools had relied upon in the past as part of the admissions 
process.177 In short, the academic institutions sought to find an approach that would 
somehow capture the underrepresented minority population, yet operate in balance 
with the need for school administrators to maintain control over setting admissions 
criteria.178 
Prior to Hopwood, Texas public colleges and universities utilized various 
policies that allowed admissions committees to take into account ethno-racial 
factors in their respective decision-making processes.179 Given that UT Law 
 174. Id. at 962. 
 175. Hopwood was heard by a three-judge panel in which Judge Smith, joined by Judge Demoss, 
wrote the court’s opinion. Id. at 934. Judge Wiener did not join the panel’s holding that race may not be 
used as a factor in admissions decisions and wrote a separate opinion. Id. at 962-68 (Wiener, J., 
concurring). 
 176. See, e.g., Richard Kahlenberg, New Ways to Achieve Diversity in California, CHRON. HIGHER 
EDUC. BLOGS (Nov. 22, 2010, 11:23 AM), http://chronicle.com/blogs/innovations/new-ways-to-achieve-
diversity-in-california/27920 (describing California’s percentage plan and the consideration of 
socioeconomic obstacles as an admissions criterion); see also Derrick Bell, Diversity’s Distractions, 103 
COLUM. L. REV. 1622, 1628 (2003) [hereinafter Bell, Diversity’s Distractions] (describing how the 
majority in Gratz expressed favor towards percentage plans in states like Texas, California, and Florida). 
 177. See Steinberg, supra note 168 (describing how Rice University in Texas sought to achieve 
diversity in admissions post-Hopwood). 
 178. Id. 
 179. See, e.g., Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 935-38 (describing the admissions procedure for minority 
applicants to UT Law School, which gave minority applications more extensive review and 
consideration by the committee than other applicant files; additionally, UT Law School lowered general 
standards of admission for minority candidates, with the end goal of admitting a class comprised of 10% 
Mexican American students and 5% black students). 
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School’s program was the subject of the Hopwood case, it can serve as an example 
of the admissions policies that were permissible in a pre-Hopwood legal 
environment. Hopwood involved several white Texas residents who sought 
admission to UT Law School.180 The Hopwood plaintiffs claimed that the design of 
UT Law School’s admissions program operated to benefit Mexican Americans and 
African Americans to the detriment of white applicants and others who were not 
within the favored ethno-racial categories.181 UT Law School relied upon a mixture 
of hard and soft factors in rendering admissions decisions. These factors consisted 
of a candidate’s Texas Index (“TI”), which is composed of the individual’s LSAT 
score and undergraduate GPA,182 undergraduate institution, undergraduate major, 
residency, “background,” and “life experiences.”183 Several aspects of UT Law 
School’s program reflected a consideration of ethno-racial factors including: (i) the 
preliminary review of Mexican American and African American candidates’ files 
by a special committee who made recommendations to the full admissions 
committee,184 (ii) the downward adjustment of the permitted TI score for the 
admission of applicants within the target minority group,185 (iii) the placement of 
the target minority applicants onto a separate waiting list from those of non-target 
applicants,186 (iv) the ongoing reference to the target minority candidate waiting list 
in conjunction with issuing acceptances to fill out the remaining admission slots for 
the entering class,187 and (v) the stating of a desired percentage of target minority 
applicants to be admitted for each academic year.188 With the Hopwood ruling, 
these ethnicity- and race-sensitive machinations were no longer permissible 
because the court concluded that “any consideration of race or ethnicity by the law 
school for the purpose of achieving a diverse student body is not a compelling 
interest under the Fourteenth Amendment,”189 and, further, that “Justice Powell’s 
argument . . . has never represented the view of a majority of the Court in Bakke or 
any other case.”190 Although Hopwood concerned UT’s Law School, its impact was 
far-reaching. Consequently, after 1996, any public higher education admissions 
program in the State of Texas that expressly utilized racial and ethnic criteria was 
in jeopardy.191 
Faced with these limitations, Texas created an approach that relied upon 
 180. Id. at 938. 
 181. Id. at 934-35. 
 182. Id. at 935. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. at 936, 937. 
 185. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 936 (comparing the presumptive TI admission score for resident whites 
and non-preferred minorities of 199 to the presumptive TI admission score of Mexican Americans and 
blacks of 189). 
 186. Id. at 938. 
 187. Id. at 938 & n.11. 
 188. Id. at 937. 
 189. Id. at 944. 
 190. Id. 
 191. See Thompson & Schiff, supra note 167, at 458, 472 (describing the race-neutral means adopted 
by UT Austin post-Hopwood in order to achieve diversity). 
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geography, demographics, high school academic evaluative factors, and the 
awarding of an arbitrary percentage of students the “prize” of attending a Texas 
public university or college of their choice. This approach was encapsulated in 
House Bill 588. On May 20, 1997,192 George W. Bush, then Governor of Texas, 
signed into law HB 588, which became known as the Texas Top Ten Percent 
Plan.193 Under the percentage plan, as originally implemented,194 Texas high school 
students within the top 10% of their graduating class were granted automatic 
admission to the public state colleges and universities of their choice. The relevant 
language in the Texas Code provides: 
 
[E]ach general academic teaching institution shall admit an applicant 
for admission to the institution as an undergraduate student if the 
applicant graduated with a grade point average in the top 10[%] of 
the student’s high school graduating class in one of the two school 
years preceding the academic year for which the applicant is 
applying for admission and . . . the applicant graduated from a public 
or private high school in this state accredited by a generally 
recognized accredited organization or from a high school operated 
by the United States Department of Defense.195 
 
In order to understand how the Texas Plan operates as a proxy strategy, it is 
first important to note that it was designed with the severe racial and ethnic 
segregation that plagues the State of Texas in mind. Law professor and proponent 
of the scheme Michael Olivas predicted the measure would be “particularly 
efficacious in the State of Texas . . . as a result of the extreme racial isolation of its 
high schools” and would work to include previously marginalized students of 
schools in urban centers and in rural regions.196 It is clear that the continued success 
of the plan is predicated on the need for hyper-residential segregation to remain the 
status quo. The Ten Percent Plan applies to the entire State of Texas, and is facially 
race-neutral because the beneficiaries are determined according to high school rank 
and geographic region.197 Given that within the state there are numerous high 
 192. H.B. 588, 1997 Leg., 75th Reg. Sess (Tex. 1997). 
 193. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.803. 
 194. For information about recent modifications to the Texas Plan, see TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 
51.803 (a-1)-(a-3), which added an amendment limiting the number of students who are automatically 
granted admission to UT Austin under the program to 75% of all the seats allocated for Texas residents.  
This cap went into effect for the 2011-2012 academic year and is set to expire by the 2015-2016 
academic year. Id. See also Fisher, 631 F.3d at 224 n.56 (describing the 2010 amendment to the Texas 
Ten Percent Plan). 
 195. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.803(a). 
 196. Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Strict Scrutiny of Facially Race-Neutral State Action and the Texas Ten 
Percent Plan, 53 BAYLOR L. REV. 289, 326-27 (2001) (quoting Hearings on H.B. 588 Before the H. 
Higher Educ. Comm., 1997 Leg., 75th Reg. Sess. (Tex. Mar. 18, 1997) (testimony of Michael Olivas)). 
 197.  See id. at 326-28 (noting that the bill is race-neutral and that test scores were eliminated as an 
admissions criteria for students graduating in the top 10% of their high school class); see also Poston II, 
supra note 165, at 265-266 (explaining the details of the Texas Ten Percent Plan). 
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schools in which the student population is all black or Latino,198 a policy which 
admits the top 10% from every high school ensures that a substantial number of 
black and Latino students will be captured by this approach. The so-called 
“neutral” factors (namely, residency, high school rank) serve as proxies for ethno-
racial factors in that their application to the eligible Texas student population 
enables post-secondary academic institutions to achieve ethno-racial diversity 
without expressly referencing ethno-racial characteristics. A focus report completed 
in 2005 by a committee of the Texas House of Representatives appointed to assess 
the impact of the program and whether it should be continued199 reinforced the 
State’s reliance on the proxy strategy, noting that the purpose of the plan is “[t]o 
broaden access to public higher education institutions by promoting greater 
geographic, socioeconomic, and racial/ethnic representation without using race as 
an admissions criterion.”200 
 The proxy approach gave Texas schools the ability to achieve their broad 
goals of serving their student communities and providing a wide base of the Texas 
population access to premier state schools, without running afoul of the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI, as interpreted by the 
Fifth Circuit in Hopwood. 
1.  The Effectiveness of the Texas Plan: Increasing Ethno-Racial Diversity 
and Access to Education Opportunities for Underrepresented Ethno-Racial 
Minorities in the United States 
In contrast to the CEP program, which only applies to those regions selected 
by Sciences Po from the list of zones previously outlined by the French 
government,201 the Texas Plan applies equally to the entire state in conformity with 
the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment.202 The program’s broad 
application suggests that it should have an impressive impact on the areas of 
education access and equality; however, the available empirical data and focus 
reports do not support this conclusion. At best, the Texas Plan has functioned to 
assist administrators in maintaining the enrollment of underrepresented minorities 
at several key institutions in a legal environment that precluded the consideration of 
 198.  See CHRISTOPHER B. SWANSON, EDITORIAL PROJECTS IN EDUC. RESEARCH CTR., HIGH 
SCHOOL GRADUATION IN TEXAS 4 (2006), available at www.edweek.org/media/texas_eperc.pdf (citing 
statistics that show the degree of racial isolation in high schools in Texas’ largest districts, including 
Houston, Dallas, and San Antonio, is more than twice the average U.S. racial segregation level); see also 
Texas Education Report Card, REALIZE THE DREAM: QUALITY EDUCATION IS A CIVIL RIGHT, 
www.realizethedream.org/reports/states/texas/html (last visited Nov. 20, 2012) (“Texas is the 13th most 
segregated state for African Americans . . .[and] the 2nd most segregated state for Hispanics . . . .”). 
 199. RITA BARR, TEX. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES HOUSE RESEARCH ORG, FOCUS REPORT: 
SHOULD TEXAS CHANGE THE TOP 10 PERCENT LAW?, NO. 79-7, at 1 (Feb. 25, 2005), available at 
http://www.hro.house.state.tx.us/focus/topten79-7.pdf. 
 200. Id. at 3. 
 201. See supra text accompanying notes 80-90 (describing the CEP program and targeted zones). 
 202. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.803(a) (stating that the Ten Percent Plan applies to any 
accredited public or private high school, or a high school which is run by the Department of Defense, in 
the State of Texas). 
 
132 TEMPLE POLITICAL & CIVIL RIGHTS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:1 
ethno-racial factors in admissions policies.203 Like Science’s Po’s proxy approach, 
Texas’ plan has had a limited effect from the standpoint of achieving concrete gains 
in admitting underrepresented minority populations to quality education 
institutions. Rather than lauding the Texas Plan as the solution to education 
disparity issues, it is more appropriate to view it as an effective backstop measure. 
A comparison of minority enrollment numbers at UT Austin before and after the 
decision is telling.  In 1997 immediately after Hopwood Latino freshman 
enrollment decreased 4.3% and black freshman enrollment decreased 33.8%.204 By 
contrast after implementation of the Ten Percent Plan from 2003 to 2004, “African-
American enrollment increased from 4.1% to 4.5%, Hispanic enrollment increased 
from 16.3% to 16.9%, and Asian-American enrollment increased from 17.6% to 
17.9%.”205 
Texas Tech also reported an increase in minority student matriculation from 
its level of 13% in 2000 to 16% in 2007.206 It is also clear that a substantial 
percentage of underrepresented minority groups are admitted under the Ten Percent 
rubric. With regard to minority admissions across the State of Texas in 2004, “77% 
of the enrolled African-American students and 78% of the Hispanic students had 
been admitted under the Top Ten Percent Law, compared to 62% of Caucasian 
students.”207 There are, however, questions regarding whether the small increases in 
minority admissions may be attributed wholly to the Ten Percent Plan rather than to 
changing demographics and the concentrated minority recruitment efforts of some 
schools.208 The data suggests that the plan merely functioned to help sustain levels 
of student ethno-racial diversity but did not substantially advance the goals of 
access and equal opportunity for historically marginalized minorities in the United 
States.209 
 203. Some commentators maintain that the increases in minority enrollment are due to other factors 
such as more concentrated outreach programs and intense recruiting by college officials and not the Ten 
Percent Plan. Poston II, supra note 165, at 269. See Steinberg, supra note 168 (discussing generally the 
tactics that Rice University uses to increase ethno-racial diversity without formally accounting for race 
in its admissions process, including increasing “recruiting at schools with traditionally high minority 
populations”). 
 204. Danielle Holley & Delia Spencer, The Texas Ten Percent Plan, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
245, 251 (1999). The numbers were equally sobering at Texas A&M which experienced a decrease in 
the “freshman enrollment of Hispanic and black students” of “12.6% and 29% respectively.” Id. 
 205. Angela M. Hough, All Deliberate Ambiguity: The Question of Diversity, College Admissions, 
and the Future of the Texas Top-Ten-Percent Plan, 39 TEX. TECH L. REV. 197, 214 (2006); BARR, supra 
note 199, at 3. 
 206.  Poston II, supra note 165, at 268. It is important to bear in mind that these increases may be 
attributable, to some extent, to an increasing minority population and the case Grutter v. Bollinger which 
held the use of race and ethnicity in admission decisions as constitutional within the limits prescribed by 
the decision. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 207. Fisher, 631 F.3d at 224. 
 208. Poston II, supra note 165, at 269. 
 209. Texas’ Plan, however, has apparently, from the standpoint of class and geography, improved the 
access of students to colleges and universities in the State of Texas. Mark C. Long et al., Policy 
Transparency and College Enrollment: Did the Texas Top Ten Percent Law Broaden Access to the 
Public Flagships?, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI., Jan. 2010, at 82, 96-97 (“[T]he Top Ten 
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While the accomplishment of maintaining minority student admission levels 
should not be minimized, my thesis is that it is critical to not rely too heavily on 
proxy strategies like the Ten Percent Plan to the detriment of actually 
accomplishing the goals of true equality and access. True equality requires that 
significant numbers of underrepresented minorities have viable and sustainable 
entry points into quality post-secondary schools. The histories of the United States 
and France have entailed the oppression and exclusion of certain groups (for 
example, African Americans and peoples of African heritage in France). The 
histories must be a part of the solution.210 Since the educational disparities that 
historically unrepresented groups experience today may be traced in part to the 
historical treatment they as a group have endured in France and the United States, it 
is appropriate to keep that factor in mind when formulating higher education 
admissions policies. 
There are other shortcomings of the Texas Plan that highlight the dangers of 
depending exclusively on this strategy to tackle the vexing issue of educational 
equality. In order to take into account history, post-secondary institutions require 
latitude to formulate their admissions policies. One of the main shortcomings of the 
Texas Plan is the lack of flexibility it accords to the schools that fall within its 
purview. Under the original structure of the plan, students in the top 10% of their 
class were given the freedom to select the school of their choice. UT Austin and 
Texas A&M, as the state’s flagship schools, tend to be the preferred choices.211 As 
a result of their elite status, these institutions have experienced a substantial decline 
in the number of discretionary slots for out-of-state applicants and for in-state 
students who fall below the top 10% of their class. In general, the impact on the 
geographic make-up of the student admissions for Texas colleges and universities 
is remarkable.212 Of the 10,200 spaces reserved for Texas residents, in 2008, 8,984 
students were admitted under the Ten Percent Plan.213 With respect to UT Austin 
Percent Law appears to have broadened access to UT for high schools that traditionally sent fewer 
students there, particularly high-poverty and rural schools . . . .”). 
 210.  See TAMMIE O’NEIL & LAURE-HÉLÈNE PIRON, RIGHTS-BASED APPROACHES TO TACKLING 
DISCRIMINATION AND HORIZONTAL INEQUALITY 13 (2003), available at 
http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/docs/4555.pdf (explaining that by ignoring past discrimination, 
otherwise colorblind laws may fail to place discriminated groups on an equal footing, and will continue 
to disadvantage certain groups). 
 211.  See generally Poston II, supra note 165, at 258 (“Following the [Ten Percent] Plan’s 
implementation, an ever increasing majority of the entering freshman classes at Texas’ two flagship 
universities, UT Austin and Texas A&M, are composed of automatic admissions.”); TIENDA ET AL., 
supra note 25, at 52 tbl.5 (noting that students in the top 10% of their class are more likely to apply to 
UT Austin and Texas A&M). 
 212. See generally THE UNIV. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN, REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR, THE LIEUTENANT 
GOVERNOR, AND THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SB 
175 (Dec. 31, 2011), available at 
http://www.utexas.edu/student/admissions/research/SB_175_Report_for_2011.pdf (explaining the 
geographic diversity of Texas Universities and the plans in place to improve the admissions for students 
from impoverished areas). 
 213. Fisher, 631 F.3d at 239 (citing Implementation and Results of the Texas Automatic Admissions 
Law (HB 588) at the University of Texas at Austin, Demographic Analysis of Entering Freshmen Fall 
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specifically, of the seats slated for all Texas residents in 2008, 88% were made up 
of students who were admitted under the Ten Percent Plan; 81% of the entering 
first year class was composed of Top Ten Percent students.214 As a result of the 
lack of flexibility, schools must overlook many excellent students who, despite 
their talent, do not graduate in the top decile of their classes for any number of 
reasons which may relate to the competitiveness of the school or the difficulty of 
the courses they choose to take in high school. In terms of the impact on 
historically underrepresented ethno-racial minorities (for example, Latinos and 
African Americans), those who fall within the second or even third decile are likely 
to suffer while Caucasians who fall within the second-tier group are likely to be 
admitted at a higher rate in comparison.215 
Another shortcoming of the percentage plan is that even though Texas schools 
may have experienced a modest increase in minority enrollments since its 
introduction, the increase is insufficient in view of the overall goals of achieving 
ethno-racial diversity and equality of educational opportunity.216 Finally, the Plan 
relies upon the persistence of ethno-racial segregation in housing and high schools 
for its success and, therefore, works against the goal of diminishing this disturbing 
social reality.217 
2. Modifications to the Top Ten Percent Plan: The Seventy-Five Percent 
Cap 
In response to the concerns raised by Texas schools that the Plan leaves them 
with little flexibility to decide the composition of their entering classes, the Texas 
state legislature opted to modify the Ten Percent Law in 2009. An amendment that 
went into effect beginning with the 2011-2012 academic year limits the number of 
students who are automatically granted admission to UT Austin under the program 
to 75% of all the seats allocated for Texas residents.218 While students who are 
2008, Academic Performance of Top 10% and Non-Top 10% Students Academic Years 2003-2007, 
UNIV. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN OFFICE OF ADMISSIONS, 8 tbl.2 (2008),  
http://www.utexas.edu/student/admissions/research/HB588-Report11.pdf. [hereinafter Implementation 
and Results of the Texas Automatic Admissions Law]). 
 214. Id. at 227 (citing Implementation and Results of the Texas Automatic Admissions Law, supra 
note 213, at 8 tbl.2); see also Long et al., supra note 209, at 91 (explaining that there has been a steady 
increase in the share of students admitted under the Texas Plan from 41% in 1998 to 54% in 2002). 
 215. TIENDA ET AL., supra note 25, at 52 tbl. 5. 
 216. Some commentators have argued that the potential of the plan has not been realized, in some 
respects, because there are substantial numbers of minority students who attend high schools in low-
income neighborhoods who do not take advantage of their eligibility under the Ten Percent Plan and fail 
to apply for admission to flagship institutions like UT, for example. See, e.g., Long et al., supra note 
209, at 96 (stating that “low-income and minority-dominated schools are disproportionately located in 
large urban districts,” and discussing the “significant decline in the share of students from urban high 
schools enrolling at UT”). 
 217. Poston II, supra note 165, at 265-66. 
 218. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.803(a-1). The expiration date for the cap is the 2015-2016 
academic year. Id. § 51.803(a-3); Katherine Mangan, Federal Court Throws Out Challenge to U. of 
Texas Admissions Policy, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Aug. 17, 2009), http://chronicle.com/article/Federal-
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captured within the top 10% ranking are still deemed to qualify for admission, the 
legislative change restores some discretion to UT Austin by allowing it to size 
down the number of students admitted under the plan, in accordance with following 
guidelines: 
 
[B]y percentile rank according to high school graduating class 
standing based on grade point average, beginning with the top 
percentile rank, until the applicants qualified [for admission to UT] 
under [the Top Ten Percent Law] have been offered admission in the 
number estimated in good faith by the university as sufficient to fill 
75[%] of the university’s enrollment capacity designated for first-
time resident undergraduate students, except that the university must 
offer admission to all applicants with the same percentile rank.219 
 
This adjustment gives UT Austin more latitude; however, it also has the 
potential to negatively impact minority admissions because a smaller number may 
be automatically captured by the plan. The change also may positively affect 
minority admission. It depends upon how the schools exercise their discretion in 
filling the new non-designated spaces. The change does not entirely free academic 
institutions from judicial scrutiny.220 Ultimately, what the schools can do with this 
new latitude to improve the access of minorities to post-secondary schools depends 
upon what the prevailing legal environment permits. 
The foregoing sections serve to explain why Texas and Sciences Po adopted 
the surrogate strategies of the Ten Percent Plan and the CEP program, respectively, 
and highlight some of the limitations of those strategies from the standpoint of 
attaining equality in education. The next section explores possibilities for 
expanding those approaches, taking into account the legal frameworks (for 
example, national laws, legal principles, governing cases) and political climates in 
which they operate. 
III.  EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY IN FRANCE AND THE CURRENT 
FRENCH LEGAL LANDSCAPE 
Before discussing the relevant laws of France that impact whether the CEP 
program may be broadened to have a national reach including other grandes écoles, 
it is useful to place France’s concept of equality in context by commenting on an 
essential difference between France’s equality laws and those of the United States. 
The corrective aspects that are part of the United States’ history of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, Title VI, and Section 1981(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 are not 
built into France’s legal background. The majority of the French laws and 
Court-Throws-Out/48023/. 
 219. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.803(a-1). 
 220. See generally Fitzpatrick, supra note 196 (discussing the legal requirements and 
constitutionality of the Ten Percent Plan). 
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documents highlighted herein were not devised to address the history of slavery 
and colonization that France imposed on peoples of African descent. Thus, there is 
no foundational juridico-historical basis to the laws to make the argument that 
policies of ethno-race-based affirmative action should be allowed and not read as 
being in conflict with France’s equality laws.221 Whereas the United States’ 
equality laws, as I discuss later, grow out of a history of de jure and de facto 
segregation and discrimination, the main historical referents for the relevant French 
laws are the French Revolution and the desire to supplant a system heavily 
influenced by wealth, royalty, and clericalism.222 Unlike the laws of the United 
States which historically have allowed for the remedial legislation of affirmative 
action policies, civil rights laws, Title VI, and Title VII stand in conjunction with 
the equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution, thereby permitting ethno-race-based initiatives in certain contexts,223 
France’s legal universe prohibits any carving out of a similar type of legal space to 
protect or assist those of African heritage in achieving de facto equality.224 Given 
the present construction of French law, the approach France must take to address its 
ethno-racial (in)equality issues diverges from that of the United States. As the 
following discussion demonstrates, under the Republic’s current legal framework, 
France must adopt substitutes for ethno-race-conscious criteria when it seeks to 
implement a program that is, in part, designed to benefit a socially and 
economically disadvantaged community such as the African French residents of 
France. 
Given the current constraints of France’s laws, which do not allow for an 
express consideration of ethno-racial criteria, in order for substantial gains to be 
 221. See generally Cynthia A. Vroom, Equal Protection Versus the Principle of Equality: American 
and French Views on Equality in the Law, 21 CAP. U. L. REV. 199, 214-21 (1992) (overviewing the 
application of France’s equality laws and France’s notions of differential treatment). 
 222. See id. at 205 (“The French historical experience has been different than [the United States’] and 
has resulted in a different notion of legal equality. The principle of equality contained in article 6 of the 
Declaration of the Rights of Man was born of the French Revolution, a reaction to the excesses of the 
monarchy, feudal privileges of the nobility, and vastly disproportionate distribution of wealth and 
property.”); see also ROGOFF, supra note 28, at 313 (“The French Revolution was first and foremost 
about equality. Particularly infuriating for the great majority of French people at the time . . . was the 
privileged legal status enjoyed by the clergy and the nobility.”). 
 223. See Jared M. Mellot, Note, The Diversity Rationale for Affirmative Action in Employment After 
Grutter: The Case for Containment, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1091, 1093 (2006) (explaining that 
American employers and universities have been using race-centered hiring and admissions policies in 
order to increase diversity); Lieberman, supra note 81, at 200-03 (explaining how American 
employment discrimination law went from being color-blind to allowing affirmative action and other 
race-based initiatives). 
 224. Lieberman, supra note 81, at 193 (“France has carefully avoided classifying citizens by race or 
ethnicity . . . . Consequently, France has not explicitly adopted policies to target racially defined 
minorities, although social policies such as Educational Priority Zones . . . have come to be recognized 
as de facto instances of racial targeting.”); see also ROGOFF, supra note 28, at 313 (“Given the 
traditional republican commitment to strict legal equality, legislative attempts to assist disadvantaged 
groups are particularly problematic.”); Matlack, supra note 62 (“France has long opposed affirmative 
action on the grounds that—since the constitution requires everyone to be treated equally, and since 
everyone is fully French—no such programs are needed.”). 
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made in the areas of increased access and improvement of educational 
opportunities for the marginalized population of peoples of African heritage, 
France needs to revisit the issue of amending the relevant laws to allow ethno-race-
based policies to be effected. Before examining the issue of amending the French 
Constitution, a discussion of the panoply of laws and principles that are at stake in 
any proposed affirmative action policies is warranted. 
A.  French Laws and the Legal System: Legal Documents and Principles Bearing 
on Equality of Educational Opportunity and Access 
It is necessary to begin by identifying: (i) the chief legal documents and laws 
that are implicated in any equality of educational opportunity project that France 
undertakes to be more inclusive of ethno-racial minorities, and (ii) the fundamental 
principles and values articulated in those laws and documents that are germane to 
the aforementioned project. 
French constitutional law scholar John Bell highlights several essential 
documents in commenting upon the principle of equality in the French legal 
system.225 These documents are the 1958 Constitution of the French Fifth Republic 
(in particular, the Preamble and Article 1),226 the Declaration of the Rights of Man 
of 1789,227 and the Preamble to the 1946 French Constitution of the Fourth 
Republic (the “Preamble to the 1946 Constitution”).228 
Several provisions of the Declaration of the Rights of Man are relevant to the 
French Republic’s goal of ensuring the equality of its citizens and, depending upon 
their interpretation, may hinder a project to amend France’s laws to include 
equality provisions that expressly reference ethno-racial classifications aimed at 
addressing the inequities in education, wealth, employment, and social acceptance 
that many individuals of African heritage in France currently experience. From this 
standpoint, the most significant of the Declaration Articles are Article 1 and Article 
6: 
 
Article First. Men are born and remain free and equal in rights. 
Social distinctions may be based only on considerations of the 
common good. . . . 
Article 6. The Law is the expression of the general will. All citizens 
have the right to take part, personally or through their 
representatives, in its making. It must be the same for all, whether it 
protects or punishes. All citizens being equal in its eyes, shall be 
equally eligible to all high offices, public positions and 
employments, according to their ability, and without other distinction 
 225.  BELL, FRENCH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 45, at 57-77. 
 226.  1958 CONST. (Fr.). 
 227.  DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN OF 26 AUGUST 1789 (Fr.). 
 228.  1946 CONST. pmbl. (Fr.). Combined, these legal sources along with the Charter for the 
Environment of 2004 and other principles and instruments referenced in the aforementioned documents, 
are referred to as le bloc de constitutionalité (the constitutional block). ROGOFF, supra note 28, at 209. 
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than that of their virtues and talents.229 
 
The foregoing provisions contain the language of formal equality that France 
emphasizes in heralding the guarantees it makes to its citizens.230 What is striking 
about these sections is the absence of language that would allow for recognition of 
gender, ethno-racial, class or religious distinctions.231 Meritocracy appears to be 
paramount given the language in Article 6, which only allows for a consideration of 
individuals based on their abilities in connection with the distribution of certain 
social goods. From a legal standpoint, this provision for the equal treatment of 
individuals is admirable. The problem arises when the experiences of certain 
sectors of the population indicate that everyone is not being treated on an equal 
basis. This disparity is the dilemma that many African French people face.232 
The relevant sections of the Preamble to the 1946 Constitution, in terms of 
equality of educational opportunity provide: 
 
Section 1. In the morrow of the victory achieved by the free peoples 
over the regimes that had sought to enslave and degrade humanity, 
the people of France proclaim anew that each human being, without 
distinction of race, religion or creed, possess sacred and inalienable 
rights. They solemnly reaffirm the rights and freedoms of man and 
the citizen enshrined in the Declaration of Rights of 1789 and the 
fundamental principles recognized by the laws of the Republic. 
Section 13. The Nation guarantees equal access for children and 
adults to instruction, vocational training and culture. The provision 
of free, public and secular education at all levels is a duty of the 
State.233 
 
In comparison with the United States’ constitutional guarantees, which do not 
include a provision regarding education framed in similar terms, Section 13 of the 
1946 French Constitution marks a substantial difference. Section 13 raises access to 
education to the level of a fundamental constitutional right.234 In contrast, the 
 229. DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN OF 26 AUGUST 1789 (Fr.). 
 230.  Id. 
 231. Articles One and Six specifically state that no distinctions may be made other than on the merits 
of a person’s talents. Id. 
 232.  See Matlack, supra note 62 (“France has long opposed affirmative action on the grounds that—
since the constitution requires everyone to be treated equally, and since everyone is fully French—no 
such programs are needed. A beautiful idea, but it ignores the reality of the ghettos, which impede 
assimilation.”); Vroom, supra note 221, at 222 (“Yet equality of result as a goal also has its limits. 
France has not been immune to the shadow of racism, and with its increasingly large immigrant 
population there is a visible gap between opportunities available to ethnic French and those available to 
immigrants from different cultures . . . .”). 
 233. 1946 CONST. pmbl. (Fr.) (emphasis added). 
 234.  Id. § 13 (“The Nation guarantees equal access for children and adults to instruction, vocational 
training and culture. The provision of free, public and secular education at all levels is a duty of the 
state.”). 
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United States has moved away from this idea of education as a right guaranteed by 
the Constitution, as evidenced by the United States Supreme Court’s decision in 
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez.235 In Rodriguez, the Court 
expressly held that education is not a fundamental right protected by the United 
States Constitution236 stating that “at least where wealth is involved, the Equal 
Protection Clause does not require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages. 
Nor, indeed, in view of the infinite variables affecting the educational process, can 
any system assure equal quality of education except in the most relative sense.” 237 
 The sentiment of the Rodriguez Court is counter to that expressed in Section 
13. Perhaps then, even more so for France than the United States, there is leverage 
to make a constitutional claim regarding the disparities in education that the 
government’s failure to provide meaningful opportunities for a substantial portion 
of the African French population to obtain a quality post-secondary education is a 
violation of their constitutional rights. Social unrest, the state of schools situated 
within residential areas populated by African French people,238 and the apparent 
dearth of African French individuals in positions of economic affluence and 
political power,239 suggest that the ideal embodied in the language of Section 13 is 
currently not being met. Therefore, strategies which would facilitate the fulfillment 
of the constitutional guarantee (for example, ethno-race-based policies) must be 
given more weight. The Sciences Po program is only one program. It is woefully 
insufficient to address the inequalities in education that the African French 
population experience as compared with the majority white French population. As I 
argue that the French Constitution should be amended to allow for reference to 
ethno-racial categories in connection with formulating future affirmative action 
policies, Section 13 could serve as the predominant legal basis for this amendment. 
 While the foregoing documents are important touchstones of the French 
Republic’s identity, Article 1 of the 1958 French Constitution is the provision often 
cited as establishing and encapsulating the notion of formal equality.240 The idea 
that all French citizens are equal before the law is central to France’s legal order.241 
Article 1 provides in relevant part: “France shall be an indivisible, secular, 
democratic and social Republic. It shall ensure the equality of all citizens before the 
 235. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). But see Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 226-30 (1982) (holding that public 
schools are prohibited from denying immigrant students access to public education). 
 236. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35. The Supreme Court reaffirmed this holding in subsequent decisions, 
including Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221; Martinez, 461 U.S. at 328 n.7 (1983); and Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 458. 
 237. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 24. 
 238. See Matlack et al., supra note 62 (detailing the circumstances causing the 2005 riots in 
residential Parisian suburbs by young adults from African and Arab families, stating “[m]ix in racial 
discrimination, crumbling education systems, and scant representation of ethnic minorities among the 
political and business elite, and it’s easy to see why young immigrants are alienated”). 
 239. Id. 
 240. BELL, FRENCH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 45, at 199 (using an edition of the 1958 
Constitution that places the text of Article 1 into Article 2, Bell states that equality “is now enshrined in 
article 2 of the Fifth Republic Constitution of 1958 . . . .”). 
 241.  Id. (“Equality has stood at the core of the French republican tradition ever since the Revolution 
of 1789.”). 
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law, without distinction of origin, race or religion. It shall respect all beliefs. It 
shall be organized on a decentralized basis . . . .”242 
 It is, in particular, because of the language in Article 1, and similar language 
in Section 1 of the 1946 Constitution,243 that the French government and other 
institutions that seek to find ways to be more inclusive of ethno-racial minorities, 
through hiring policies or educational programs, must resort to alternative strategies 
that do not explicitly reference ethnicity or race.244 French legal scholar, Gwénaële 
Calvès explains that “[t]he word ‘distinction’ [as used in the French Constitution] 
must . . . be understood in its original and most basic sense: current legislation 
prohibits—except under very restricted circumstances—labeling, classifying, or 
counting citizens by their religious affiliations, ‘racial’ characteristics, or national 
origins.”245 In accord with this view, French scholar Daniel Sabbagh concludes that 
because of the language of Article 1, which precludes any distinction based upon 
origin, race, or religion, “corrective or ‘remedial’ uses of race by state authorities” 
will be treated by French courts as “‘invidious’. . . and simply ruled out.”246 
While it is clear that France opposes racial and ethnic discrimination247 and 
that the country has a deep commitment to the idea of equality for all individuals 
residing within its borders,248 it is also evident that people in France encounter 
ethnic and racial discrimination,249 which can have a negative impact on their 
quality of life. As the current French legal terrain stands, there is no constitutional 
amendment on the agenda to change this reality, which means that any policies 
designed to address ethno-racial disparities must conform to the prevailing legal 
framework. The architects of the Sciences Po’s CEP program took the constraints 
 242.  1958 CONST. (Fr.) (emphasis added). 
 243.  1946 CONST. pmbl. (Fr.) (“[T]he people of France proclaim anew that each human being, 
without distinction of race, religion or creed, possesses sacred and inalienable rights.”). 
 244. Sabbagh, Affirmative Action in the United States and France, supra note 4, at 1-2. 
 245. Calvès, supra note 89, at 219. 
 246. Daniel Sabbagh, The Collection of Ethnoracial Statistics: Developments in the French 
Controversy, FRENCH-AM. FOUND., 1, (Feb. 2008), 
http://equality.frenchamerican.org/sites/default/files/sabbagh_ethnicstatistics_brief_en.pdf [hereinafter 
Sabbagh, The Collection of Ethnoracial Statistics]. 
 247. In addition to signing off on the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination [ICERD.], Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (signed by France Jul. 28, 1971), 
available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/pdf/cerd.pdf, France has added anti-discrimination 
measures to its Criminal Code, CODE PÉNAL [C. PÉN.] art. 225-1 (Fr.), and the Act of July 1972, Loi 72-
546 du 1er juillet 1972 relative à la lutte contre le racisme [Law 72-546 of July 1, 1972 pertaining to the 
Fight Against Racism], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE 
OF FRANCE], Jul. 2, 1972, p. 6803. Jacqueline Costa-Lascoux, French Legislation Against Racism and 
Discrimination, 20 J. ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUD. 371, 372 (1994). 
 248. See Costa-Lascoux, supra note 247, at 372 (quoting Loi 89-548 du 2 août 1989 relative aux 
conditions de séjour et d’entrée des étrangers en France [Law 89-548 of August 5, 1989 on the 
conditions of stay and entry of foreigners in France] J.O., Aug. 8, 1989) (“From its inception, the French 
Republic has affirmed the principles of hospitality and tolerance which are its own. Consequently, it 
prohibits and condemns racism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia in all the territories under its authority.”). 
 249. See id. at 378 (providing examples of racist incidents that have led to litigation in France); BEN 
JELLOUN, supra note 49, at 47-61 (commenting on ethnic and race-based prejudice experienced by 
peoples of African heritage in France during the colonial period). 
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of the legal landscape into account when drafting their initiative.250 In fact, the 
school administrators at the Sciences Po looked to the American political and legal 
scene for criticisms of U.S. affirmative action education policies and sought to take 
some of the prominent objections into account when crafting their own plan in 
order to anticipate and deflect any fatal challenges.251 Evidence of the influence of 
U.S. affirmative action education policies is apparent in the flexible structuring of 
the Sciences Po’s approach, which allows for an increase in the number of 
admissions to accommodate the CEP track. The creation of new slots is a 
significant departure from U.S. programs. Typically U.S. programs have not added 
new slots, but merely carved places out of already existing admission slots,252 
leading to criticisms that minority students, benefitting from affirmative action, 
were taking the spaces of white candidates.253 Bakke gave voice to these criticisms. 
In Bakke, the Court viewed the Medical School’s race-conscious admissions 
program as operating to decrease the number of admission slots that were 
previously available to white students, commenting that “some individuals are 
excluded from enjoyment of a state-provided benefit—admission to the Medical 
School—they otherwise would receive.”254 That is, the Court accepted the view 
that, with the implementation of the special program, white students were only 
allowed to compete for eighty-four out of the one hundred available seats in the 
entering class whereas minority students were purportedly allowed to compete for 
every available seat.255 The Bakke court emphasized that race-based admissions 
programs must be evaluated in terms of whether they place undue pressures on 
“innocent persons” who are asked “to bear the burdens of redressing grievances not 
of their making.”256 The Court struck down the Medical School’s program because: 
 
[The program] tells applicants who are not Negro, Asian, or Chicano 
that they are totally excluded from a specific percentage of the seats 
 250.  See, e.g., Interview with Richard Descoings, supra note 21, at 2-3 (explaining that Sciences Po 
looked to the United States in constructing the CEP program to fit within the French Republic system). 
 251. Id.; see also Sabbagh, Affirmative Action at Sciences Po, supra note 70, at 52 n.37 (offering a 
different view on Bakke and the Sciences Po’s policy). 
 252. See, e.g., Bakke, 438 U.S. at 272-77 (explaining that the University of California at Davis 
Medical School’s admissions process fixed the number of available seats for its entering class while 
increasing the number of minorities through a separate admissions program, thereby increasing minority 
enrollment from approximately 6% in 1958 to 23% in 1974). 
 253. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 123 (5th ed. 2004) [hereinafter 
BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW] (remarking that the majorities in Bakke and Grutter 
appeared “paranoid” over the possibility of “unduly trammel[ing] the interests or expectations of 
‘innocent’ nonminorities”); see also Sabbagh, Affirmative Action at Sciences Po, supra note 70, at 52 
(noting that some opponents of the program criticized it as “flatly abusive,” rather than suggesting 
alternatives to achieve a shared goal). 
 254. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 305 (opinion of Powell, J.). 
 255. Id. at 289. 
 256. Id. at 298; see also BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW, supra note 253, at 132-33 
(addressing the problems with describing affirmative action programs in terms of “innocents”); 
Freeman, supra note 111, at 29-31 (same); Thomas Ross, Innocence and Affirmative Action, 43 VAND. 
L. REV. 297, 299-310 (1990) (same). 
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in an entering class. No matter how strong their qualifications, 
quantitative and extracurricular, including their own potential for 
contribution to educational diversity, they are never afforded the 
chance to compete with applicants from the preferred groups for 
special admission seats. At the same time, the preferred applicants 
have the opportunity to compete for every seat in the class.257 
 
Cognizant of this criticism, the Sciences Po opted to expand its class sizes to 
accommodate the acceptance of CEP students.258 Due to this structuring of the 
program, the CEP plan has thus far survived the political storms surrounding it and 
the constitutional challenges and criticisms launched against it.259 There are, 
however, some drawbacks to this approach. First, the broadening of the program to 
include more ethno-racial candidates will always be constrained by the financial 
resources the school has to expand its class sizes. To the extent that expanded class 
sizes may negatively impact the learning experience (e.g., increased teacher–
student ratios), it may not be desirable to continue to modify an admissions 
program in this way. Second, at some point, courts and the general populace may 
no longer accept the view that the newly created spaces are different from the 
admission slots that were previously in place. If this happens, the Sciences Po will 
have to contend with arguments that the new slots along with the previously 
existing ones should be open for competition by all candidates. Third, the approach 
reinforces the idea that the status quo pool of applicants (that is, white middle- and 
upper-class students) are entitled to a certain number of seats at the Sciences Po. 
That is, notwithstanding the implementation of the CEP plan, the Sciences Po is 
still primarily operating from the philosophy that admission slots are “merit badges 
or prizes for some innate talent or past performance or industry,”260 rather than 
“opportunities that are properly offered to those who show the most promise of 
future contribution to goals the university rightfully seeks to advance.”261 Given 
this perspective, the impact that the institution can have on increasing educational 
opportunities for ethno-racial minorities and expanding ethno-racial diversity will 
remain severely limited. Fourth, the dedication of a specified number of spaces to 
CEP students that are awarded according to alternative criteria creates the special 
track problem criticized by the Bakke court, which led to the Medical School’s 
 257. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 319-20 (opinion of Powell, J.). 
 258. See Sabbagh, Affirmative Action at Sciences Po, supra note 70, at 52 (explaining that Sciences 
Po did not decrease the number of spaces reserved for students who gained admission under the 
traditional process). 
 259.  Id. at 52 n.6 (citing unsuccessful challenges to the policy); Amelia Gentleman, France Rules on 
Elite Education for Poorest: University May be Prevented from Targeting Pupils in Deprived Areas, 
GUARDIAN (U.K.), Nov. 6 2003, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/nov/06/highereducation.internationaleducationnews?INTCMP=
SRCH (reporting on an imminent ruling on the admissions policy by the Paris appeals court); Polakow-
Suransky, supra note 99 (recalling that the admissions policy withstood an immediate legal challenge 
from the National Interuniversity Union in a Paris appeals court). 
  260. Dworkin, supra note 109. 
 261. Id. 
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admissions program being held unconstitutional.262 So, while the Sciences Po’s 
plan avoids one potential problem, its structure remains vulnerable to a pitfall that 
the Bakke case highlights. 
Nevertheless, thanks to the overall careful design of the program, it has 
weathered the constitutional challenges it has confronted thus far. A look at the 
legal challenges posed and the resulting endorsements and legal restrictions placed 
on the program is useful for identifying the further actions that must be taken in 
order to accomplish educational equality in France. 
B.  Signs of Change: Support for and Resistance to the CEP Program 
1. France’s Constitutional Council, the French Parliament, and Court 
Challenges 
There are signs that an ideological shift is underway in certain sectors of 
France that allows for conversations regarding affirmative action to take place and 
helps to sustain a radical undertaking like the CEP plan. Signs of ideological 
change are found in the legal system’s responses to challenges to the CEP program 
and legislative action. The CEP initiative met and survived several legal tests. A 
conservative right-wing student group, the National Interuniversity Union 
(“UNI”),263 brought an unsuccessful court challenge against the plan in its early 
days.264 UNI charged that the creation of an alternative admissions track that was 
defined solely according to the locale in which students reside violated the “French 
constitutional guarantee of equal opportunity.”265 One of the UNI members 
complained that the program “goes against the core French tradition of equality of 
opportunity,” remarking that “[t]he law guarantees that all lycée [high school] 
students should be treated equally, but Sciences-Po [sic] has decided to ignore that 
principle.”266 A Paris court of appeals rejected that argument in November 2003, 
opting instead to affirm the constitutionality of the program.267 
Another sign of change is the French Parliament’s passage of a bill on June 
28, 2001 in support of the program. Following its passage, the Conseil 
constitutionnel, or Constitutional Council, ex officio raised the matter of the 
legislation’s constitutionality.268 The law, referred to as Article 14,269 provides in 
 262. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 319-20 (opinion of Powell, J.). 
 263. UNI is a major right-wing student union in France. Polakow-Suransky, supra note 99. 
 264. Gentleman, supra note 259. In 2001, the conservative group’s request for an immediate hearing 
was turned down by the Conseil Constitutionnel. Daley, supra note 20. 
 265. Polakow-Suransky, supra note 99. 
 266. Gentleman, supra note 259. 
 267. Burton Bollag, A French Court Supports an Elite University’s Affirmative-Action Program, 
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Nov. 21, 2003), http://chronicle.com/article/A-French-Court-Supports-
an/24832; Gentleman, supra note 259; Aisha Labi, Lessons From—Quelle Horreur!—les Americains, 
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Sept. 2, 2005), http://chronicle.com/article/Lessons-From-Quelle/13604; 
Polakow-Suransky, supra note 99. 
 268. ROGOFF, supra note 28, at 335. 
 269. Id. 
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relevant part: 
 
The governing board of the Institute of Political Studies of Paris may 
determine, by derogation from the provisions of the third paragraph 
of article L. 621-3, the conditions and procedures for admission to 
the Institute’s programs as well as the organization of its programs of 
study for the first cycles of its doctoral program. It may adopt 
admissions procedures that include particular modalities aimed at 
assuring the recruitment of a diverse student body from among 
undergraduate students. The admissions procedures may be 
implemented by way of agreements concluded with French or 
foreign secondary or higher educational institutions, in order to 
involve them in the Institute’s recruitment of their pupils or students 
. . . .270 
 
Before commenting on the outcome of this challenge, some explanation 
regarding France’s high advisory legal institution, the Constitutional Council, is 
necessary.271 Scholar John Bell examined certain decisions of the Constitutional 
Council and concluded that “the Conseil’s notion of equality is . . . mainly 
concerned with non-discrimination in relation to specific constitutional values . . .  
rather than with requiring the legislator to seek substantive equality of outcomes, 
 270. Id. For a reproduction of the law, see infra Appendix (quoting Constitutional Court decision No. 
2001-450DC, supra note 28, ¶ 32 (Fr.)). The official French version is available online at 
http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/francais/les-decisions/acces-par-
date/decisions-depuis-1959/2001/2001-450-dc/decision-n-2001-450-dc-du-11-juillet-2001.508.html (last 
visited Oct. 19, 2012). 
 271. The Constitutional Council is charged with reviewing the legislation of the Parliament and the 
executive. BELL, FRENCH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 45, at 31-32. Although a “third branch” of 
government, the Consitutional Council is not exactly the equivalent of the U.S. Supreme Court. See id. 
at 23, 27-28, 30-32, 55, 242 (identifying some of the main differences between the U.S. and French 
consitutional institutions). The chief role of the Conseil is to keep the other organs of the government 
within the limits of the French constitution. Id. at 21, 242. The Constitutional Council, similar to the 
U.S. Supreme Court, is a “supervisor of last resort” when a fundamental right is violated or threatened. 
Id. at 242. The Parliament has the leading responsibility of giving substance to fundamental rights. Id. 
The jurisdiction of the Constitutional Council is “limited to reviewing lois before they are promulgated; 
once promulgated a loi becomes immune from challenge in the ordinary courts.” Id. at 55. Bell describes 
the nominating process for the Constitutional Council as follows: 
[T]here are no criteria for membership of the Conseil other than having been nominated 
  by either the President of the Republic, the President of the Senate, or the President of the 
  National Assembly. One member is appointed by each of these three every three years for a 
  non-renewable term of nine years. . . . In addition, all past Presidents of the Republic are 
  members for life. 
BELL, FRENCH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 45, at 34. 
Despite the fact that past Presidents of the Republic are technically members of the court, none 
have assumed their seats since the Fifth Republic. The seated members, therefore, number nine. Id. at 
34, 40. The President of the Republic appoints three members. Three members are appointed by the 
President of the National Assembly and three members are appointed by the President of the Senate. 
Stéphanie Cottin & Jérôme Rabenou, Researching French Law, GLOBALEX (May 2005), 
http://nyulawglobal.org/globalex/france.htm. 
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resources, or opportunities.”272 
While the foregoing assessment suggests that the Council would not be in 
favor of an affirmative action policy, even one that is not based on race or ethnicity, 
the Constitutional Council nonetheless issued a decision on July 11, 2001 (Decision 
no. 2001-450 DC) holding that the June 28, 2001 French Parliament law under the 
education code, which upholds the Sciences Po’s action to implement the CEP 
plan, is in conformity with the French constitution: “[O]n the condition that [the 
admissions criteria implemented for the CEP program] are based on objective 
criteria of a nature to guarantee respect for the constitutional requirement of equal 
access to education.”273 
In so ruling, the Council specifically referenced Section 13 of the Preamble to 
the 1946 Constitution,274 underscoring that this provision is the appropriate focal 
point for discussions involving French laws and any radical changes needed to 
attain diversity in educational institutions. The Council’s ruling is encouraging and 
suggests that, perhaps, additional equalizing socio-economic policies and programs 
could be developed within the parameters of currently existing French laws and be 
constitutionally valid. The ruling also supports my argument that formal equality, 
while important, only goes so far. Article 14 indicates the French legislature’s 
recognition of the limits of formal equality.275 The ruling also marks a shift in the 
French government’s focus towards the objectives of “equality of outcomes, 
resources, [and] opportunities.”276 This shift may allow institutions to effect deep 
meaningful changes in French society to address the disparities that certain ethno-
racial minorities experience. The Council does not go so far as to state that the 
“modalities” that may be adopted can be expanded to take note of ethno-racial 
classifications. If this variation were possible, then French universities would not 
be limited to working within pre-established segregated zones to achieve their 
objectives. That is, post-secondary institutions could specifically delineate the 
ethno-racial population that they are seeking to target without reference to 
geographic location, make the case that this population has been denied equal 
access to education and is in need of special assistance to alter the status quo, and 
track the status of the target group as the various programs move forward. The 
potential restrictive aspect of the Council’s ruling in relation to the foregoing 
proposed plan concerns the question that is left unanswered: How does the Council 
define “objective criteria” that is “of a nature” that is in conformity with the equal 
access requirement of Section 13? 
While the French legal establishment’s responses to the Sciences Po’s plan 
thus far are affirming, the restrictions on making distinctions between people on the 
basis of race and ethnicity remain intact. Therefore, there are substantial limitations 
on what can be accomplished from the standpoint of the goal of ethno-racial 
 272. BELL, FRENCH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 45, at 200. 
 273. Constitutional Court decision No. 2001-450DC, supra note 28, at 336. 
 274. Id. 
 275. Id. 
 276. BELL, FRENCH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 45, at 200. 
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inclusion and access at the post-secondary education level. It is my argument that if 
the Republic wishes to improve or equalize the access that African minorities have 
to educational opportunities at prestigious French universities then it will need to 
implement policies utilizing ethno-race-conscious criteria. In order to do this, it is 
necessary to amend the French constitution. My conclusion is in keeping with 
recent proposals that have emerged in the context of France’s ongoing debate about 
national identity, the direction of the nation, and its policies concerning disaffected 
sectors. 
2.  Amending the French Constitution 
Recognition that the French Republic’s goal of egalité has not yet been 
realized, fear of ongoing socio-political unrest similar to the uprisings in 2005, and 
awareness of other national models (for example, the United States’ model) for 
addressing ethno-racial inequality motivated French President Nicolas Sarkozy277 
to explore more aggressive options for changing the status quo in France.278 For 
example, while serving as Minister of Finance in 2004, Sarkozy announced his 
intention to investigate whether Article 1 and the Preamble to the 1958 French 
Constitution should be amended to allow for affirmative action policies to be 
introduced in France.279 
President Sarkozy selected respected political figure Simone Veil280 to 
organize and head a committee that would determine whether the Preamble should 
be amended.281 In December 2008, the committee issued its report (the “Veil 
Constitution Report”).282 After extensively studying affirmative action policies in 
 277. Sarkozy was president from 2007 until 2012. Times Topics: Nicolas Sarkozy, N.Y. TIMES (May 
15, 2012), http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/s/nicolas_sarkozy/index.html. In 
April 2012, France elected François Hollande as its new president. Id. 
 278. See, e.g., Elizabeth K. Dorminey, France Says Non to Affirmative Action: Will the U.S. Do the 
Same?, ENGAGE, July, 2009, at 42, 43, available at http://www.fed-
soc.org/doclib/20090720_DormineyEngage102.pdf (noting that in 2004 President Sarkozy, as part of his 
constitutional reform efforts, commissioned a report to determine whether the Preamble to the French 
Constitution should be revised to “permit . . . minorities to gain access to opportunities in education and 
employment on a preferential basis” to combat social unrest and high crime “among minorities who are 
disproportionately unemployed and undereducated”); see also France Backs Constitutional Reform, 
BBC NEWS (Jul. 21, 2008), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7517505.stm (explaining that Sarkozy’s 
constitutional reforms, which were one of his “key election pledges,” passed through Parliament). 
 279. Dorminey, supra note 278, at 43. The 1958 Preamble to the French Constitution, in relevant 
part, states: “The French people solemnly proclaim their commitment to the Rights of Man and the 
principles of national sovereignty as have been defined in the Declaration of 1789, confirmed 
and complemented by the Preamble to the Constitution of 1946 . . . .” 1958 CONST. pmbl. (Fr.). 
 280. See, e.g., Pascale Fréry, Simone Veil, FRANCE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, 
http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/Politics-Simone-Veil.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2012) (explaining that 
Ms. Veil, currently a member of France’s Constitutional Council, previously served as both President of 
the European Parliament and as French Minister; Ms. Veil is also an Auschwitz survivor). 
 281. Dorminey, supra note 278, at 42-43. 
 282. Id.; COMITÉ DE RÉFLEXION SUR LE PRÉAMBULE DE LA CONSTITUTION, REDÉCOUVRIR LE 
PRÉABULE DE LA CONSTITUTION: RAPPORT AU PRÉSIDENT DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE (2008) (Fr.), available at 
http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/var/storage/rapports-publics/084000758/0000.pdf. 
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other countries and the spirit and goals of the foundational documents of the French 
nation, including the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the 1958 French 
Constitution, the committee concluded that amending the French Constitution to 
facilitate the implementation of affirmative action policies would be counter to the 
basic guiding laws and principles of the nation.283 The committee concluded that 
the 1958 Constitution, in its unmodified form, provides ample protection for the 
“fundamental rights” articulated by the French nation.284 Specifically, the Veil 
Constitution Report states: 
 
Overall, the committee did not recommend in the Preamble of the 
Constitution the adoption of affirmative action measures founded on 
ethnic or racial grounds regardless of whether they would be 
conceived as temporary or not. This was not, in the committee’s 
opinion, the meaning of the question it was asked to interpret in the 
mission letter spelling out the assignment. It therefore did not 
recommend that Article I of the Constitution which guarantees 
“the equality of all citizens before the law without distinction as to 
ethnic origin, race or religion,” be modified in such manner.285 
 
Other prominent French scholars, such as Patrick Weil, have also expressed 
opposition to amending the Constitution in this regard, arguing that inserting 
language permitting ethno-racial classifications recalls the days of slavery, 
colonization, and the Vichy regime.286 Patrick Weil reasons that the current 
language of the French 1958 Constitution, which prohibits such distinctions, is 
designed to ensure that similar atrocities against humanity do not happen again.287 
Another compelling argument against the use of ethno-racial criteria and the 
collection of ethno-racial statistics in any form is offered by Dominique Sopo, 
President of SOS Racisme, a prominent anti-discrimination group in France.288 
Sopo comments: 
 
[T]he way in which identity has been constructed in France is very 
 283. Dorminey, supra note 278, at 43. 
 284. Id. at 43-44; ROGOFF, supra note 28, at 221. 
 285. COMITÉ DE RÉFLEXION SUR LE PRÉAMBULE DE LA CONSTITUTION, supra note 282, 44-45 (trans. 
Kristen Barnes) (“Au total, le comité n’a donc pas recommandé d’autoriser, dans le Préambule de la 
Constitution, des politiques d’action positive à fondement ethnique ou racial, fussent-elles conçues 
comme provisoires. Tel n’était du reste pas, à ses yeux, le sens qu’il fallait prêter à la question qui lui 
était posée dans la letter de mission qui lui était addressée. Il n’a donc pas proposé que soit modifié en 
ce sens l’article 1er de la Constitution Assurant «l’égalité devant la loi de tous les citoyens sans 
distinction d’origine, de race ou de religion».”). 
 286. Interview with Patrick Weil, Entretien Avec Patrick Weil, Directeur de Recherche Au Cnrs «Il 
faut passer à l’action au lieu de se contenter de symboles!», LE MONDE (Fr.), Dec. 18, 2008, 
http://www.lemonde.fr/cgibin/ACHATS/acheter.cgi?offre=ARCHIVES&type_item=ART_ARCH_30J
&objet_id=1062848&xtmc=il_faut_passer_a_l_action_au_lieu_de_se_contenter_de_symboles&xtcr=1. 
 287. Id. 
 288. Interview with Dominique Sopo, supra note 56, at 1. 
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different from what happened in the U.S. For example, the category 
“black” would be very problematic in the French context, because in 
this country an individual’s identity can be defined in many ways. To 
take my own case, I could decide to classify myself as French, or as 
black, or as métis (“mixed-race”), or as Togolese, or even French-
Togolese. In France, if you invite people to classify themselves, 
you’ll end up with dozens, if not hundreds, of different answers. So, 
for ethno-racial categories to have any kind of utility, one would be 
forced to consolidate these answers into a smaller number of labels. 
But this would leave us with a statistical apparatus that wouldn’t 
allow people to decide for themselves who they are, and which 
eventually could harden into a normative, or even a prescriptive, set 
of requirements.289 
 
Notwithstanding these objections, it is important to note some of the 
benefits290 that the French government could reap from officially recognizing 
ethno-racial classifications. If ethno-racial categories are recognized, then accurate 
statistics on majority and minority populations can be collected and a 
comprehensive assessment of how various groups are faring in education, 
employment, and in attaining access to other vital goods and services can be 
undertaken, instead of leaving these tasks to guesswork.291 While the concerns of 
Weil, Sopo, and the Veil Commission should not be discounted, amending the 
constitution to allow for ethno-racial classifications to be recognized in connection 
with effectuating certain equalizing policies is not incongruous with France’s 
foundational principle of equality. As long as such criteria are used in a careful, 
sensitive, and monitored way, it could help to improve the lives of French citizens 
and residents overall while remaining faithful to the paramount goal of equality. 
Further, the concerns expressed by Sopo miss the point that regardless of whether 
ethno-racial statistics are collected, people, historically, have formed opinions 
about others, in France and the United States, when differences are detected based 
upon numerous factors including phenotype features, religious practices, and 
origins. This phenomenon has proven to be, in the history of both countries, 
enormously detrimental to minorities.292 Given that distinctions are made anyway, 
 289. Id. 
 290. Law professor Gwénaële Calvès challenges whether ethno-racial statistics would be used for 
benign purposes. She maintains instead that businesses will seek to use the information to “demonstrate 
that their workforce contains an ‘appropriate proportion’ of people from a given category” in the event 
that they are charged with discrimination. Interview with Gwénaële Calvès, supra note 79, at 2. I 
question whether this is a negative outcome. The fact that employers may be charged with ethno-racial 
discrimination and their guilt or innocence may be established in part by the use of such statistics may 
incentivize employers to be careful and fair in their hiring practices, to the extent they are not already 
proceeding in this manner. Therefore, the statistics could work to curb ethno-racial discrimination in 
hiring. 
 291. See Fouteau, supra note 62 (explaining that racial statistics are the only means of measuring the 
effects of discrimination). 
 292.  See, e.g., Sabbagh, The Collection of Ethnoracial Statistics, supra note 246, at 1 (noting that the 
United States’ census includes race despite the country’s history of state-sanctioned racial 
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why not have a formal mechanism in place to combat the harmful effects? In 
France, where a substantial number of individuals who fall under the broad, non-
government-endorsed categories of “African” and “Arab” live in the impoverished 
outer cities that suffer from limited education opportunities and broad social 
exclusion,293 why not acknowledge that these groups are experiencing 
disadvantages and design programs to assist them? The fact that ethno-racial 
categories are acknowledged does not mean that individuals will no longer be able 
to engage in the ongoing process of self-definition and identification; this is a 
struggle that will continue to be waged, regardless of the system in place.294 Rather 
than getting inundated by endless micro-ethno-racial categories, broader categories 
can serve the purpose of crafting equalizing educational and anti-discrimination 
policies.295 
The implications of the Veil Constitution Report for expanding pro-equality 
policies in the direction of ethno-racial minorities cannot be ignored. While the 
commission’s conclusions may stall France’s progression towards the explicit use 
of ethno-racial factors in fashioning equality of educational opportunity policies, 
the question of how to reconcile France’s admirable grand concepts of liberty, 
egality, and fraternity with the real circumstances of inequality that many French 
African people are currently experiencing remains unanswered. Despite the 
unwillingness of the Veil Commission to endorse an amendment to the 1958 
Constitution to allow for distinctions to be drawn on the basis of ethno-racial 
criteria in facilitation of affirmative action-like policies, the commission 
nonetheless proposed that a statement regarding “the principle of the equal human 
dignity of every individual” be included in Article I of the 1958 Constitution.296 
Perhaps this suggestion can be used as a starting point when the issue of the 
appropriateness of ethno-racial factors and affirmative action policies in France is 
revisited by constitutional law experts and government officials. It is clear that 
given the virulence of current events, the issue will continue to resurface until more 
broad-based national solutions to the country’s inequities are crafted. 
The task of persuading a majority of the French populace and the appropriate 
discrimination, whereas the French census does not include race due in part to the Vichy government’s 
use of race to persecute Jews). 
 293. See, e.g., Polakow-Suransky, supra note 99 (explaining that France’s growing North African 
immigrant population lives primarily in “drab” neighborhoods on the outskirts of Paris); Interview with 
Dominique Sopo, supra note 56, at 1, 3, 4-5, 8 (noting the impact that culture has on French racism and 
the exclusion of African immigrants from center city neighborhoods). 
 294. See Interview with Dominique Sopo, supra note 56, at 1-2 (considering the effect ethno-racial 
categories would have on the self-identification of France’s minority citizens); Peter H. Schuck, 
Affirmative Action: Past, Present, and Future, 20 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 14-16 (2002) (noting that 
due to ongoing and inevitable racial integration, new demographics and identities are spreading, and will 
continue to spread in the future). 
 295. See Cristina M. Rodriguez, Against Individualized Consideration, 83 IND. L.J. 1405, 1407 
(2008) (“[T]he broad, undifferentiated use of racial classifications better balances the interest in ensuring 
the representation of disadvantaged or subordinated minority groups in public institutions and the 
political process with the imperative of keeping the definition of race fluid.”). 
 296. ROGOFF, supra note 28, at 221. 
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government officials that amending the 1958 Constitution in the manner proposed 
is daunting; nevertheless, it is worth noting that, historically, the French 
Constitution of 1958 has undergone numerous amendments297 and there is already a 
process for amending this document outlined in Title XVI, Article 89 of the 
Constitution.298 The July 2008 amendments provide recent precedents for amending 
the French Constitution.299 Thus, it is possible for the French Republic to conclude 
that a constitutional amendment to address the disparities in treatment of ethno-
racial minorities is merited; however, it will take persistence, substantial 
persuasion, and the recognition that the current limited programs undertaken by 
certain institutions are insufficient. Persuasive support to facilitate this process of 
moving towards amending the French Constitution can be found within French law 
and within international law and the laws of the European Union, of which France 
is a member. 
In addition to Section 13 of the Preamble to the 1946 French Constitution, 
which “guarantees equal access for children and adults to instruction, vocational 
training and culture at all levels” and avers that the “provision of free, public, and 
secular education at all levels is a duty of the state,”300 proponents of a 
constitutional amendment could also turn to the international law arena to bolster 
their arguments that France must recognize ethno-racial criteria in order to achieve 
the elusive goals of equal access and equality in education for African minorities 
residing in France. 
3.  An Alternative Legal Basis for Affirmative Action Grounded in 
International Law 
While an in-depth consideration of how France’s legal regime and certain 
European conventions and international treaties may figure into the development of 
 297. See id. at 34 (noting that the French Constitution of 1958 has been amended twenty-three times 
between its creation in 1958 and February 2008 and that in July 2008, the Constitution was substantially 
amended in order to conform to new developments, needs, ideas, and values in French society). 
 298. Title XVI, Article 89 of the 1958 French Constitution provides: 
The President of the Republic, on the recommendation of the Prime Minister, and Members 
of Parliament alike shall have the right to initiate amendments to the Constitution. 
A Government or a Private Member’s Bill to amend the Constitution must be considered 
within the time limits set down in the third paragraph of article 42 and be passed by the two 
Houses in identical terms. The amendment shall take effect after approval by referendum. 
However, a Government Bill to amend the Constitution shall not be submitted to 
referendum where the President of the Republic decides to submit it to Parliament convened 
in Congress; the Government Bill to amend the Constitution shall then be approved only if 
it is passed by a three-fifths majority of the votes cast. The Bureau of the Congress shall be 
that of the National Assembly. 
No amendment procedure shall be commenced or continued where the integrity of national 
territory is placed in jeopardy. 
The republican form of government shall not be the object of any amendment. 
1958 CONST. art. 89 (Fr.). Rogoff counts no less than twenty-three amendments to the 1958 French 
Constitution from the moment of its adoption to the present. ROGOFF, supra note 28, at 6. 
 299. ROGOFF, supra note 28, at 85. 
 300. 1946 CONST. pmbl. § 13 (Fr.). 
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France’s affirmative action and anti-discrimination policies is beyond the scope of 
this article, the issue merits some attention. Within the international legal 
framework there is support for the argument that the matter of amending the French 
Constitution should be revisited to allow for the fashioning of broader national 
solutions to the education and socio-economic disparities that plague African 
minorities, along with certain other minority groups,301 and that the necessary 
changes can be accomplished without violating France’s fundamental principle of 
equality. 
The complex interplay between France’s laws, institutions, and procedures 
and the international conventions, treaties, and courts to which France is subject 
continues to be sorted out by the French government.302 Notwithstanding this 
ongoing process, because France is a member of the European Union and a 
participant in the 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (“ICERD”),303 proponents for the use of ethno-race-based 
affirmative action can resort to international law as an alternative source of support 
for the arguments that (i) such classifications are necessary in order to design 
policies that effectively assist that sector of the French population which seems to 
be encountering substantial obstacles in the areas of educational attainment and 
socio-economic advancement; and (ii) the use of such policies does not unduly 
impinge on the ideal that all peoples should be treated equally and not subjected to 
ethnic or racial discrimination.304 In contrast to the prevailing interpretation of 
French laws which deems any ethno-racial distinctions made in the context of 
distributing governmental resources and benefits as constitutionally-prohibited 
invidious racial discrimination,305 ICERD defines “racial discrimination” as 
“impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any 
other field of public life.”306 Under the legal rubric of ICERD, 
 301. Recent minority immigrant groups in France from the French Caribbean, Vietnam, Cambodia, 
and Eastern Europe are also susceptible to suffering from the inequities noted. See HARGREAVES, 
MULTI-ETHNIC FRANCE, supra note 12, at 72-74 (discussing the difficulties that immigrants from 
Vietnam, Cambodia, and the French Caribbean face); see also Quinn Bennett, Please Don't Be Our 
Guest: The Roma Expulsion from France Under European Union Law, 40 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 219, 
226-27 (2011) (discussing the difficulties that immigrants from Eastern Europe face). 
 302. See ROGOFF, supra note 28, at 407 (“French judges have become more aware of and more 
sensitive to the requirements of international law, and have made enormous progress in formulating 
constitutional doctrine that is both responsive to the need to fulfill France’s international legal 
obligations, while at the same time doing so with constitutional legitimacy.”). 
 303. ICERD, supra note 247; Costa-Lascoux, supra note 247, at 371. 
 304. Costa-Lascoux, supra note 247, at 372 (noting that France makes reference to ICERD in its 
legislation and adopts its definitions). 
 305. Sabbagh, The Collection of Ethnoracial Statistics, supra note 246, at 1. 
 306. The full text of Part I, Article 1, Section 1 defines “racial discrimination”: 
In this Convention, the term “racial discrimination” shall mean any distinction, exclusion, 
restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which 
has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, 
on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, 
social, cultural or any other field of public life. 
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Special measures taken for the sole purpose of securing adequate 
advancement of certain racial or ethnic groups or individuals 
requiring such protection as may be necessary in order to ensure 
such groups or individuals equal enjoyment or exercise of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms shall not be deemed racial 
discrimination, provided, however, that such measures do not, as a 
consequence, lead to the maintenance of separate rights for different 
racial groups and that they shall not be continued after the objectives 
for which they were taken have been achieved.307 
 
Drawing inspiration and support from ICERD could be useful to the French 
government in at least three respects. First, referencing ICERD, the French 
government could formally recognize ethno-racial classifications which would 
allow the government to assess the extent to which certain minority groups are not 
receiving a quality education and have no meaningful track for acceptance into 
institutions of higher education as compared to the majority population. Second, 
policies could be specifically tailored to address the educational needs of those 
underserved minority groups. Third, the rationale the French government offers for 
adopting this track for responding to ethno-racial inequalities in education could be 
couched in the language of ICERD to underscore that a refusal to adopt the type of 
approach outlined results in a denial of the “equal enjoyment” and “exercise of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms” to a significant part of the French 
populace. That is, France’s resistance to adopting the more aggressive, explicit 
avenue that ICERD allows effectively consigns a substantial number of African 
French students to a life of poverty or severely impairs their economic 
advancement.308 To persist without change threatens France’s image as a nation 
that prides itself as an exceptional example of fairness and equality. 
An argument can also be made that to resist such ethno-race-based approaches 
puts France out of step from a human rights standpoint.309 Rather than being a 
leader on this front, France is lagging behind the times with respect to the actual 
opportunities for minorities, including African French people, to have decent 
quality lives. The foregoing ICERD provision suggests that devising measures to 
assist ethno-racial minorities who are socially, politically, and economically 
marginalized is a legally permissible strategy from the standpoint of international 
law and, because France has acceded to this Convention, from the perspective of 
ICERD, supra note 247, at art. 1, ¶ 1. 
 307. Id. art. 1, ¶ 4 (emphasis added). 
   308.See Guttenplan, supra note 107 (discussing the significant increase in wealth that 
underprivileged minorities experienced after Sciences Po decided to relax its standards for eighty-five 
secondary schools in underprivileged parts of France). 
 309. See John Rossant, Liberté, Égalité, Affirmative Action, BUS. WK., Jan. 30, 2005, 
http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2005-01-30/liberte-egalite-affirmative-action (arguing that 
affirmative action is necessary in France in order to ameliorate the unemployment and poverty in the 
suburbs that are home to many French citizens of North African origin). 
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French legal principles as well.310 There is even a basis, within French 
constitutional law, for addressing complaints that adopting policies to satisfy 
France’s obligations under ICERD would be in conflict with French laws. French 
constitutional law scholar Martin Rogoff comments that Article 55 of the French 
Constitution,311 under certain circumstances, supports the position that in matters of 
conflict between a French law and international treaties and conventions, the 
international convention should trump.312 Finally, the language of ICERD indicates 
that it is aimed at promoting the aggressive undertaking of affirmative action 
policies that will assist in eradicating, inter alia, unequal (educational) 
opportunities that are suffered by ethno-racial minorities.313 
IV.  EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY IN TEXAS AND THE CURRENT U.S. 
LEGAL LANDSCAPE 
A.  What a Difference a Day Makes: Grutter, Gratz, and the Ten Percent Plan 
In Section II, I highlighted the cases Brown,314 Bakke,315 and Hopwood,316 as 
the historical legal precedents that laid the foundation for the Texas Ten Percent 
Plan. Since the plan’s implementation in 1998, U.S. educational equality law has 
experienced some tumultuous shifts and remains contested.317 Fierce debates 
continue to be waged over the best methods to address historic inequalities that 
certain minorities have experienced,318 and continue to experience, within this 
country while also remaining faithful to the idea that all citizens are equal before 
the law.319 The legal changes have a critical impact on the ways in which the plan 
 310. ICERD, supra note 247, art. 1, ¶ 4. 
 311. “Treaties or agreements duly ratified or approved shall, upon publication, prevail over 
Acts of Parliament, subject, with respect to each agreement or treaty, to its application by the other 
party.” 1958 CONST. art. 55 (Fr.). 
 312.  See ROGOFF, supra note 28, at 224. (“Treaties and international agreements . . . can be applied 
by the Council of State and the Court of Cassation, and in case of conflict with a law or administrative 
act, the international obligation, by virtue of article 55 of the constitution, will take priority.”). 
 313. See ICERD, supra note 247, art. 7 (“States Parties undertake to adopt immediate and effective 
measures, particularly in the fields of teaching, education, culture and information, with a view to 
combating prejudices which lead to racial discrimination . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 314. 347 U.S. 483. 
 315. 438 U.S. 265. 
 316. 78 F.3d 932. 
 317. See Ronald Caldwell Jr., The Erosion of Affirmative Action and Its Consequences for the Black-
White Educational Attainment Gap, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 813, 818 (2009) (discussing the various laws 
that were passed in multiple states regarding affirmative action in education contemporaneously to the 
Texas Ten Percent Plan). 
 318. Id. at 813 (noting that the “disparity in economic outcomes between whites and blacks in the 
United States has long been an important social and political issue” and that the “use of affirmative 
action in university admissions has now endured more than a decade of legal, political, and social 
challenges and will likely remain a topic of significant debate in the near future”). 
 319. The Declaration of Independence of 1776, a cornerstone U.S. history proclaims, “We hold these 
truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal . . . .” THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 
para. 2 (1776). 
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can be reformed and expanded in the interests of attaining equality in educational 
opportunities for underrepresented minorities. The proposed modifications to the 
Ten Percent Law relate to my first and second theses, that race and ethnicity still 
matter, requiring academic institutions and policy makers to continue to take these 
factors into account when formulating equality policies. At the forefront of the shift 
in U.S. equality jurisprudence is the U.S. Supreme Court decision Grutter v. 
Bollinger,320 which redefined the education equality law landscape.321 
The Grutter decision marked the U.S. Supreme Court’s return to the question 
whether the use of ethno-racial criteria by public universities in admissions 
decisions is constitutionally permissible, after nearly twenty-six years of silence 
following the Bakke case.322 A white female resident of Michigan, named Barbara 
Grutter, in 1996 brought the case after she applied to the University of Michigan 
Law School (“UM Law School”), was placed on a waiting list, and eventually was 
denied admission. In the following year, Ms. Grutter filed suit against the UM Law 
School, the Regents of the University of Michigan, and school officials responsible 
for overseeing the admissions process, alleging that those named in the suit 
discriminated against her on the basis of race in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment,323 Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,324 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.325 
As relief, Grutter sought compensatory and punitive damages, an order directing 
the UM Law School to grant her admission, and an injunction to prohibit the law 
school from continuing to engage in racially discriminatory practices.326 The policy 
challenged in Grutter entails the selection of students based upon a range of factors 
including LSAT score, grade point average, essays, letters of recommendation, 
 320. 539 U.S. 306. 
 321. Id. at 337-44 (holding that a “highly individualized, holistic review of each applicant’s file, 
giving serious consideration to all the ways an applicant might contribute to a diverse educational 
environment” and not based on race alone was within constitutionally prescribed limits for the 
admissions process of a post-secondary educational institution); see also Fisher, 631 F.3d at 249-51 
(Garza, J., concurring) (“[T]he Court [in Grutter] redefined the meaning of narrow tailoring. . . . And 
thus, all that truly remains of strict scrutiny’s narrow tailoring inquiry post-Grutter is the requirement of 
‘individualized consideration.’”). 
 322. See Joshua P. Thompson & Damien M. Schiff, Divisive Diversity at the University of Texas: An 
Opportunity for the Supreme Court to Overturn Its Flawed Decision in Grutter, 15 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 
437, 446 (2011) (noting that during the twenty-five years between Bakke and Grutter, the Supreme 
Court had many opportunities to introduce diversity as a compelling state interest, but declined to do so). 
 323. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV., § 2. 
 324. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. 
 325. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 317. The framing of Ms. Grutter’s suit is exemplary of lawsuits involving 
equal educational opportunity issues. As an interesting aside, both the intended beneficiaries of these 
laws, from the vantage point of the legislative histories, and complainants who seek to dismantle 
affirmative action have relied upon the aforementioned laws in stating their claims. See, e.g., Gratz, 539 
U.S. at 270 (holding that the university’s policy utilizing ethno-racial criteria was not narrowly tailored 
and therefore violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Title VI, and 42 
U.S.C. § 1981(a)); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 566 (1974) (holding that the failure of the school 
district to provide remedial language instruction to non-English speaking Chinese students violated Title 
VI). 
 326. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 317. 
 
Fall 2012] RIDING INTO THE SUNSET IN A “POST-RACIAL” WORLD 155 
undergraduate courses taken, and life experience.327 The UM Law School also 
includes, as part of its admissions policy, a focus on attaining and maintaining a 
diverse student body with special emphasis on individuals from groups that have 
been historically marginalized such as African Americans, Latinos, and Native 
Americans.328 
Grutter resolves opposing views of the lower courts regarding whether Justice 
Powell’s opinion in Bakke, that assembling a diverse student population constitutes 
a sufficiently compelling interest to withstand strict scrutiny,329 and that race and 
ethnicity may be included as factors for consideration in administering a school’s 
admissions policy,330 is binding precedent.331 The Grutter Court answered in the 
affirmative holding that (1) “student body diversity is a compelling state interest 
that can justify the use of race in university admissions”332 and (2) the UM Law 
School’s use of ethnicity and race in its admissions policy was not precluded by the 
Equal Protection Clause because it was “narrowly tailored” to the school’s 
“compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a diverse 
student body.”333 The Grutter holding had direct and substantial implications for 
school administrators and the Texas Ten Percent Plan because it overruled 
Hopwood and cleared the way for race and ethnicity to once again be considered by 
public colleges and universities in Texas in formulating their student admissions 
schemes.334 The Grutter holding offered desperately needed maneuverability to 
school administrators, judging from the limitations that they were encountering in 
having to rely solely upon the percentage strategy to accomplish ethno-racial access 
and diversity in their student populations. Evidence of the limited effectiveness of 
the Ten Percent strategy is provided, in part, by the comments voiced by the Plan’s 
administrators, who observed that the plan does not result in a sufficient number of 
admissions of underrepresented minorities if one takes into account the ethno-racial 
make-up of the state.335 Patricia Ohlendorf, Vice President for Legal Affairs at UT 
Austin has expressed concern that the surrogate Ten Percent approach is inadequate 
 327. Id. at 315. 
 328. Id. at 316. 
 329. In a section of the opinion that was not joined by a majority of the Court, Justice Powell 
concluded that “the attainment of a diverse student body” is “clearly a constitutionally permissible goal 
for an institution of higher education.” Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-12 (opinion of Powell, J.). 
 330. Id. at 320. 
 331.  See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 944 (“Justice Powell’s view in Bakke is not binding precedent on this 
issue.”); cf. Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. FCC, 141 F.3d 344, 354 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (stating, 
without mentioning Bakke, that diversity cannot “be elevated to the ‘compelling’ level”). 
 332. 539 U.S. at 325. Justices O’Connor, Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer were the majority 
upholding the UM Law School’s ethno-race-conscious admissions policy. Id. at 343-44. Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy dissented from the majority decision. Id at 379 
(dissenting opinion). 
 333. Id. at 343. 
 334. See Ian Ayres & Sydney Foster, Don’t Tell, Don’t Ask: Narrow Tailoring After Grutter and 
Gratz, 85 TEX. L. REV. 517, 519 (2007) (noting that due to the holdings in Grutter and Gratz, public 
college and universities are now free to consider race and ethnicity in their admissions process). 
 335. See Holley & Spencer, supra note 204, at 247 (discussing that when taking into account the 
racial make-up of Texas, the Texas Plan fails to admit enough underrepresented minorities). 
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to satisfy the important objective of providing significant educational opportunities 
to a multi-ethnic community, particularly in view of the growing Latino 
population.336 Ohlendorf observed,  “We [at UT Austin] have not found that the 
top-10-percent law and policy in and of itself have been sufficient to achieve a 
critical mass of minority students.”337 
Comments about the potential resulting shortfalls of Texas’ Plan did not fall 
on deaf ears. Empowered by Grutter, the University of Texas Board of Regents, by 
an August 6, 2003 resolution, invited each university in the Texas school system to 
review whether ethno-racial factors should be reintroduced and considered as part 
of the admissions process.338 Relying upon Grutter as a roadmap, the Board of 
Regents cautioned that taking into account such criteria must be done in a “holistic” 
way conforming to the type of review advocated in Grutter.339 Following each 
school’s independent assessment of whether ethnic and race-based information 
should be incorporated back into the admissions decisions, the Texas Board of 
Regents opined in August 2004 that race and ethnicity could be considered as a 
“special circumstance” in determining the personal achievement score of a high 
school applicant.340 
Taking its cue from the Board of Regents decision, in 2004, UT Austin 
announced its intention to address the constraints of the plan by fashioning an 
ethno-race-conscious admissions approach, based upon the admissions policy 
scrutinized and held constitutional in Grutter, to operate in tandem with the Ten 
Percent Plan.341 UT Austin outlined its plan in the document, Proposal to Consider 
Race and Ethnicity in Admissions (“UT 2004 Proposal”).342 Under this plan, UT 
Austin kept in place, for Texas residents, its policy of first granting automatic 
admission to those individuals meeting the criteria of the Ten Percent Law. For the 
remaining slots carved out for Texas residents, those students who do not qualify 
for automatic admission under the Ten Percent Law are granted admission based 
upon their Academic Index (“AI”) and Personal Achievement Index (“PAI”).343 
 336. Mangan, supra note 218. 
 337. Id. (emphasis added). The concept of “critical mass” is an important one that will continue to 
arise in the debates regarding equal education. Justice O’Connor, in Grutter, distinguished a quota from 
the critical mass concept emphasizing that the first is too rigid in that it requires that a fixed number be 
met. 539 U.S. at 325. 
 338. Fisher, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 593. 
 339. Id. 
 340. Id. at 594. 
 341. See James F. Blumstein, Grutter and Fisher: A Reassessment and a Preview, 65 VAND. L. REV. 
EN BANC 57, 58-59 (2012) (“In 2004, the University of Texas reintroduced the consideration of race into 
the admissions process as a means of increasing student body diversity.”). 
 342. Fisher, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 601. 
 343. The AI is “a computation based on the student’s high school class rank, standardized test scores, 
and the extent to which the applicant exceeded UT’s required high school curriculum.” Fisher, 631 F.3d 
at 222. The PAI is composed of three scores. Two separate scores are awarded for the two mandatory 
essays, and a “personal achievement score” which is based on the complete file of the applicant. Id. at 
227-28. The personal achievement score is based on admissions officials’ “assess[ment] [of] an 
applicant’s demonstrated leadership qualities, awards, and honors, work experience, and involvement in 
extracurricular activities . . . [and] a ‘special circumstances’ element that may reflect the socioeconomic 
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Whereas ethnicity and race previously were not included as items for consideration, 
UT Austin modified its permissible criteria to allow race and ethnicity factors to be 
weighed as part of a student’s PAI. UT Austin’s addition of ethno-race-based 
criteria to the admissions decisions process yielded notable increases in Latino and 
African American enrollment. At the time the 2004 proposal was issued, African 
Americans comprised 4.5% of the first year class and Latinos constituted 16.9%344 
of a total entering class of approximately 7000 students.345 With the addition of the 
ethno-racial components into UT Austin’s admissions decisions, the percentage of 
Latino students in the first year class advanced to 20% and the percentage of 
African American students climbed to 6%.346 The Texas Board of Regent’s 
decision to allow the reintegration of ethnicity and race into college admissions 
procedures suggests that a successful strategy to include historically excluded 
ethno-racial minorities must expressly account for those factors which were the 
basis of their prior exclusion (that is, race and ethnicity). The Texas results also 
indicate that a battery of inclusion strategies may be necessary to attain the elusive 
ideal of equality of educational opportunity. UT Austin’s hybrid plan of attack 
strikes the right balance by combining the percentage plan, which works to some 
extent, with the use of ethno-racial criteria to address the shortfalls of minority 
admissions under the plan. 
Grutter is not only significant because of what it permits schools to consider 
in rendering their admissions decisions, but also because it helps to delineate the 
constitutionally-acceptable boundaries within which a school may operate 
according to its admissions procedures.347 The Texas Board of Regents and UT 
Austin took note of these boundaries when re-incorporating ethnic and racial 
elements back into the admissions process.348 UT Austin’s attentiveness to this 
aspect of Grutter proved useful to it in terms of withstanding a challenge to its 
revised policies in 2009.349 The Grutter Court accomplished the feat of outlining 
the appropriate contours for an admissions policy by giving substantial attention to 
status of the applicant and his or her high school, the applicant’s family status and family 
responsibilities, the applicant’s standardized test score compared to the average of her high school, and 
beginning in 2004–the applicant’s race.” Id. at 228 (emphasis added). Allowing race to be factored into 
an applicant’s PAI represents the significant change to the AI/PAI system, which was in place as early 
as 1997. Fisher, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 596. Other permissible factors in the “special circumstances” 
consideration include “whether [the applicant] lives in a single-parent home, whether languages other 
than English are spoken at home, [and] her SAT/ACT score compared to her school’s average score.” 
Id. (citing IMPLEMENTATION AND RESULTS OF THE TEXAS AUTOMATIC ADMISSIONS LAW, supra note 
213, at 2). 
 344. Fisher, 631 F.3d at 244. Some sources report the figure of 16.3% for the Latino population in 
2004. Hough, supra note 205, at 214. 
 345. Fisher, 631 F.3d at 224. 
 346. Fisher, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 594. 
 347. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327-28, 334 (holding that a university’s race-based admissions 
decisions were constitutional as they were narrowly tailored and necessary to further a compelling 
governmental interest in achieving educational benefits from a diverse student body). 
 348. Fisher, 631 F.3d at 225. 
 349. Id. at 247. 
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the legal standard it applied to review UM Law School’s admissions scheme.350 
The Court adopted strict scrutiny as the legal standard of review in accordance with 
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,351 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,352 and 
Bakke.353 The strict scrutiny standard requires that any ethnic or racial 
classifications imposed by federal, state or local government be “narrowly tailored” 
and “further compelling governmental interests” in order to be held 
constitutional.354 
Grutter demonstrates that a school can consider ethnicity and race without 
being found to have acted counter to the equal protection guarantees of the 
Fourteenth Amendment355 and the equality guarantees of Title VI356 and Section 
1981(a).357 The ability to take ethno-racial criteria into account even though there 
are laws in place that guarantee equal treatment exemplifies the tension Justice 
Harry Blackmun identifies in the epigraph to this article.358 While the Grutter case 
is positive in the sense that it supports the use of a variety of strategies in the name 
of equal educational opportunity, it still plays into the hands of the proxy strategy 
 350. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326-28 (discussing its application of strict scrutiny to all racial 
classifications imposed by the government and examining UM Law School’s stated compelling 
government interest to obtain educational benefits from a diverse student body). 
 351. 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion); see Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333 (“The purpose of the 
narrow tailoring requirement is to ensure that the means chosen fit th[e] compelling goal so closely that 
there is little or no possibility that the motive for the classification was illegitimate racial prejudice or 
stereotype.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 352. 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (plurality opinion); see Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334 (“[W]e adhere to 
Adarand’s teaching that the very purpose of strict scrutiny is to take . . . ‘relevant differences into 
account.’” (citations omitted)). 
 353. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334 (“To be narrowly tailored, a race-conscious admissions program 
cannot use a quota system—it cannot insulat[e] each category of applicants with certain desired 
qualifications from competition with all other applicants. . . . Instead, a university may consider race or 
ethnicity only as a plus in a particular applicant’s file, without insulat[ing] the individual from 
comparison with all other candidates for the available seats.” (alterations in original) (quoting Bakke, 
438 U.S. at 315-317) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 354. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227. 
 355. 539 U.S. at 343. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized 
in the United States . . . are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State 
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
 356. 539 U.S. at 343; see Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (“No person in the United 
States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied 
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal 
financial assistance.”). 
 357. 539 U.S. at 343; see 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (“All persons within the jurisdiction of the United 
States shall have the same right in every State . . . to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give 
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and 
property as is enjoyed by white citizens . . . .”). 
 358. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 405 (Blackmun, J., separate opinion) (“If [affirmative action] conflicts 
with idealistic equality, that tension is original Fourteenth Amendment tension, constitutionally 
conceived and constitutionally imposed, and it is part of the Amendment’s very nature until complete 
equality is achieved in the area.”). 
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approach in that it obscures ethnicity and race by enfolding it within the notion of a 
“holistic” view.359 That is, schools can rely on ethno-racial criteria, as part of their 
admissions decision-making as long as they also consider a host of other factors 
such as high school region, language ability, athletic ability, etc. Encapsulating 
ethnicity and race in this way is perhaps necessary given a conservative political 
environment that is resistant to any policies which suggest that certain minorities 
are benefiting from preferences to the detriment of “innocent” non-minority 
candidates.360 But, this maneuver also limits how far government and institutions 
can go with attempting to equalize educational opportunities for underrepresented 
minorities.361 Applying Grutter’s guidelines to its institution, UT Austin 
administrators also shielded ethnicity and race behind a phalanx of items under the 
PAI that may be considered for admitting students.362 
In reformulating its admissions components, UT Austin also had to take into 
account the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision, Gratz v. Bollinger,363 which was issued 
in conjunction with Grutter.364 Gratz explained how much latitude public 
universities have in fashioning policies designed to address the vestiges of past 
discrimination and to stem the ongoing impact of disparities and discriminatory 
practices. It is clear from the Gratz holding, which struck down UM’s ethno-race 
inflected admissions policy, that under the current U.S. legal regime, the freedom 
public post-secondary institutions have to attend to these issues is severely 
restricted.365 Gratz involved UM’s use of ethno-racial factors in its admissions 
 359. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337 (characterizing UM’s admissions program as a “highly 
individualized, holistic review of each applicant’s file, giving serious consideration to all the ways an 
applicant might contribute to a diverse educational environment.”). See generally Sabbagh, Affirmative 
Action in the United States and France, supra note 4, at 7 (explaining the nature of a proxy strategy). 
 360. The Grutter Court made the determination that UM Law School’s race-conscious policy does 
not “unduly harm nonminority applicants” and placed substantial weight on the fact that “[t]he Law 
School frequently accepts nonminority applicants with grades and test scores lower than 
underrepresented minority applicants (and other nonminority applicants) who are rejected.” Grutter, 539 
U.S. at 338, 341. Legal scholar Derrick Bell has commented extensively on this practice of restricting 
affirmative action policies to the extent that they will harm the majority white population. See BELL, 
RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW, supra note 253, at 209 (“[O]pponents [of minority admissions 
plans] resist any policy that appears to require that whites pay or even risk paying for racial wrongs that 
they did not themselves commit.”); id. at 126 (“The admissions program upheld in Grutter is one 
example of a race-based measure that furthers racial justice without unduly interfering with nonminority 
expectations.”). 
 361.  See BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW, supra note 253, at 120 (“[N]arrow tailoring 
requires that any race-based classification be limited in time, necessary to achieve the desired goal, and 
minimally burdensome to innocent nonminorities.”). 
 362. Fisher, 631 F.3d at 227-28. 
 363. 539 U.S. 244. 
 364. See Fisher, 631 F.3d at 235 & n.121 (explaining how the UT Austin administration knew that a 
quota system of establishing a specific number would not survive judicial review in consideration of 
Gratz, 539 U.S. at 268, 271-72, which held that a university may not award a fixed number of bonus 
points to minority applicants in admissions decisions). 
 365. See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 271-72 (finding UM’s admissions policy problematic because it 
automatically distributes twenty points to every applicant from an underrepresented minority group and 
lacks an individualized consideration that “has the effect of making ‘the factor of race . . . decisive’ for 
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procedures for the undergraduate program in the College of Literature and Arts.366 
UM, in administering its program, considered a variety of factors including, inter 
alia, test scores, grades, high school curriculum, alumni connections, quality of 
high school attended, personal essays, in-state residency, race, and ethnicity.367 
Regarding the latter two factors, UM identified Native Americans, African 
Americans, and Latinos as underrepresented minorities in their student population 
and sought to increase the representation of individuals from these groups.368 
Accordingly, UM awarded students points based upon the multi-layered criteria 
identified above.369 The Court chose to focus on the aspect of UM’s approach that 
awarded twenty points to applicants who are members of the underrepresented 
minority groups and concluded that: 
 
[T]he University’s policy, which automatically distributes 20 points, 
or one-fifth of the points needed to guarantee admission, to every 
single “underrepresented minority” applicant solely because of race, 
is not narrowly tailored to achieve the interest in educational 
diversity that respondents claim justifies their program.370 
 
Based upon its determination that UM’s admissions scheme did not meet the 
strict scrutiny requirement of narrow tailoring, the Court held that the policy was 
unconstitutional in that it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, Title VI, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.371 Bearing in mind the parameters that 
Gratz defined, UT Austin, in refactoring racial and ethnic elements back into its 
admissions calculus, was careful not to quantify how these elements would be 
evaluated (for example, by awarding a specific number of “points” for race or 
ethnicity). Instead, UT Austin nestles ethnicity and race among other “special 
circumstance” elements and encases them within the constitutionally-approved 
holistic approach of the PAI.372 
 
B.  Reintroducing Race and Ethnicity Criteria: The Fisher Case 
UT Austin’s decision to re-infuse ethnicity and race into the school’s 
admissions considerations incited some controversy and gave rise to the case 
virtually every minimally qualified underrepresented minority applicant.” (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 
317)). 
 366. Id. at 265. 
 367. Id. at 255. 
 368. Id. at 253-54. 
 369. Id. at 255. 
 370. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270. 
 371. Justices Rehnquist, O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Breyer constituted the majority to 
hold UM’s admissions policy unconstitutional. Id. at 275-76. Justices Stevens, id. at 282-91 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting), Souter, id. at 291-98 (Souter, J., dissenting), and Ginsburg, id. at 298-305 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting), all filed dissenting opinions. 
 372. Fisher, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 596-98. 
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Fisher v. University of Texas.373 The immediate critical importance of the Fisher 
case in the U.S. affirmative action debate cannot be overemphasized, especially 
because a final decision on the case, which was argued before the Court in October 
2012, is anticipated in the coming year.374 In Fisher, two white Texas residents 
filed the initial lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas 
against UT Austin and other school officials after the school denied them 
admission for the 2008 school year.375 The crux of the plaintiffs’ argument was that 
UT Austin is precluded from re-introducing ethnicity and race criteria into its 
admission process given that it already has in place a strategy that does not rely on 
these criteria (that is, the Ten Percent Plan) yet achieves a diverse student 
population. In other words, UT Austin may not simultaneously pursue two different 
strategies to accomplish ethno-racial diversity, and, further, where a non-ethno-
race-based strategy exists, the university’s reliance upon such factors is not 
constitutionally permissible.376 Specifically, the Fisher plaintiffs argued that: 
 
UT’s decision to reintroduce the use of race-conscious admissions 
was unconstitutional because minority enrollment already met or 
exceeded “critical mass” when this decision was made, and thus any 
further facial consideration of race was neither warranted nor 
constitutional.377 
 
Despite the plaintiffs’ argument, there is no numeric value attached to the 
definition of “critical mass”378 and thus, as a preliminary matter, their attempt to 
posit what constitutes that threshold does not have a basis in equal education 
jurisprudence. Rejecting the plaintiffs’ argument, the District Court held that, 
“Nothing in Grutter prohibits a university from using both race-neutral alternatives 
and race itself.”379 Concluding that “[a] university presenting itself as open to all 
may be challenged when the state’s minority population grows steadily but 
minority enrollment does not,”380 the Fifth Circuit affirmed the constitutionality of 
UT Austin’s admissions program.381 
The controversy in Fisher demonstrates the necessity of keeping the goals of 
inclusion and diversity transparent in admissions processes, even when the 
processes rely on non-race-based strategies and ethno-racial proxies. This clarity is 
 373. 631 F.3d at 213. 
 374. 132 S. Ct. 1536, No. 11-345 (argued Oct. 10, 2012). 
 375. Fisher, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 590. 
 376. Fisher, 631 F.3d at 242-43. 
 377. Id. at 242. 
 378. Id. at 235. 
 379. Fisher, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 612 (emphasis added). 
 380. Fisher, 631 F.3d at 237. 
 381. Id. at 246-47. The recent Fisher decision was rendered by a federal appeals court consisting of a 
three-judge panel, which was composed of Judge Patrick Higginbotham, the author of the opinion, 
Judge Carolyn Dineen King, and Judge Emilio M. Garza. In a nine to seven vote, the judges of the U.S. 
Court of Appeals of the Fifth Circuit declined to grant a rehearing of the Fisher case before the full Fifth 
Circuit. 
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necessary so that, if the proxy approach is deemed inadequate by school officials, 
for example, an appropriate adjustment can be made, including one that allows for 
the express consideration of ethno-racial criteria. UT Austin’s move to 
reincorporate an ethno-race-conscious policy into its admissions decisions indicates 
that proxy strategies, such as percentage plans, are insufficient to achieve the goals 
of equal access and ethno-racial diversity. 
However, while current proxy plans may have limited potential to produce a 
critical mass of minority students, this limitation derives from the specific 
application of the plans. Proxies may not be inherently inferior. That is, a substitute 
approach could be crafted combining a number of factors as proxies (for example, 
low economic status, attendance at poorly performing schools of limited economic 
resources, and residence in economically-challenged neighborhoods) that 
disproportionately impact underrepresented minority students.382 This “super-
proxy” could result in a significant increase in the percentage of minority students 
admitted to post-secondary schools. However, there would likely be a public outcry 
over the adoption of a super-proxy. A mechanism particularized in this manner that 
yields a substantial increase in minority admissions would lose its claim to being 
racially “neutral” and would be subject to constitutional challenge. Opponents 
would likely argue that the super-proxy is a mere pretext for making ethno-race-
conscious decisions. Political climate limits how far schools may go with 
developing a proxy for admissions programs.383 When one encounters the limits of 
proxy strategies, there may be a need to take ethno-racial factors into account. If 
one has been clear about which outcomes are important, then it strengthens the 
response to legal challenges. My thesis is in accord with the guidelines recently 
issued by the Office of Civil Rights for the U.S. Department of Education and the 
Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, which assert that “[i]n 
some cases, race-neutral approaches will be unworkable because they will be 
ineffective to achieve the diversity the institution seeks.”384 
V.  OVERALL COMPARISON OF THE SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE 
TEXAS TEN PERCENT PLAN AND THE SCIENCES PO’S CEP PLAN 
A.  Similarities Between the Texas and the Sciences Po Strategies 
The proxy approaches implemented in the United States and France share 
similar goals regarding diversity. Like the Sciences Po’s CEP program, the Texas 
 382. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV. & U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE OF CIVIL 
RIGHTS, GUIDANCE ON THE VOLUNTARY USE OF RACE TO ACHIEVE DIVERSITY IN POSTSECONDARY 
EDUCATION 7 (2011), available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/guidance-pse-
201111.pdf [hereinafter GUIDANCE ON THE VOLUNTARY USE OF RACE] (“An institution could consider 
an applicant’s socioeconomic status, first-generation college status, geographic residency, or other race-
neutral criteria if doing so would assist in drawing students from different racial backgrounds to the 
institution.”). 
 383. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW, supra note 253, at 211. 
 384. GUIDANCE ON THE VOLUNTARY USE OF RACE, supra note 382, at 6. 
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Plan relies upon factors other than race and ethnicity to categorize and select 
students.385 Also, like the French program, the Texas Plan relies upon the secondary 
factor of ethno-racial high school demographics and housing so that its program 
can be cast as facially race-neutral.386 Both plans were introduced into challenging 
legal environments that ostensibly precluded explicit references to and reliance 
upon ethno-racial criteria.387 
Another similarity that both plans share is the shortcoming that the way in 
which the schemes are structured means they are inadequate proxies to fully 
capture sufficient numbers of underrepresented ethno-racial students.388 Just as 
there are talented Texas students from the underrepresented pool who fall within 
the second and third deciles and, thus, do not qualify for automatic admission under 
the Top Ten Percent Law, there are talented underrepresented minority French 
students who do not live within the favored zones but may, nonetheless, encounter 
exclusion or discrimination which impairs their ability to advance within France’s 
education system and ultimately, to acquire gainful and prestigious employment. 
B.  Differences Between the Texas and Sciences Po Strategies 
There are also some important differences between the CEP scheme and 
Texas’ Plan. First, as distinguished from the French plan, the Texas Plan does not 
have to de-emphasize ethnicity and race to the same degree as the French program 
in order to be deemed constitutionally valid because, under Grutter, race may be 
considered as one factor among many to achieve the compelling goal of 
diversifying a school’s student population.389 For political reasons, the ethno-racial 
goals are not always highlighted, but Texas schools are permitted, under the U.S. 
Constitution, to articulate and pursue the goals of equal access and diversity in 
education.390 Indeed, as expressed in the amicus brief filed by the United States in 
Grutter, the goal of “[e]nsuring that public institutions are open and available to all 
segments of American society, including people of all races and ethnicities, 
represents a paramount government objective.”391 The Sciences Po, in contrast, 
strategically chooses not to emphasize the ethno-racial diversity goals of its CEP 
program so as not to run afoul of the constitutional prohibition of not making 
distinctions as to “origin, race or religion.”392 
Second, as previously discussed, the CEP program is more limited in focus in 
that it does not apply to the whole of France or even to the entire center of Paris 
 385. Fisher, 631 F.3d at 228. 
 386. Id. at 228-29. 
 387. Donahoo, supra note 8, at 264. 
 388. See id. at 253 (“[T]hese programs help to protect White privilege by providing a limited 
pathway that allows a few non-Whites to succeed in what continue to be racially hostile 
environments.”). 
 389. 539 U.S. at 334. 
 390. Id. at 343. 
 391. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 
U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241), 2003 WL 176635 at *13. 
 392. 1958 CONST. art. 1 (Fr.). 
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and its adjacent outlying regions and is confined to the admissions of one 
university.393 This reach is in contrast to the Texas plan, which applies to the entire 
State of Texas and all of the state’s public post-secondary education institutions.394 
A third difference is that, while the Texas Plan stipulates that a certain 
percentage of high school students are qualified to be admitted to a Texas college 
or university of their choice, there is no agreed upon percentage of top students 
from each high school that is granted admission under the French plan. Rather, the 
Sciences Po has substantial discretion in selecting who will be admitted under the 
CEP program and the number of students.395 The Texas schools had to lobby to 
reintroduce discretion back into their admissions process.396 
Fourth, under the CEP plan, students are very clearly subjected to a different 
set of admissions criteria than the students living outside of the designated zones 
who are admitted under the regular admissions process. Most notably, the CEP 
students do not have to take the concours.397 One potential way that the CEP 
program can eliminate this glaring difference in admissions criteria is to require the 
CEP students to take the concours as part of their application requirements. This 
change would mean that the students would need to undertake the rigorous two-
year preparatory course to sit for the concours.398 The Sciences Po administrators 
could set a different minimum score level threshold for the CEP students, so that 
they would not be barred from admission based upon their test scores, or they could 
disregard the scores altogether but at least they would have a record of them. 
Adding this component to their application requirements would help, in 
appearance, to equalize the application process for all French students. Also, adding 
the test requirement would allow the Sciences Po to keep track of test performance 
levels of students from the CEP regions over time as a way to track whether the 
effects of the program are positively impacting curriculum, quality of teaching, and 
the test taking abilities of the students. Comparing the selection criteria of the 
Sciences Po to that of Texas, while the Ten Percent Plan is neutral on its face, in 
that all admitted students must meet the criteria stipulated by the Ten Percent 
Law,399 there remain differences in the particular courses of study Texas high 
school students may follow and in the quality of the various high schools they 
attend. The main equalizing factors are that for the top ten percent students, the 
standardized test scores (namely, SAT or ACT scores) are disregarded and class 
rank is decisive.400 
Fifth, the CEP students are only competing amongst themselves for the 
 393. Donahoo, supra note 8, at 262-63. 
 394. Fisher, 631 F.3d at 224 n.56. 
 395. Donahoo, supra note 8, at 263. 
 396. Fisher, 631 F.3d at 224-26. 
 397. Donahoo, supra note 8, at 263 (describing the concours as “rigorous competitive entrance 
exams”). 
 398. Id. 
 399. Fisher, 631 F.3d at 224. 
 400. Id. at 241. 
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separate admission slots created by the Sciences Po.401 It is clear that a special track 
of entry has been created for them that is not available to France’s general student 
population who reside outside of the targeted regions.402 In some respects, the 
special track is like the one that was held unconstitutional in Bakke.403 The 
difference in admissions criteria and the isolation of the review of CEP candidates 
from other candidates for admission may raise questions in terms of evaluating the 
Sciences Po’s plan from the constitutional perspective of the United States,404 even 
though the ethno-racial impact is not offered as the primary purpose of the plan and 
race and ethnicity are not the declared factors determining admission. In contrast to 
the Sciences Po’s scheme, the Texas Plan allows all graduating Texas resident high 
school students to compete for the Texas resident top ten percent slots.405 In this 
respect, it differs from the Sciences Po program; however, in terms of the entire 
pool of applicants to UT Austin, for example, applicants are placed within groups 
and individuals within those discrete groups compete amongst themselves for 
available spaces.406 
VI.  LESSONS FOR THE UNITED STATES AND FRANCE: THE FUTURE OF PROXY 
STRATEGIES AND DIVERSITY IN EDUCATION 
There are lessons the United States and France can glean from one another in 
examining the initiatives both nations have instituted in the pursuit of ways to 
achieve and maintain ethno-racial diversity in their respective institutions of higher 
learning. Regarding this discussion of the lessons for France and the United States, 
I appreciate that there may be resistance to the idea of looking to other jurisdictions 
 401. While the Sciences Po’s strategy of increasing class size to accommodate the CEP students 
worked well at its institution to help dampen the potential outcry that CEP students were taking 
admission seats away from more qualified candidates, for the U.S., expanding class sizes to 
accommodate a disenfranchised student population may not be economically feasible to the extent that 
there may be a need for budget-constrained schools to increase financial packages for certain students. 
Increasing student admissions also may not be desirable, in terms of classroom learning experiences and 
maintaining reasonable student to teacher ratios. It is unlikely that U.S. courts would accept the Sciences 
Po’s characterization to view the newly created seats as admissions slots that students outside of the 
Sciences Po’s targeted zones were never allowed to compete for, because they didn’t exist prior to the 
advent of the CEP program, and never would be allowed to compete for if the program ended. A more 
probable outcome is that U.S. courts would view all the admissions places, including the new slots, as 
the entire pool of admission seats that all students should be able to compete for without any restrictions. 
 402. Sabbagh, Affirmative Action in the United States and France, supra note 4, at 5-6. 
 403. See id. (noting that the special track policy of focusing on geography is similarly systematic to 
programs which focus on race). 
 404. According to the Grutter Court, universities implementing race-conscious programs “cannot 
establish quotas for members of certain racial groups or put members of those  groups on separate 
admission tracks. . . . Nor can universities insulate applicants who belong  to certain racial or ethnic 
groups from the competition for admission.” 539 U.S. at 334 (internal citations omitted). 
 405. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.803. 
 406. The district court in Fisher noted: “Before their candidacies are evaluated, all applicants to UT 
are divided into three pools: Texas residents, domestic non-Texas residents and international students. . . 
. Students compete only against other students in their respective pools for admission.” 645 F. Supp. 2d 
at 595 (internal citations omitted). 
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for solutions to address the issues of social integration and fuller inclusion of ethno-
racial minorities.407 I am not advocating the wholesale adoption of 
antidiscrimination and pro-equality strategies developed in one nation by another 
nation. I know and expect that even though a policy developed in France could be 
potentially effective if adopted by the United States, the policy will be 
deconstructed and reformulated, as necessary, to take into account the 
particularities of a country and to fit the contours of the social and juridical 
landscape. In this section, my goal is to draw some conclusions regarding the 
potential sharing of strategies to tackle issues that are germane to both the United 
States and France. 
A. What the Sciences Po’s Approach to Affirmative Action Can Teach the United 
States 
One of the most compelling aspects of the Sciences Po’s plan and, more 
broadly, France’s equality project, is the challenge to try to think outside of ethno-
racial classifications. France offers a testing ground for this approach. France’s 
form of affirmative action, via the Sciences Po, provides the United States with an 
opportunity to monitor the results that can be achieved when a modern Western 
society holds steadfast to the position that ethno-racial categories will not be 
formally acknowledged or relied upon in designing affirmative action policies. The 
Sciences Po’s approach reflects France’s postulate that an equal, non-race-based 
society should not codify the language of ethnic-racial difference in that society’s 
socio-economic policies. Accordingly, policymakers who seek to address racial 
disparity should not have to worry about finding ways to excise ethno-racial 
language from the laws once ethnic-racial balance is achieved and discrimination is 
eradicated. In such a paradigm, it will be unnecessary to address the sunset 
provision issue that arises in the United States. If applied in the United States, such 
a policy’s lack of explicit reference to race would obviate the need to assess 
whether the policy has a clearly delineated durational endpoint.408 Further, there 
would not be tension between the proposed affirmative action policy and 
constitutional language which requires, for example, the “equality of all citizens 
before the law, without distinction of origin, race, or religion”409 or that “[n]o state 
 407. Legal scholar Gwénaële Calvès’ words are exemplary of this resistance: 
We can’t simply import a technique or method we’ve come across in another country and, 
with the help of this “magic wand,” solve the problem of discrimination in our own country. 
To imagine that we can is to depoliticize the issue. Discrimination tells us something about 
the society from which it has arisen; and French society is not American society. Can we 
really abstract from the fundamental differences—historical, political, economic, and social 
differences—between France and the U.S. and transfer this or that technique, considered in 
isolation? I do not think so, and so I reiterate my assessment of a decade ago: there is 
nothing that France can learn from the U.S. as far as antidiscrimination is concerned. 
Interview with Gwénaële Calvès, supra note 79. While I share Professor Calvès’ concerns and recognize 
the need to evaluate the initiatives proposed, I disagree with her conclusion. 
 408. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342. 
 409. 1958 CONST. art. 1 (Fr.). 
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shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws.”410 
The Sciences Po’s CEP approach also suggests that focusing on economic 
class or geographic location, given the prevailing ethno-racial segregation in 
housing, are more useful markers, than ethnicity or race, of socio-economic 
disparities; therefore, a program could rely upon these factors and still be effective 
without offending the principle of equality.411 Some parallels may be drawn 
between the ethno-racial housing segregation in the United States and France. In 
both countries, where one lives can significantly impact one’s access to quality 
schools, jobs, and other precious resources.412 So, to the extent that a plan can be 
designed to counteract the concomitant negative aspects of locale, such a plan 
should be encouraged. The Texas Plan already appropriates the (negative) fact of 
segregation for the positive purpose of increasing ethno-racial minority admissions 
to post-secondary schools.413 While percentage plans may not work in all regions of 
the United States, some consideration should be given to expanding this geographic 
approach if it would help to achieve the goals of eliminating disparities in the 
quality of education and access to education opportunities for underrepresented 
ethno-racial minorities. Regarding using economic class as a proxy, France’s 
emphasis on this factor converges with the rising sentiment in some U.S. quarters 
that Americans find class preferences more acceptable than ethno-racial ones414 and 
thus, schemes designed to target students who suffer economic disadvantages are 
less likely to provoke constitutional challenges. Further, because there is a 
disturbing degree of overlap between economic status and the underrepresented 
 410. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 411. Adopting the approach of concentrating on other factors (e.g., housing demographics) holds 
some promise for success and is in keeping with the views expressed by Justice Kennedy in his 
concurring opinion in Parents Involved, wherein he suggested that school boards could “draw[] 
attendance zones with general recognition of the demographics of neighborhoods” as an alternative, 
constitutionally-permissible strategy for achieving ethno-racial diversity in schools. 551 U.S. at 789 
(Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 412. See Richard Fry & Paul Taylor, The Rise of Residential Segregation by Income, PEW RES. CTR. 
(2012), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2012/08/Rise-of-Residential-Income-Segregation-
2012.2.pdf (discussing the rise of residential segregation by income in the United States); Florence 
Goffette-Nagot & Yves Schaeffe, Income Segregation and Suburbanization in France: A Discrete 
Choice Approach, GROUPE D’ANALYSE DE THÉORIE ÉCONOMIQUE LYON - ST ÉTIENNE (Mar. 30, 
2011), http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/58/11/39/PDF/1112.pdf (discussing residential 
segregation by income in France). 
 413. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.803. 
 414. See RICHARD KAHLENBERG, REWARDING STRIVERS 179 (2010) (advocating a class-based 
approach to affirmative action rather than an ethno-race-based focus); RICHARD KAHLENBERG, THE 
REMEDY: CLASS, RACE AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 83 (1996) (arguing for class-based affirmative 
action); Richard Kahlenberg, Is Affirmative Action Headed Back to the Supreme Court?, CHRON. 
HIGHER EDUC. (June 21, 2011), http://chronicle.com/blogs/innovations/is-affirmative-action-headed-
back-to-the-supreme-court/29699 (discussing that more people believe they are divided by income and 
not race); Richard Kahlenberg, Reactions: Is it Time for Class-Based Affirmative Action?, CHRON. 
HIGHER EDUC. (Dec. 16, 2009), http://chronicle.com/article/Reactions-Is-It-Time-for/62615/ (explaining 
the expectation that trends will shift toward income based affirmative action). 
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ethno-racial minorities that schools seek to target,415 a proxy focusing on class is 
likely to address the intended groups that a race-conscious affirmative action policy 
would also capture. While class-based affirmative action may serve with limited 
effectiveness some of the same goals as ethno-race-based programs, it is important 
to take care that the outcomes of increased ethno-racial diversity and access to 
education for underrepresented minorities are not, ultimately, subordinated.416 
Depending upon the statistics regarding lower income underrepresented minorities 
in comparison with lower income whites, programs that only focus on class may 
end up primarily benefitting white majority lower-income students.417 While 
alleviating class disparities is also an important objective, it would mean that the 
goal of equality in education for certain ethno-racial minorities is once again 
thwarted. 
B.  What Texas’ Approach to Affirmative Action Can Teach France 
The history of affirmative action policies in education in the United States 
suggests that in order for such policies to have a substantial impact and for the 
citizenry to accept them, the policies must be undertaken at the national as well as 
local levels. France needs to create national strategies for addressing issues of 
ethno-racial exclusion and discrimination. 
In the move towards nationalizing affirmative action equal education policies, 
France may conclude that the percentage plan offers substantial promise as a 
vehicle to increase access to its colleges and universities without explicitly 
referencing ethno-racial criteria. The Ten Percent Plan demonstrates that 
percentage plans can work to increase the admission of underrepresented ethno-
racial minorities to elite academic universities thereby assisting in the process of 
equalizing educational opportunities. Not surprisingly, U.S. percentage plans have 
already come to the attention of France because of their emphasis on high school 
rank and geographic location.418 Several prominent advocates have lobbied the 
 415. A recent study by the Pew Research Center reports that the “[m]edian wealth of whites is now 
20 times that of black households and 18 times that of Hispanic households.” Sabrina Tavernise, 
Recession Study Finds Hispanics Hit the Hardest, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/26/us/26hispanics.html (citing Paul Taylor et al., Twenty-to-One: 
Wealth Gaps Rise to Record Highs Between Whites, Blacks, and Hispanics, PEW RES. CTR., 5 (July 26, 
2011), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2011/07/SDT-Wealth-Report_7-26-11_FINAL.pdf). 
 416. Carl Irving, There’s No Valid Surrogate for Race, NAT’L CTR. FOR PUB. POL’Y & HIGHER 
EDUC. (May 1998), http://www.highereducation.org/crosstalk/ct0598/news0598-race.shtml. 
 417. Numerous scholars in the United States have been critical of adopting class-based approaches 
over race-conscious ones. See, e.g., Carson Byrd et al., Class-Based Policies Are Not a Remedy for 
Racial Inequality, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Sept. 25, 2011), http://chronicle.com/article/Class-Based -
Policies-Are-Not-a/129097 (explaining that class cannot serve as a proxy for race and ethnicity). 
 418. The French-American Foundation, in 2007, sent a special delegation to the United States 
charging the participants with the task of learning more about the structure, operation, and success of 
percentage plans in California and Texas. The Equality of Opportunity Program Initiative on Selective 
Higher Education, FRENCH-AM. FOUND., 1 (2008), 
http://www.frenchamerican.org/sites/default/files/documents/media_reports/percentageplans_brief_en.p
df. The delegation produced a report on their observations and recommendations for France. 
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government to adopt percentage plans as part of its project to develop pro-equality 
policies.419 Sarkozy even proposed that for the preparatory courses necessary to 
succeed on the concours, and required by some grandes écoles, all students in the 
top 5% of their high school classes be admitted to the courses.420 While this 
proposal, if approved, does not entirely address the problem of access to quality 
academic institutions at the postsecondary education level, it has the potential to 
increase the pool of underrepresented minority candidates for the exclusive 
schools.421 In pursuing this proxy strategy of the percentage plan, in order to 
accurately assess whether the outcomes of increased ethno-racial diversity and 
access are being met, the government will need to allow for the collection of ethno-
racial statistics. Statistical data will help evaluate how the program is impacting the 
proxy’s main target population (that is, “students from racial-ethnic or recent 
immigrant backgrounds”).422 Being transparent about the outcomes of an initiative 
is important. 
Finally, in terms of what lessons the U.S. experience holds for France, just as 
France provides the United States with a focal point to view whether the absence of 
the formal recognition of ethno-racial categories results in the outcomes desired, 
the United States offers an example of whether the use of ethno-racial categories 
affords any positives in terms of social policies. For France, Texas’ reintroduction 
of ethno-racial criteria is particularly worthy of note. 
VII. THE LIMITS OF PROXY STRATEGIES 
While I believe proxy strategies should be supported because they have 
achieved some positive results regarding the goals of attaining equality of 
education in France and the United States, my endorsement is given along with 
some caveats and suggestions. 
A.  The Potential Danger of Disguising Objectives 
First, it is critical to be clear in terms of the outcomes being sought and the 
rationales underlying the policies implemented. That way, if modifications need to 
Promouvoir l’égalité des chances dans l’enseignement supérieur sélectif: l’expérience américaine des 
percentage plans et sa pertinence dans le contexte français [Promoting Equal Opportunity in Selective 
Higher Education: The American Experience with Percentage Plans and its Relevance for the French 
Context], FRENCH-AM. FOUND., 1 (2007), 
http://www.frenchamerican.org/sites/default/files/documents/media_reports/percentageplans_report_fr.p
df. 
 419. Interview by Daniel Sabbagh with Richard François Héran, FRENCH-AM. FOUND., 12 (2010), 
http://equality.frenchamerican.org/sites/default/files/herantranscript_en.pdf. 
 420. The Equality of Opportunity Program Initiative on Selective Higher Education, FRENCH-AM. 
FOUND., supra note 418, at 1. 
 421. A future potential avenue may be to introduce a percentage plan that would have a more direct 
impact ensuring that a substantial number of underrepresented ethno-racial minorities are actually 
granted admission to the elite institutions and not merely admission to the preparatory course needed to 
take the exam in order to qualify for admission to the grandes écoles. Id. 
 422. Id. 
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be made in the event the objectives are not being met, there is less of a chance that 
the original purposes will be muddled and redirected towards other goals. For 
example, if there is a charge, like that of Patricia Ohlendorf’s regarding the Ten 
Percent Plan, that an academic institution’s policy is operating in some way to 
hinder the number of ethno-racial minorities admitted or that the policy fails to 
maintain (or to increase) minority admissions over time,423 it is less likely that the 
original goals (that is, diversity and equal access for underrepresented minorities) 
can be supplanted by others or subordinated. The CEP plan is operating on a much 
smaller scale than the Texas scheme. It is being administered by an elite school, 
rather than on a regional or national level. While the change in scale does not alter 
my recommendation of maintaining clarity in the outcomes, the difference in the 
application of the Sciences Po’s plan means that there is latitude for the school to 
make sure that its objectives (stated and unstated) are met. The problem that I 
allude to will become more a reality for France if programs, like the one at the 
Sciences Po, are expanded across regions and embraced by the government. Then, 
the act of disguising the objectives of ethno-racial diversity and access as ones of 
geographic and class diversification will likely limit what programs framed in this 
manner can ultimately accomplish. 
B.  Drawbacks to Relying Upon Socio-Economic and Housing Segregation as 
Part of the Solution 
Second, it is important not to become complacent with a strategy just because 
it yields some positive results. U.S. and French schools and policymakers should 
attempt to create alternatives to percentage plans and the CEP initiative that do not 
rely upon what may be perceived as a social negative (for example, persistent 
socio-economic disparities and housing segregation) for the proxy. Both proxy 
strategies depend upon the continuation of ethnically and racially-segregated 
housing patterns and, thus, help to legitimate those patterns.424 Both plans 
recognize and play upon the “interdependence” between race, poverty, and 
marginalization.425 As a consequence, even though the schemes are facially neutral 
and appear to be egalitarian, the policies are, arguably, complicit in maintaining 
continued ethno-racial social fracturing. This is a problem if the United States and 
France believe that a healthier society is one that has substantial ethno-racial 
interactions and that society should work towards decreasing this type of 
segregation. On the other hand, one could argue that to the extent the proxy 
strategies improve ethnic and racial social interactions at the college level, and 
 423. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner at 38-40, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 132 S. Ct. 1536 (No. 
11-345), 2012 WL 1882759 (characterizing the statistical gains in diversity attributable to Texas’ 
percentage plan as “infintesimal” and not narrowly tailored). 
 424. See Michelle Adams, Isn’t it Ironic? The Central Paradox at the Heart of “Percentage Plans,” 
62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1729, 1730 (2011) (discussing the reality that percentage plans can only have a positive 
effect on minority enrollment if housing is firmly segregated). 
 425. Id. at 1747 (explaining the interdependent relationship between percentage plans and racial 
housing segregation); Kimberlé Crenshaw, Race, Reform and Retrenchment: Transformation and 
Legitimation in Anti-Discrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1352 (1988). 
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hopefully later in the employment sector, the good accomplished mitigates any 
potential harm. 
C.  The Problem with Coded Language  
Third, while I ultimately weigh in favor of the use of proxy strategies, it is 
important to register my uneasiness with the apparent necessity to pursue equality 
in education for underrepresented ethno-racial minorities by this surrogate method. 
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Ginsberg’s sentiment that transparency is better at 
fostering equality of opportunity than programs that operate to “achiev[e] similar 
numbers through winks, nods, and disguises”426 resonates, to some degree, with my 
own. My discomfort is related to my position that neither the United States nor 
France is experiencing a post-racial historical moment. Residence, the location of 
high schools, and economic status can serve as somewhat effective proxies for race 
because the societal ill of racism has had a substantial impact on where people live, 
attend school, and obtain employment,427 and because racism still exists.428 The 
proxy is popular, in part, because there is a prevailing denial of the relationship 
between race and racism. The proxy allows people to speak in terms of geographic 
location and high school rank instead of the uncomfortable language of ethnicity, 
race, and racism. The proxy strategy also makes the goals of ethno-racial diversity 
and increased access to education more difficult to attain because it is necessary to 
continuously come up with coded constructs to do so.429 The use of coded language 
requires vigilant monitoring to ensure that the school’s equity in education and 
diversity objectives are being met.430 
CONCLUSION 
The question of how to achieve equal access to educational opportunities is 
one that continues to be heavily debated. At the time of writing this article the 
United States Supreme Court had not yet granted certiorari to hear the Fisher case. 
The Court’s agreement to hear the case signals that the American legal landscape is 
in flux regarding matters of education and ethno-racial diversity. The Fisher 
 426. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 304 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting). 
 427. See N.R. Kleinfield, ‘Why Don’t We Have Any White Kids?,’ N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/13/education/at-explore-charter-school-a-portrait-of-segregated-
education.html (exploring the persistence of racially segregated schools); Jonathan Roswell, Housing 
Costs, Zoning, and Access to High-Scoring Schools, BROOKINGS INST. REP. (April 19, 2012), 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2012/04/19-school-inequality-rothwell (exploring the 
connections between segregated schools, housing, and zoning regulations). 
 428. See Ian F. Haney Lopez, Post-Racial Racism: Racial Stratification and Mass Incarceration in 
the Age of Obama, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1023, 1072 (2010) (discussing racial disparities that result from 
continuing patterns of racism). 
 429. Bell, Diversity’s Distractions, supra note 176, at 1622 (discussing Supreme Court rulings that 
have enabled policy makers to avoid tackling issues of race and class). 
 430. Id. (discussing the extra litigation invited by the term diversity, which, in comparison to race, 
offers “a distinction without a real difference”). 
 
172 TEMPLE POLITICAL & CIVIL RIGHTS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:1 
decision will dramatically influence the strategies that schools can adopt in 
pursuing equality in college admissions. Regardless of the outcome of the case, the 
importance of the topic means that the intense polemics will continue. This paper is 
essential to the ongoing discussions in that it provides guidance on how to think 
through solutions to the issues in different juridical landscapes. 
This article critically evaluates and compares two key proxy strategies that 
have been adopted by higher education institutions in France and the United States 
to achieve ethno-racial diversity and increase educational opportunities for 
underrepresented minorities. It further examines the legal environments in which 
the strategies arose. The histories of the United States and France concerning 
certain ethno-racial minorities require that both countries move beyond the 
emphasis on formal equality in order to extend to those minorities substantial and 
meaningful opportunities to attend quality post-secondary education institutions. 
The United States’ troubled history is defined by slavery, de jure and de facto 
segregation, and the marginalization of racial minorities, in particular, African 
Americans, Latinos, and Native Americans. Similarly, in France, the history of 
slavery in the empire and colonization of parts of Africa are at the root of many 
current issues plaguing the nation regarding the African French minority 
population. These oppressive histories must be taken into account when 
formulating education policies. 
Recent events in France suggest that now more than ever it is open to finding 
ways of fully including ethno-racial minorities (e.g., the African French population) 
into mainstream French society. The government and academic institutions, like the 
Sciences Po, are appropriately focusing on the key areas of education, employment, 
and government as crucial sectors that if opened up will help pave the way towards 
bringing France more in conformity with its egalitarian ideals. Despite the 
shortcomings and the fact that the scale of the Sciences Po’s CEP program cannot 
adequately address the enormity of the problem, the school’s effort is a crucial step 
towards tackling the current socio-economic inequities that the African French 
community is experiencing. The CEP program is one that should be expanded and 
serve as a model for other equalizing initiatives in French society. 
In Texas the Ten Percent Plan performed the critical role of permitting Texas 
colleges and universities to maintain minority student admissions during precarious 
times; however, the constraints of the program mean that it ultimately stymies 
progress towards the goal of attaining and improving access to post-secondary 
institutions for underrepresented minorities. The University of Texas’ reliance upon 
a mix of strategies (ethno-racial criteria and the percentage plan) offers a more 
effective approach for wrestling with the challenging issues of access and equality 
of educational opportunity and, as such, should be considered by other jurisdictions 
and countries, including France. 
The overall lesson for both the United States and France is to continue to be 
nimble and flexible in devising ways to address the challenging issue of equal 
educational opportunity and to remember that if groups of people experience de 
facto ethno-racial discrimination and marginalization, the methods proposed for 
countering this experience cannot wholly rely upon so-called “race-neutral” criteria 
because the substantive harms, including denial of a valuable life-changing 
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education, will be obscured by a dazzling cloak of formal equality. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL COUNCIL 
DECISION 2001-450 DC, July 11, 2001, Rec. 82431 
 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COUNCIL . . . 
31. Considering that paragraph I of article 14 of the referred law 
adds . . . to the Education Code an article L. 621-3, which provides: 
“The governing board of the Institute of Political Studies of Paris 
may determine, by derogation from the provisions of the third 
paragraph of article L. 612-3, the conditions and procedures for 
admission to the Institute’s programs as well as the organization of 
its programs of study for the first cycles of its doctoral program. It 
may adopt admissions procedures that include particular modalities 
aimed at assuring the recruitment of a diverse student body from 
among undergraduate students. The admissions procedures may be 
implemented by way of agreements concluded with French or 
foreign secondary or higher educational institutions, in order to 
involve them in the Institute’s recruitment of their pupils or 
students”; 
32. Considering that, according to paragraph 13 of the Preamble of 
the Constitution 1946: “The Nation guarantees equal access for 
children and adults to instruction, vocational training and culture . . 
.”; 
33. Considering that, even if it is permissible for the legislature to 
derogate from the provisions of the third paragraph of article L. 612 
– 3 of the Education Code for the purpose of allowing diversification 
of access of undergraduate students to the Institute’s programs, it is 
only on the condition that the particular modalities that the governing 
board of the Institute establishes, subject to judicial review, are based 
on objective criteria of a nature to guarantee respect for the 
constitutional requirement of equal access to education; that, with 
this reservation, article 14 conforms to the Constitution . . . . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 431. Constitutional Court decision No. 2001-450DC, supra note 28. 
 
